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Epigraph 
In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential, than that permanent, inveterate antipathies 
against particular Nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of 
them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The Nation, which indulges towards 
another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity 
or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in 
one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes 
of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. 
Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The Nation, prompted by ill-will and 
resentment, sometimes impels to war the Government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The 
Government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason 
would reject; at other times, it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility 
instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes 
perhaps the liberty, of Nations has been the victim.  
So likewise, a passionate attachment of one Nation for another produces a variety of evils. 
Sympathy for the favorite Nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where 
no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a 
participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. It leads 
also to concessions to the favorite Nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the 
Nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by 
exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are 
withheld. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to the favorite 
nation,) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even 
with popularity; gilding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference 
for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, 
corruption, or infatuation.  
As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming 
to the truly enlightened and independent Patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with 
domestic factions, to practise the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the Public 
Councils! Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to 
be the satellite of the latter.  
Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens,) the 
jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake; since history and experience prove, that foreign 
influence is one of the most baneful foes of Republican Government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must 
be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defence against 
it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they 
actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. 
Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while 
its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests.    






The United States and Israel have developed one of the most unique and 
unusual, and indeed “special” political alliances in modern history.  This alliance 
that exists on many levels:  political, military, economic, religious and cultural.  
This alliance is at the crux of American involvement in the Middle East and a 
cause of great concern throughout the Arab and Islamic world.  It helps define 
America’s role in the world and Israel’s unique status in the Middle East.  It is an 
alliance with broad bipartisan support, but one that is also widely criticized, 
because of the difficulties it creates for the United States. 
While literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on this 
unique alliance, it remains in many ways a poorly understood phenomenon.  
Competing theories and explanations remain deeply tied to allegiances and 
opinions around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Many of them are more about 
efforts to influence American policy in the Middle East rather than to deconstruct 
and understand and explain its origins and continuity. 
The following study is an attempt to separate myth from reality and to 
understand how it is that Americans view Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and how American perceptions and misperceptions of that reality have 
defined the contours of American foreign policy in the Middle East undermined 
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The “special relationship” between the United States and the State of Israel cannot 
be fully explained by conventional realist analysis of so-called “hard factors” such as 
strategic importance and economic; nor can it be fully explained using pluralist theory by 
the influence of the pro-Israel lobby.  The U.S.-Israel relationship, which was initially 
established as a strategic partnership, has quietly metamorphosed into an alliance that 
while still nominally rationalized as a strategic has actually becoming deeply rooted in 
American politics and political culture. 
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In order to fully explain this unique alliance, which has shaped much of American 
foreign policy in the Middle East and most particularly American policy towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process over the past several decades it is necessary to consider 
“soft factors” most especially cultural, historical, moral, political, and ideological 
components of the relationship. These often-overlooked factors contribute to a political 
culture which strengthens the alliance between the United States and Israel and further 
reinforces American values and identity.  American strategic priorities in the Middle East 
are defined by a context of cultural intimacy that has been established between the two 
countries rather than Israel’s actual strategic value to the United States.   
The result is that American policy in the Middle East has often been inconsistent 
with America’s publicly stated overall strategic goals.  Often the alliance has ended up 
undermining goals like political and economic stability that it was originally intended to 
enhance.  The political imperatives that often seem to govern American commitment to 
Israel are actually better explained as the results of deeply-rooted cultural and moral 
interpretations about Israel and its relationships with its neighbors.  Thus it is the 
America’s constructed perceptions of the reality of Israel rather than the actual reality of 
the Middle East that defines the U.S. relationship with the Israel and the broader Middle 
East.  This study is an attempt to analyze how mass political culture influences the ideas 
and values, and ultimately the actions, of the political elite, which have shaped American 
policy towards Israel and more broadly the entire Middle East. 
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Introduction – Defining the Nature of the U.S.-Israel “Special Relationship” 
“Many, even all relationships are special, George Orwell might 
have said, had Animal Farm been a foreign ministry.  But some 
relationships are more special than others.  Some relationships are 
born special, Shakespeare might have added, had Twelfth Night 
been a policy planning staff.  But some achieve their specialness, 
while others have it thrust upon them” 
The United States’ relationship with the State of Israel is different from every 
other foreign policy relationship that the United States has developed during past half-
century.  Two thoughtful observers commented that the U.S.-Israel relationship “has 
come to be one of the strongest, if strangest, in history.”2  This “special relationship” is so 
unique that it requires a serious scholarly inquiry to explain.  Recently, John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt stirred great controversy in their critical examination of 
“The Israel Lobby” in which they said the U.S.-Israel alliance has become the 
“centerpiece of US Middle Eastern policy.”  They added that “this situation has no equal 
in American political history.”3  Unfortunately, the vast majority of the research that has 
been conducted on this subject has been designed, either explicitly or implicitly, to serve 
as academic polemics in the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than efforts to promote a serious 
academic discourse.  The politicization of this academic discourse has obscured many of 
                                                 
1
  Schoenbaum, David.  “Commentary: More Special than Others.”  Diplomatic 
History.  (Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring, 1998): 274. 
2
  Melman, Yossi & Dan Raviv.  Friends in Deeds: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance.  
(New York: Hyperion, 1994): xiv 
3 Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt.  “The Israel Lobby.” London Review of 




the serious issues surrounding American foreign policymaking in the Middle East, which 
is often left to drift amidst the political crossfire.   
Since 1970, and especially since 1980, the United States has maintained a 
practically unprecedented patron-client relationship with the State of Israel.4  David 
Schoenbaum notes that it is, “hard to think of many cases where relations between a very 
big, powerful and ambivalent patron, and a very small, dependent, but resourceful and 
resolute client have left equivalent marks on the region, and even the world.”5 American 
decision-making in the region has often been based on the implicit (and sometimes 
explicit) assumption of a near-total convergence of American and Israeli national 
interests.  This assumption, which has been especially strong under the Clinton and 
George W. Bush administrations,6 is more of a convenient political construction than a 
strategic reality.  This implicit assumption has become a type of political gospel with the 
rise of the foreign policy neo-conservatives as the dominant force in American foreign 
policy during the Bush/Cheney administration.  In other words, American policy in the 
region often seems to operate on the presumption that positions taken by the government 
                                                 
4 This study is focusing solely on the patron (the U.S.) rather than the client 
(Israel).  While there is a complicated debate about Israel’s goals around the peace 
process, there seems to be little debate about Israel’s goals in seeking a close and 
supportive economic, military, and diplomatic relationship with the United States in order 
to strengthen its security vis-à-vis its various regional adversaries.   
 
5
  Schoenbaum, David.  “Commentary: More Special than Others.” Diplomatic 
History.  (Volume 22, Number 2, Spring 1988): 280. 
6 This study will refer to the 41st President, who served from 1989 to 1993, as 




of Israel are automatically in the best interest of the United States.  In colloquial terms, it 
appears to be a case of the Israeli tail wagging the American dog.  The current 
administration has in many ways fallen into all of the entanglements of “passionate 
attachments” that George Washington warned against during in his above-cited Farewell 
Address in 1796. 
Since the term “special relationship”-- which was first used to describe the Anglo-
American relationship after 1940 -- has become rather ambiguous in both its political and 
academic usages, it is necessary to define why so many observers view this relationship 
as unique, if not unprecedented in the history of American foreign policy.  In order to do 
this it is useful to turn to a description of the alliance written just before the end of the 
Cold War.  Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov writes that: 
The special relationship thesis generally maintains that the United States 
and Israel have a unique and unparalleled partnership, with high levels of 
friendship, amity, trust, and political and military cooperation.  Each side 
occupies a special position in the other’s domestic and foreign polices.  
The relationship is not limited to decision makers but also involves the 
two societies, which ensures its endurance in times of conflict.... the U.S.-
Israeli relationship became “special,” different from what is common 
between two states, especially a superpower and a small state in a patron-
client relationship.  It became, in other words, a special patron-client 
relationship, characterized by common political, ideological, security, and 
strategic interests, that is, a community of strategic interests; common 
values and ideals, that is, a community of values; an informal political and 
military alliance; and reciprocal relations, that is routine exchanges of 
tangible and intangible goods and services and shared perceptions of what 
was mutually beneficial.7 
                                                 
7
  Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov.  “The United States and Israel since 1948: A “Special 




Far more succinctly and eloquently, Winston Churchill described the aforementioned 
Anglo-American relationship in terms that are perhaps even more applicable to the U.S.-
Israel relationship; Churchill eloquently summarized that the two parties to a special 
relationship had “faith in each other’s purpose, hope in each other’s future, and charity 
towards each other’s shortcomings.”8  There is little doubt that is this sort of relationship 
that has evolved between the United States and Israel. 
 
Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid -- roughly $3 billion per year with 
some variations.9  U.S. foreign aid to Israel between 1949-2005 totals just over $96 
billion.10  If this is adjusted for inflation, the figure comes to approximately $187 billion 
in 2007 dollars.11 (See Appendix A and accompanying graphic below.) By one accounting 
                                                 
8
 Reich, Bernard. Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the 
Cold War.  (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1995): 3. Reich also applies this quote to 
the U.S.-Israel relationship. 
9
  Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. In a sense, the high 
level of U.S. aid to Egypt is also an indirect result of the “special relationship” with 
Israel.  Large scale aid to Israel began after the U.S.-negotiated Camp David Accords in 
1979.  The U.S. provides aid to Egypt in large part to help keep Egypt at peace with 
Israel. 
10
  Curtiss, Richard.  “The Subject No One Mentions.” The Link.  (Volume 30, 
Issue 4, January, 1998):  3.  Curtiss’s figures are taken from a report by the Congressional 
Research Service.  Aruri, Naseer.  The Obstruction of Peace: The United States, Israel, 
and the Palestinians. (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995):  85.  Aruri’s figures 
are slightly different; he offers a figure of $79 billion for the years 1949-1995.  Mark, 
Clyde R.  Israel: US Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, Updated April 
26, 2005 
11  Subsequent research indicated that the US Agency for International 
Development pegged the total in constant 2005 dollars from 1946 to 2005 at $154 billion.  
Presumably USAID was using a different method to calculate inflation than that used by 
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USAID website estimates that Israel received about $94 billion of $677 billion -- roughly 
14% -- of all the foreign aid distributed by the United States between 1946 and 2005.  In 
both aid dollars and especially in per capita terms, this is far higher than any other foreign 
aid recipient.   Israel receives large amounts of U.S. foreign aid despite the fact that it can 
no longer be defined as developing country like practically every other recipient of 
American foreign aid.  Furthermore, whereas other recipients of U.S. economic aid have 
a large contingent of U.S. personnel assigned to them to supervise the distribution of the 
aid, there is no such presence in Israel.  Israel actually supervises its own foreign aid.12  
Israel’s foreign aid package is so politically secure, that there is no constituency in 
Congress for reducing it.  Rather the task fell to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu to propose to the U.S. Congress that they adopt a proposal that would 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal Reserve which has been applied in Appendix A.  USAID figures can be obtained 
from the constant and historical dollar calculations for Israel from 
http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/  Incidentally the figure for U.S. government aid to the West 
Bank/Gaza Strip from 1946-2005 is roughly $1.65 billion in constant 2005 dollars 
(Source: USAID website).  Also in constant dollars, USAID’s website indicates that 
Israel’s $154 billion is almost half (47%) of the $327 billion in aid the U.S. has provided 
to the entire Middle East from 1946 to 2005. Of the $173 billion in aid going to other 
Middle East countries, $93 billion (28% of the total) has gone to Egypt – mostly since 
1979 Camp David Accords.  Another $20 billion (6% of the total) has gone to Iraq – 
almost all of that since the 2002 American invasion.  Another 5% of the total -- $16 
billion --  has gone to Jordan.  Another 11.6 billion (4%) went to Iran – mostly under the 
Shah.  Israel’s $154 billion is about 9.4% of $1.65 trillion dollars in all U.S. foreign aid 
between from 1946 to 2005.  By comparison, the U.S. spent only $119 billion on foreign 
aid to all of Latin America during the same period or roughly equivalent to the $152 




  This was noted by the author during a summer 1994 internship in the Inspector 
General’s Office of the U.S. Agency for International Development.  It’s is also worth 
nothing that much of the military aid used to buy US weapons systems. 
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gradually wean Israel from American economic aid while partially compensating for it 
through an increase in military aid.  Speaking to a joint session of U.S. Congress in 1996, 
Netanyahu explained to the members of Congress that though Israel was very grateful to 
the U.S. for its generosity that it had now grown up and no longer required quite so much 
assistance from the United States Congress: 
Finally, permit me briefly to remark on our future economic relationship. 
The United States has given Israel -- how can I tell it to this body? The 
United States has given Israel, apart from political and military support, 
munificent and magnificent assistance in the economic sphere. With 
America’s help, Israel has grown to be a powerful, modern state. I believe 
that we can now say that Israel has reached childhood’s end, that it has 
matured enough to begin approaching a state of self-reliance….We are 
deeply grateful for all we have received from the United States, for all that 
we have received from this chamber, from this body.  But I believe there 
can be no greater tribute to America’s long-standing economic aid to 
Israel than for us to be able to say:  We are going to achieve economic 
independence. We are going to do it.  In the next four years, we will begin 
the long-term process of gradually reducing the level of your generous 
economic assistance to Israel. I am convinced that our economic policies 
will lay the foundation for total self-reliance and great economic strength.13 
                                                 
13

















































 In actuality, while the promised reductions in Israel’s standard foreign aid have 
taken place, the primary aid package has been enhanced by a supplemental aid packages 
including over a billion dollars to support implementation of the U.S.-brokered 1998 Wye 
River Agreement.  There is a great likelihood that a final Israeli-Palestinian peace deal 
would result in an additional multi-billion dollar supplemental aid package as happened 
with the Camp David Accords and the Wye Agreement.  Over the past decade, the level 
of economic aid to Israel has dropped while the level of military aid has been increased 
by about half of the decrease in economic aid.  The process is leading to the phasing out 
of the economic aid component. 
                                                 
14 Supporting data for the above chart is drawn from Jeremy Sharp, “U.S. Foreign 
Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service, Updated January 5, 2006.  The detailed 
data supporting this chart is contained in Appendix A.  
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8124:1.  Inflation 






Israel also continues to be the beneficiary of nearly unprecedented military and 
intelligence cooperation, as well as hi-tech weapon sales designed to maintain Israel’s 
“qualitative edge” over its adversaries.  Few, if any, other countries have been able to buy 
so many sophisticated U.S. weapons systems.   
One area where the United States has expressed a great deal of   “charity 
towards... [Israel’s] shortcomings” is the issue of proliferation of non-conventional 
weapons.  With most other countries, the United States has followed a strict policy of 
encouraging non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  The U.S. claimed that its invasion of Iraq in 2003 was because of its belief that 
Iraq was developing WMD.  The current administration has supported sanctions against 
Iran, because of the fears of Iranian nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.  In mid-
1998, the U.S. imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan when they exploded nuclear 
weapons.  The U.S. has harshly criticized Chinese and North Korean efforts to export 
nuclear technology to unfriendly states in the region. 
Indeed, in the early days of the relationship before it became “special,” Presidents 
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all attempted to pressure Israel not to “go nuclear.”  
One of the reasons that Kennedy and Johnson approved weapons sales to Israel was to 
provide the Israelis with enough of a conventional deterrent so that it would stop their 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.   And yet, the U.S. now seems to have a “special” policy 
towards Israeli nuclear proliferation.  The U.S. appears to have adopted a “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” policy towards Israel’s development of a large, although always officially 
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unacknowledged, nuclear program.15  Avner Cohen describes how Israel has been able to 
maintain a policy of “nuclear opacity;” by opacity, Cohen means that Israel’s nuclear 
policy is “shrouded in secrecy, officially unacknowledged, and insulated from domestic 
Israeli politics.”16  Over the last 35 years, there has been little or no pressure by the United 
States to restrict Israel’s nuclear development or to encourage it to become part of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime in part, because the policy remains in the peculiar limbo 
of an unofficially unacknowledged open secret.  On a related note, the United States 
rarely questions Israeli efforts to export sensitive technology to states that are unfriendly 
to the United States.17 
While there have been ups and downs in the relationship, the United States has 
repeatedly defended Israel’s interests, both diplomatically and militarily, when its 
security has been threatened. The relationship has a certain elasticity that allows it to 
overcome difficult times.  Bernard Reich has argued that:  
Endurance and resilience are trademarks of this special relationship, the 
hallmark of which is the ability to endure crises in which the parties have 
conflicting interests.  There are often are periods of coolness and discord 
                                                 
15
  Hersh, Seymour M. The Sampson Option Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and 
American Foreign Policy. (New York: Random House, 1991).  Also see Reich: 55-58. 
16
  Cohen, Avner.  Israel and the Bomb.  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998): 1.  Cohen’s book provides a comprehensive political history of the development of 
Israel’s nuclear opacity from 1950 to 1970. 
 
17  A controversy in early 2000 over the sale of sophisticated Israeli radar to the 
People’s Republic of China was notable because it was so unusual in the history of U.S.-
Israeli relations.  The sale was canceled in mid-July 2000 after strong objections by the 




on specific issues, but because of the relationship’s fundamentals the 
United States and Israel come together again for mutual advantage.  In this 
sense, the United States and Israel have a familial linkage -- it is intimate 
and intense, and each is involved in the affairs of the other.18 
The most dramatic such cases were the U.S. airlift during the Yom Kippur War in 
1973 and the dispatching of American Patriot Missile crews to defend Israel from Iraqi 
scuds during the 1991 Gulf War. While a mutual defense treaty has never been signed in 
order to formalize the “special relationship,” it has long been understood that America is 
committed to Israel’s security and defense.  There are numerous Memorandums of 
Understanding that have been signed that codify U.S.-Israeli cooperation in a slightly less 
formal sense.  These policies have been maintained by half-dozen U.S. administrations 
dating back more than three decades.  
This “special” standard is typical of many U.S. policies towards Israel, which has 
been typified by an unusual policy compartmentalization.  There are numerous areas 
where Israeli actions -- particularly as they concern the on-going Middle East peace 
process -- have explicitly contradicted U.S. policy goals.  Besides the aforementioned 
American nuclear double standard, since 1967, the U.S. has often disagreed with Israeli 
policies regarding Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories on such issues as settlement 
expansion, the status of Jerusalem, and violations of the rights of Palestinians. Ever since 
1967, the U.S. has -- under most administration to one degree or another -- actively 
promoted a process of Arab-Israeli reconciliation and compromise within the framework 
                                                 
18
  Reich, Bernard.  Securing the Covenant: United States-Israeli Relations after 
the Cold War.  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995): 4. 
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of United Nations Resolutions 242, and often over the strong objections of numerous 
Israeli governments -- more stridently so under right-wing Israeli governments.  Despite 
these very significant disagreements in this central regional conflict in which Israel has 
acted often against U.S. priorities in the region, there are very few cases, especially under 
the last two administrations, in which the U.S. has used any of its numerous sanctions or 
levers to pressure Israel to conform to American policy goals.  Thus Israel is rewarded for 
its strategic cooperation and assistance of the U.S., but it rarely receives more than a mild 
public rebuke -- if that -- when it acts against explicit and well-known American strategic 
priorities in the Middle East.  The question as to why this peculiar compartmentalization 
of U.S. policy has taken place will be one that this study will attempt to address.  The 
U.S. initially defined Israel as a strategic asset that could be utilized in order to assist the 
U.S. in achieving its goals of containing communism; in the post-Cold War era, 
protecting Israel has become an end, in and of itself, rather than a means to achieving an 
end.  Thus the alliance is insulated from the pressure of helping the U.S. achieve its other 
current strategic goals such as maintain economic stability and advancing the fight 
against Islamic fundamentalism in the Global War on Terrorism.  In effect, the alliance 
with Israel often ends up being a net burden that undermines efforts to achieve those 
goals.  The chart on the next page summarizes the process of compartmentalization that 
has occurred in the definition of U.S. strategic goals since the end of the Cold War.  This 
information on this chart will be explored more as this study progresses. 
In recent decades, U.S. support for Israel has become increasingly bipartisan as 
the two major political parties vie to prove which is the most “pro-Israel.” Indeed, as will 
 
 -12-
be discussed in Chapter 6, it is often difficult to distinguish between the Democratic and 
Republican Party platform planks on Israel.  Some of the recent statements by leaders of 
the two parties should demonstrate how unique and truly unprecedented this relationship 
has become.  In 1994, President Clinton succinctly and quite remarkably explained in a 
speech to the Israeli Knesset that “the survival of Israel is important not only to our 
interests, but to every single value we hold dear as a people”19 At the 1997 American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference, Vice-President Al Gore explained 
U.S. policy towards Israel in the following unambiguous terms: 
Simply put, we will never permit anyone to drive a wedge between the 
United States and Israel. Our commitment to Israel’s security will be as 
unshakable now as it has been in the past. This commitment is ironclad 
and unequivocal. It rests on a strong moral and strategic foundation. It is 
based on shared values and on our unwavering commitment to democracy. 
Above all, let me assert my unshakable belief that this unique relationship 
is good for the United States of America. We will never depart from this 
path.20 
                                                 
19
  Reich, Bernard. .  Securing the Covenant (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 
1995): vii. President Bill Clinton speaking to the Israeli Knesset, October 27, 1994.  
Italics added for emphasis. 
20
  AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C. April 6, 1997.  Italics added by 
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At the 1998 AIPAC convention, Gore -- who was preparing the groundwork for 
his 2000 Presidential run -- may have strengthened the administration’s rhetorical 
commitment to Israel even further -- if such a thing is possible.  This speech was part of 
an effort by the administration to repair its relationship with the Israel after the 
administration’s failed attempt to pressure the hard line government of Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make additional concessions to the Palestinians.21  Vice-
President Gore clearly signaled below that the administration was giving up its 
unsuccessful public effort to exert serious pressure on the Israeli government.  Gore 
begins by reflecting on Israel’s recent jubilee: 
On that auspicious day [May 14, 1948] was born not only one of the most 
enduring nations in history but also the most enduring friendship between 
nations in history.  Our admiration for Israel has never been stronger, our 
friendship with Israel has never been deeper, America stands by Israel 
now and forever.  Our special relationship with Israel is unshakable, it is 
ironclad, eternal and absolute.  It does not depend on the peace process, it 
transcends the peace process.... Don’t you even think for one minute that 
any differences about this or that between the governments of the United 
States and Israel belie the slightest weakening in our underlying unity of 
purpose or will shake our relationship in any way, shape or form.  Our 
commitment to the security of Israel is unconditional and this 
administration is acting decisively to meet that commitment.... The United 
                                                 
21
  This also came shortly after Hillary Clinton’s public endorsement of a 
Palestinian state.  While the President did not officially endorse her position, the 
underlying intent and direction was quite clear to most Israelis and Israeli policy-makers.  
Mrs. Clinton has become much more supportive of Israeli since she entered the U.S. 
Senate race in heavily Jewish New York state.  This pattern has continued during her 
Senate career and her Presidential run. 
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States has an absolute, uncompromising commitment to Israel’s security 
and an absolute conviction that Israel alone must decide the steps 
necessary to ensure that security.  That is Israel’s prerogative.  We accept 
that.  We endorse that.  Whatever Israel decides [about the further 
redeployments from the West Bank] cannot, will not, will never, not ever 
alter our fundamental commitment to her security.22 
It is hard to imagine the U.S. government making such unequivocal, absolute security 
commitments to any other state or states -- including its NATO allies -- as the one that 
the Clinton administration makes to Israel above.  The implication of Gore’s 
“unconditional,” “absolute,” “eternal”, “uncompromising,” and “fundamental” 
commitment to Israel is that the Vice-President puts security of Israel ahead of the 
security of the United States and that he would be willing to undermine American 
national security for the sake of Israel.  While this can be partially attributed to rhetorical 
excess on the Vice-President’s part in speaking before the pro-Israel lobby, the 
emotional, passionate tone of his remarks is hard to completely dismiss as mere political 
rhetoric.  His extraordinary statements are not at all unusual, or even particularly 
controversial, among those of leading American policy-makers.  Regardless of whether it 
is a completely true statement of the position of the Clinton/Gore administration, it 
remains a truly extraordinary, and perhaps unprecedented, language in the rhetoric of 
American foreign policy.   
                                                 
22
    http://www.aipac.org/pc98/webcasts/gore0518.shtml.  Italics added by author 
for emphasis.  Brackets added by the author for clarification. It is rather disingenuous for 
Gore to argue that the close U.S.-Israel friendship goes back to 1948 for this is not really 
the case as will be explained in chapter 4. 
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But the Vice-President is not the only leading Democrat to speak in such terms.  
Then-Senate Minority leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD) noted in a speech that: 
[That the creation of the state of Israel meant that] No longer were the 
Jewish people forced to wander the world unwanted.  No longer would the 
Jewish people have to depend on anyone else for their security.  America 
was committed to that principle 50 years ago, and it should be committed 
today.  Our commitment to Israel’s security must never change....The bond 
of friendship that exists between us is deep and unbreakable.  The United 
States has no better friend and no more important ally than Israel23 
Daschle went on to develop the familial connection between the United States and 
Israel: 
The relationship between the U.S. and Israeli government and the U.S. and 
Israeli people is so strong, he [Prime Minister Netanyahu] said, it’s like a 
family sitting around the dinner table.  And I think that’s a good 
analogy....It must be acknowledged that there is nothing on earth that will 
split this family.24 
His colleague, House Minority leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO), explained the U.S.-
Israel relationship in even more intimate and personal terms.  Gephardt stated that: 
I often tell I’ve been married now to Jane Gephardt for 32 years.  We’ve 
had some occasional disagreements -- not very often.  When we disagree, 
through the disagreement, we respect one another.  I adore her.  I will 
always adore her.  That is the United States’ relationship with Israel.25 
                                                 
23
     AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1998.  




  AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1998.  
http://www.aipac.org/pc98/webcasts/dasc0519.shtml.  Italics added by author for 
emphasis.  Brackets added by author for clarification. 
 
25
  AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1998. 
http://www.aipac.org/pc98/webcasts/geph0519.shtml.  One can’t help wonder what Mrs. 
Gephardt thought of having her marriage compared to U.S. foreign policy? 
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While the Democratic Party has traditionally been the strongly pro-Israel, they no 
longer hold a monopoly in this area since it is not only Democrats that express undying 
support for Israel.  Both Daschle and Gephardt, as leaders of the minority party, took the 
unusual step (in those same speeches) of emphasizing in their speeches that support for 
Israel on Capitol Hill was strongly bipartisan. 
Then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) shared very similar sentiments.  
For Senator Lott, Israelis were his “brothers” and “kindred spirits.”  He noted that: 
We [the United States and Israel] are kindred spirits together.  This is 
important not just for Israel; it’s important for America.  It’s important for 
free men and women all over this world.  Israel is our strongest strategic 
ally but also they are our kindred spirit and brothers.  So this is an 
important relationship, one that we cherish, one that we will not 
forget....Shalom, ya’ll.26 
Then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA), speaking at the 1997 AIPAC 
convention, tried to one-up Vice-President Gore by criticizing the Clinton Administration 
-- by practically all accounts, one of the most pro-Israel administrations in history -- for 
not being pro-Israel enough.  The Speaker sharply criticized a relatively minor 
Administration effort to pressure Israel to pursue the peace process. Speaker Gingrich 
stated that we must 
...Never allow a wedge to be driven between the United States and 
Israel.... We should never allow a wedge to be driven between the two 
democracies. And we certainly should not allow that wedge to be driven 
by those who condone and sustain terrorism.  Now, I was very 
                                                 
26
   AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1998. 




disappointed...that the United States would attend a conference convened 
by Yasser Arafat in March [1997] in Gaza, a conference that explicitly 
excluded Israel. I hope this administration will make clear that it will 
never again ever attend a one-sided, anti-Israeli conference to the 
exclusion of Israel. If Israel can’t be in the room, why should America 
walk in and teach the Arab world that they don’t need to deal with Israel?27 
Speaker Gingrich’s 1998 remarks seemed to suggest that Israel needed to defend itself 
against the demands of the United States, or at least the Clinton administration.  His 
argument, which seem remarkable coming from the third-ranking official in the U.S. 
government, seem to suggest that the United States, despite everything that it does to aid 
and support Israel, has no right to criticize it.  Gingrich further noted that: 
...Can you imagine the American reaction if an Israeli diplomat showed up 
and said -- You know, we’ve thought about it, and we have a better way to 
defend Texas than you do.  And we’ve thought about it and we’ve decided 
how to redefine the Canadian-American border because we know it better 
than you do.  When I see an American diplomat suggest to Israeli generals 
that our understanding of their security needs on the West Bank is better 
than their understanding, I’m looking at somebody who’s been in fancy 
hotels too long and out of touch with reality.... [Israel’s] right of self-
determination has to be defended at all costs, even against the best 
intentions of Israel’s friends -- including the United States.
28
 
Gingrich continued this line of argument on his May, 1998 visit to Israel.  During 
this visit the Speaker Gingrich seriously considered participating in a ceremony to lay the 
cornerstone for the construction of the long-promised American embassy in Jerusalem -- 
                                                 
27
   AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., April 8, 1997. 
Http://www.aipac.org/policy/transcripts/gingrich.htm.  Brackets added for clarification.  
Italics added for emphasis. 
28
  AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., April 8, 1997. 
http://www.aipac.org/pc98/webcasts/ging0519.shtml.  Italics added for emphasis.  
Brackets added for clarification. 
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an action that would have directly contradicted the policy of the Clinton administration.29  
The Speaker used this disagreement between the Legislative and Executive branches as 
an excuse to take the very unusual step of criticizing the President’s foreign policy while 
abroad.  The same type of disagreement was apparent in a set of letters from majorities of 
both houses of Congress in the spring of 1998, which criticized the Clinton 
administration’s effort to pressure Israel into agreeing to redeployment out of a 13% of 
the West Bank.  They advised the President to turn down the heat on Israel; the 
administration, as seen in the Vice-President’s quote above, did just that.  A bipartisan 
letter, co-authored by Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Connie Mack (R-FL) and 
co-signed by 79 other Senators, advised the President Clinton that: 
It would be a serious mistake for the United States to change from its 
traditional role as facilitator of the peace process to using public pressure 
against Israel.... America’s commitment to Israel’s security under girds the 
entire peace process and provides Israel the confidence it needs to take 
very real risks for peace. As you know, Secretary [of State William] 
Christopher made a written commitment that it would be up to Israel to 
decide the size and scope of further redeployments of Israeli forces on the 
                                                 
29
  Speaker Gingrich ultimately backed off from this idea at the urging of National 
Security Advisor Samuel Berger who feared that it might lead to violence.  While 
Congress has approved construction of a new American embassy in Jerusalem, the 
President and the State Department (and most foreign governments) still recognize Tel 
Aviv, not Jerusalem, as Israel’s capital. The Congress has conditioned full funding of the 
State Department on its transfer of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem -- 
although the President was granted a national security waiver that he can use to block the 
move. The administration argues that such an action would undermine on-going 
negotiations over the final status of Jerusalem.  Although, it should be noted that 
President Clinton promised to move the U.S. embassy while campaigning for the White 
House in 1992.  In an interview on July 28, 2000 in the wake of the failure of Camp 
David II and in an attempt to sure of the government of Israeli Prime Ehud Barak, 
President Clinton suggested that the U.S. might reassess this policy and consider moving 
the Embassy at a later date.   
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West Bank. Presenting an American plan C especially one that includes a 
specific redeployment figure beyond what Israel believes to be in its 
national security interest before final status arrangements -- runs counter 
to Secretary Christopher’s commitment and can only undermine Israel’s 
confidence.30 
The wording above suggests that the U.S. Senators were more concerned about Israel’s 
“confidence” and Israel’s “national security interest” than the Secretary of State’s ability 
to engage in active diplomacy.  Remarkably, this letter about U.S. foreign policy never 
mentions American national security or American interests in the Middle East.   
In the post-9/11 Bush administration, the relationship has drawn even closer as 
the perceived common threat of international terrorism has created an even stronger bond 
between Israel and the Bush/Cheney administration.  The neo-conservatives in the 
administration have viewed Israeli national interests as almost indistinguishable from 
American national interest and both houses in the U.S. Congress have repeatedly passed 
resolutions and authored letters to the President praising Israeli policies in lavish terms. 
On an economic level, this alliance seems counterintuitive when one considers 
that the “special relationship” developed and strengthened during the very period that 
many of Israel’s Arab adversaries were establishing a predominant economic position in 
the petroleum export market.  Clearly, the United States has strong economic and 
strategic interests in maintaining friendly relations with the Arab states, which control the 
                                                 
30
  Http://www.aipac.org/letter.shtml.  The quote above is reference to the “Note 
for the record” that Secretary of State Warren Christopher appended to the January1997 
Hebron accord.  Brackets added by author for clarification. 
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economic lifeline of the industrialized world.31  While the U.S. has developed other 
sources of oil both domestically and outside the Middle East, there can be little doubt that 
both the U.S. and many of its European and Asian allies still rely heavily on the 
importation of oil from the Persian Gulf.  So much so, that during the last two decades 
the United States has gone to war in the Persian Gulf twice in order to establishing 
political hegemony and to attempt to maintain economic stability in this key geo-
strategically vital region.  However, both the Clinton and George W. Bush 
Administrations have completely refused to even consider that Israeli policies -- 
primarily the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories -- are partially responsible 
for the widespread hostility to the United States in the Middle East.  This would require 
acknowledging that American and Israeli interests may not be as synonymous as they 
have so often been asserted to be.  The American political discourse seems to preclude 
the possibility of considering significance divergence in the interests of the two close 
allies.  By contrast none of the other members of the Organization for Economic 
                                                 
31
 It is not too early to begin to speculate -- albeit in a highly tentative manner -- 
how the economic transformations associated with global warming could potentially 
affect U.S. policy in the region.  If global warming were to lead in coming decades to the 
successful development of alternatives to fossil fuels, than its quite possible that the 
industrialized world would become significantly less dependent on extracting petroleum 
from the Middle East.  This could, conceivably, lead to a significant decrease in the 
demand for -- and therefore the price of oil.  If petroleum becomes less important to the 
world economy than it is certainly a real possibility that oil-producing states will become 
less geo-strategically important to the industrialized world over the next several decades.  





Cooperation and Development (OECD) -- including Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan -- have established and maintained such a close alliance with Israel.32 
Despite serious questions as to the wisdom and strategic benefit of U.S.-Israel 
alliance, public support for the State of Israel has remained consistently high in 
practically every poll conducted since Israel’s founding in 1948.  While there have been 
some dips in public support for Israel during periods when particularly disturbing Israeli 
actions were highly publicized,33 these periods have been remarkably brief quickly 
returning to its original levels.  Within a few weeks, public support for Israel always 
seems to return to its normally high levels.  Eytan Gilboa has thoroughly researched the 
public opinion data through the mid-1980s and he concludes that: 
General American feelings for Israel have remained consistently favorable 
since the inception of a Jewish state in 1948.  Various polls, utilizing 
different methods and measurements, have revealed relatively high 
percentages of national samples stating that Israel is a close, strong, or 
reliable ally of the United States.  This pattern has remained constant even 
in times of tension and disagreement between the two governments and 
during controversial events, such as the 1982 Israeli war in Lebanon.... 
[The graph of the sympathy index from 1947 to 1984] indicates that since 
the establishment of Israel, Americans have consistently sympathized 
more with Israel than with the Arabs.... Since 1967, however, the 
                                                 
32
 Germany has a very unique relationship with Israel as would be expected given 
the historical experience of Jews during the Holocaust.  See Feldman, Lily.  The Special 
Relationship between West Germany and Israel. (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984) 
and Lavy, George.  Germany and Israel:  Moral Debt and National Interest. (London:  
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1996). 
33
  After Israel’s Christian Phalangist Allies with apparent Israeli complicity 
massacred hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilia refugee camps near Beirut 
in September 1982, the sympathy index which measures American sympathy for Israel 
dropped to its lowest levels ever.   See Appendix B. 
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American public has regularly expressed more sympathy for Israel by a 
margin of a least four to one.34 [See Appendix B for Gilboa’s data chart on 
Feelings toward Israel, 1957 to 1983] 
 Gilboa further demonstrates that there is a remarkable degree of uniformity of 
belief about Israel across most of the usual cleavages.  Surveys that control for race, 
education, occupation, income, gender, age, region, community-size, religion, and 
political orientation, produce some minor variations, but do not show a significantly 
weaker sympathy for Israel among any of these groups.35  Gilboa writes that, 
“…consistently strong pro-Israeli sentiments were found among each stratum of 
American society.”36 
 A later study by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations seems to confirm that 
American attitudes have changed little in the decade since the Gilboa study.  According 
to the Chicago Council’s 1994 survey, 64% of the American public considered Israel to 
be a vital interest of the United States.  A substantial segment of the American public, 
                                                 
34
  Gilboa, Eytan.  American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict.  (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books / D.C. Heath Company, 1987): 306, 308.  
The table referred to in the quote is “Figure 9-1.  American Sympathies for Israel and the 
Arab Nations, 1947-1984” and it appears on Gilboa: 310-311.  Additional figures on the 
sympathy index can be found Table 1-5 (p. 26), Table 2-1 (p. 47), Table 3-2 (p. 90), and 
Table 4-1 (p.127) as well as numerous other tables in Gilboa well-documented study of 
public opinion.  Brackets added for clarification. 
35
  Gilboa.  American Public Opinion: 271-304.   
36
  Gilboa.  American Public Opinion: 301. 
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42%, went as far as supporting the use of American troops “if Arab forces invaded 
Israel.”37  Page and Shapiro argue that: 
United States public opinion about the Middle East has followed a 
generally stable pattern of support for Israel but reluctance to get directly 
involved in conflict.  Within this basic framework, opinions have changed 
somewhat in response to major events like wars and peacemaking attempts 
and the Palestinian uprising.38 
Appendix B includes hundreds of public opinion polls compiled by Mitchell Bard of the 
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise and posted on the website of the Jewish Virtual 
Library.  In the standard question of sympathy for Israel vs. sympathy for Arab states or 
the Palestinians, the results have remained remarkable consistent with support for Israel 
in mid-40s or low-50s and support for Arabs and Palestinians around 10%.  A July 2006 
poll by the Pew Center for the People and the Press taken around the time of Israel’s 
intervention in Gaza and the Israeli-Hezbollah War in Lebanon put support for Israel at 
44% and support for the Palestinians at 9%.  (Data from several hundred public opinion 
polls is contained in Appendix B.) In short, the American public’s support for Israel has 
been very high for over half a century and has remained so with remarkable consistency.  
                                                 
37
  Rielly, John E. (Editor) American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 
1995.  (Chicago, IL: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995):  20, 26, 35.  By 
means of comparison only 54% of that same public supported using American forces to 
protect Western Europe from an invasion by Russia.     
38
  Page, Benjamin and Robert Shapiro.  Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in 
American’s Policy Preferences. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992): 251.  The 
chapters in their book on foreign policy are coauthored with John M. Gillroy.   
 
 -25-
 Thus it is clear that the U.S. and Israel have established a very unusual patron-
client relationship as measured by U.S. policy in the region, American political rhetoric, 
and American public opinion.  Since this relationship is both unique and highly 
counterintuitive, it is not surprising that it will require a very unique explanation that 
accounts for the fact that this relationship “is not limited to decision makers but also 
involves the two societies.”  While most international relationships seem to be squarely 
based on strategic factors, this one requires analysis of what Bar-Siman-Tov calls “hard” 
and “soft” factors.  Bar-Siman-Tov, in his aforementioned article, goes on to speak of the 
“community of strategic factors” in the relationship as the “hard” factors and the 
“community of strategic values” as the “soft” factors in the special relationship.  He 
argues that the relationship resulted from the “unique interplay of “soft” and “hard” 
factors”39 While this analysis will substantially agree with much of Bar-Siman-Tov’s 
analysis and adopt his language of that analysis, it will argue that he, like most other 
scholars, substantially undervalues the role of the “soft” factors especially in terms of 
their role in shaping attitudes among policy elites.  As we will see below, the language 
and approach of strategic analysis is unable to explain the remarkable continuity of the 
“special relationship” in the greatly changed strategic environment following the Arab 
Oil Embargo, the end of the Cold War, the First Gulf War, 9/11 attacks, and the U.S. 
Occupation of Iraq.  Each of these events could have easily formed the basis for strategic 
                                                 
39
 Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov.  “The United States and Israel since 1948: A “Special 
Relationship”?”  Diplomatic History    (Volume 22, Number 2, Spring 1988): 232. 
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decisions to weaken American ties to Israel, but they were ultimately reinterpreted as 
grounds for continuing and strengthening the U.S.-Israel alliance. 
 Chapter 1 explains and critiques out the two primary theories – U.S. strategic 
interest and interest-group liberalism – that are most often used to explain the U.S.-Israel 
“special relationship.”  Chapter 2 proposes an alternative theory based on a political 
culture model.  Chapter 3 elaborates that model and explores how recent cultural changes 
have strengthened the “special relationship” when many would have predicted that it 
would deteriorate.  Chapter 4 analyzes the historical development of the alliance within 
the Executive Branch up through the end of the Cold War.  Chapter 5 examines the 
alliance during the three Presidential administrations since the end of the Cold War.  
Chapter 6 considers the political development of the U.S.-Israel relationship through the 
lens of the Democratic and Republican Parties by analyzing the content of their Party 
platforms commitments around Israel.  Chapter 7 considers the manner in which the 
alliance has been framed by the Jewish community operating primarily within the realm 
of the U.S. Congress.  In the following model, Chapters 2 and 3 will attempt to explain 
the independent cultural variables.  Chapters 4 and 5 describe the resulting dependent 
policy outcomes.  And Chapters 6 and 7 offer an explanation of the role of the 
intervening political and cultural institutions -- particularly political parties (in Chapter 6) 




Chapter 1 – Standard Explanations of the U.S.-Israel Alliance 
American policymaking elites have maintained, and indeed strengthened, the 
United States’ “passionate attachment”40 to the State of Israel for nearly four decades.41  
Even after the Cold War, when the major shared threat to the United States and Israel 
disappeared, the relationship remained and even appears to have strengthened.  These 
elites have generally defended it in terms of America’s strategic interests in the region.  
This argument fits in with the standard realist paradigm of international relations, which 
argues that states develop their foreign policies based strictly on rational analysis of their 
strategic national interests.   Morgentahuian realism42 assumes that “statesmen think and 
act in terms of interest defined as power.”43   In so doing, realism greatly underestimates 
the role that politics and culture play in shaping the political decision-making about the 
                                                 
40
 George W. Ball and Douglass B. Ball applied this phrase to the U.S.-Israel 
relationship in their book of the same title. Ball borrowed the phrase from George 
Washington’s 1797 Farewell Address.  Ball, George W. and Douglass B. Ball. The 
Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to Present. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1992)  
41
  The focus here is on the last three decades or so and the “special relationship” 
is being dated from the period following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and particularly after 
1970.  Some recent scholarship suggests that the beginnings of the “special relationship” 
can be traced back to the second Eisenhower Administration just after the 1956 Suez 
Crisis.  See Ben-Zvi, Abraham.  Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the 
Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance.  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)   
42
  Consult Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson’s  Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (6th Edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1985) for the meaning of this term, particularly chapter 1 - “A Realist Theory of 
International Politics.” 
43
  Morgenthau and Thompson: 5. 
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Middle East.  Measured strictly in terms of strategic interest, U.S. policy towards the 
Middle East in general, and Israel in particular, has often been highly irrational.  In 
reality, decisions to defend Israel’s interests appear to be almost irrational acts of either 
courage or folly, depending on one’s perspective.   Thus the perplexing question that this 
project will attempt to answer is:  Why did American policy elites establish, and why 
have they continued to maintain, America’s “special relationship” with Israel as a central 
organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy in Middle East -- often in spite of America’s 
strategic interests in the region? 
To begin with, in order to discuss U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, it is 
necessary to define them.  While there are innumerable nuances and complexities to this 
subject, there is also a fair amount of consistency to the U.S. goals within the broad 
context of the period of Cold War (roughly from 1948 to 1989).  It is well-established 
that the overall U.S. strategy during the Cold War was containment of the Soviet Union.  
Within this context, Ben-Zvi concisely summarizes these goals as “the desire to mitigate 
(or, at the very least, stabilize) the Arab-Israeli conflict; the wish to maintain political and 
economic access to Arab oil; and the quest to increase American influence in the area at 
the expense of the Soviet Union (but without risking a direct superpower 
confrontation).”44  It is reasonable to assume that the third reason expired with the Cold 
War, but that the first two remain valid.  While mitigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
                                                 
44
  Ben-Zvi, Abraham.  Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the 
Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance.  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)  
Ben-Zvi is speaking in the context of the 1950s and early 1960s here, but the description 
seems to aptly describe the entire Cold War period. 
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access to Arab oil were once seen as means for containing the Soviet Union, they remain 
valid strategic goals in the Post-Cold War era although they are now primarily means for 
maintaining the stability of the global economy.  Since the September 11th attacks, the 
fight against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism has been emerged as the primary goal 
of U.S. foreign policy.  In the context of the “Global War on Terror,” the goal mitigating 
the Arab-Israeli conflict has taken on additional strategic value as a means addressing the 
anger and frustration that fuels the threat of Islamic terrorism. 
The Strategic Interest Approach.  Many of the advocates of the U.S.-Israel 
relationship have argued that the primary explanation of the “special relationship” is a 
product of a mutually beneficial strategic situation in which Israel as the only democracy 
in the Middle East serves U.S. strategic goals in the region.  While it is obvious that a 
relationship with the world’s strongest -- and by the 1990s only -- superpower is 
beneficial to Israel, the strategic value thesis does not fully explain the ongoing American 
commitment to the State of Israel.  Nor can it account for the considerable evidence that 
Israel has often been a strategic burden to the pursuit of U.S. interests in the region.45 
Although the strategic interest approach is mostly the territory of supporters of 
Israel, it is also the method of some of its most severe critics.  Ironically, these two 
radically different schools of thought see Israel as a strategic asset.  While they have a 
similar assessment of Israel’s strategic value to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, they 
                                                 
45
  Mansour, Camille.  Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994).  On this subject see Chapter 2, “A Doctrine of 
Israel as a Burden?” 
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have radically different views of the underlying motivations of U.S. foreign policy.  The 
argument that Israel is a strategic asset to the United States is most closely associated 
with defenders of the “special relationship” (most obviously the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, AIPAC’s Washington think tank); however, very similar arguments are 
also used by a school of critics of U.S. Middle East policy -- most prominently MIT 
linguist Noam Chomsky.   
 The defenders of the “special relationship” view the goals of U.S. foreign policy 
in fairly benign terms and thus believe that Israel being a strategic asset of the United 
States is a positive and constructive phenomenon for the advancement of democracy and 
peace for both countries and the world.  Chomsky and his allies have a much more 
insidious view of American foreign policy.  They view American foreign policy as 
essential exploitative and neo-colonial/imperial phenomenon.  Thus Israel’s position as a 
strategic asset of the United Sates undermines rather than advances the process of making 
peace and expanding democracy in the world.  While the essential evaluation that Israel 
is a strategic asset is the same, Chomsky emphasizes different, and generally more 
insidious, aspects of the “special relationship.”  Chomsky states that the Israel is a 
valuable strategic asset for defending the Arabian oil supply.  He also argues that: 
From the late 1950s...the U.S. government increasingly came to accept the 
Israel thesis that a powerful Israel is a “strategic asset” for the United 
States, serving as a barrier against indigenous radical nationalist threats to 
American interests, which might gain support from the USSR….Israel 
aided the U.S. in penetrating Black Africa with substantial secret CIA 
subsidies -- supporting Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Idi Amin in Uganda, 
Mobutu in Zaire, Bokassa in the Central Africa Republic, and others at 
various times -- as well as in circumventing the ban on aid to Rhodesia 
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and South Africa, and more recently, in providing military and 
technological aid, as well as many advisers, for U.S. clients in Central 
America.  An increasingly visible alliance between Israel, South Africa, 
Taiwan and the military dictatorships of the southern cone in South 
America has proven an attractive prospect for major segments of 
American power.  Now, Israel is surely regarded as a crucial part of the 
elaborate U.S. base and backup system for the Rapid Deployment Force 
ringing the Middle East oil producing region...the primary U.S. interest in 
the Middle East region...is to maintain control over its energy reserves and 
the flow of petrodollars.....Israel’s military might enhances the capacity of 
the United States to rule the region by force and violence.....46 
Most of the strategic benefits that Chomsky attributes to Israel are not benefits that are 
inherent or specific to Israel as much as they are incidental roles that could have been 
attained through any number of U.S. client states.  Like the defenders of the “special 
relationship,” the Chomsky school rarely discusses the strategic liabilities created by the 
U.S.-Israel alliance or the problems that it poses to securing the Middle Eastern oil 
supply. 
 Nor do the economic benefits of the U.S.-Israel relationship explain the 
compartmentalization -- separation of the maintenance of the U.S.-Israel alliance from 
the broader American strategic interests in the region -- of American policy towards 
Israel. Despite its high-technology boom and its 1986 Free Trade Treaty with the United 
States, is far too small to provide a market large enough to justify the 
compartmentalization of U.S. strategic priorities.  Economically speaking, this alliance 
appears even more inexplicable than it does strategically.  As noted above, the United 
States government has given the State of Israel billions of dollars in economic and 
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military assistance over the past half-century.  In addition to the cost of foreign aid to 
Israel, one leading former policymaker contends that the United States lost billions of 
dollars in arms sales due to its alliance with Israel.  Former Undersecretary of State 
George Ball, an outspoken critic of U.S. policy towards Israel, asserts that America’s 
alliance with Israel cost the U.S. $70 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the late 
1980s.47  Moreover, many policymakers have argued that the “special relationship” has 
endangered America’s ability to purchase inexpensive oil from Israel’s Arab adversaries 
and has undermined western efforts to achieve political hegemony in the region.  The 
U.S. alliance with Israel has clearly stoked the flames of anti-Western/anti-American 
variants of both Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism since most of the Islamic 
world views Israel as a Western colonial intrusion into the Arab and Islamic worlds.   
 From the very beginning, many policy-makers in the United States viewed Israel 
as a liability for U.S. interests in the region.  In 1948, then-Secretary of State George 
Marshall and his key advisors at the State Department advised President Truman not to 
recognize the new Israeli state so as not to anger the Arab oil producers.  This issue, of 
course, rose to crisis proportions at the time of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo when the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) raised the price of oil and 
reduced exports to the United States, because of U.S. support for Israel in the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War.  Robert Kaplan seemed to capture the issue when he summarized the cynical 
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economic logic of many State Department analysts as: “How many oil wells do the Jews 
have?”48 
The realist explanation of these events is that during the late Cold War Israel’s 
strategic value to the United States outweighed its intransigence in the peace process and 
thus resulted in these two realms being compartmentalized.  Steven Spiegel argued in 
1983 that Israel provided a number of important, but less visible, strategic benefits for the 
United States.  Spiegel writes that: 
...Israel has often served as a silent partner in the American role in the area 
[the Middle East]....  Israel today is a significant enough military power to 
act as a deterrent against Soviet plans for invasion of the Persian Gulf or 
for activities in the Mediterranean.... Israel...is in essence testing American 
equipment under combat conditions against Soviet arms, and it is Israel 
which is developing the technical innovations and tactics to deal with new 
challenges posed by the latest Soviet weaponry....  Israeli 
research-and-development procedures are quicker and cheaper than in the 
United States...49 
In the post-Cold War context, Gerald Steinberg has tried to explain continuation 
of the relationship in terms of institutionalization and growth of Israeli burden sharing.  
Steinberg wrote in 1998: 
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The available evidence indicates that the overall strategic relationship, 
characterized by weapons and technology deliveries, meetings of various 
joint groups, such as the JPMG [joint political-military working group], 
and other cooperative activities, was not affected. Similarly, more recent 
tension with the United States over Israeli policies with respect to the 
negotiations with the Palestinians, settlements, etc. have also apparently 
not had an impact on the strategic relationship....The degree of Israeli 
reciprocity and the contributions in the context of this alliance relationship 
have been increasing steadily.  Intelligence sharing has been a major if 
often hidden aspect of the relationship for many years, particularly during 
the Cold War....both Israel and the United States have increased the 
emphasis on theater missile defense....The Israeli “Homa” (Wall) ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) project, which includes the “arrow” missile 
system, the “Green Pines” fire-control radar system, a command and 
control system and other sub-systems.  Research and development of the 
Arrow is a joint U.S.-Israeli project, with Israel providing most of the 
technology and manpower, and the United States providing most of the 
R&D costs (expected to exceed $2 billion)….U.S.-Israeli cooperation and 
division labor extends to this technology as well….In addition, the threat 
perceptions shared by the United States and Israel in the post-Cold War 
era have also highlighted the importance of continued cooperation in 
intelligence and assessment of threats….Israel provided UNSCOM with 
critical intelligence information on Saddam Hussein’s program of 
concealment and deceit.  Israel has also been an important source of 
information on the Iranian WMD and missile programs, and on the role of 
Russia in the process.50 
The Steinberg’s explanation of the alliance, which is fairly typical of post-Cold 
War explanation’s of the alliance, is based on justifying the relationship in terms 
of specific cooperative programs while discounting the larger strategic burdens 
that the alliance with Israel imposes on the U.S. 
Critique of Strategic Interest Approach.  The argument that Israel is a strategic 
asset for the United States seems to fly in the face of the view of many scholars and 
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former policymakers who have continued to believe that the American alliance with 
Israel has been a strategic albatross around America’s neck.  By allying itself with Israel, 
the United States seemed to push far larger and more populous Arab states -- such as 
Egypt (until Camp David), Algeria, Syria, and Iraq -- into the arms of the Soviet Union.    
Furthermore, American commitment to Israeli security seems to have impeded the 
regional peace process and undermined American influence and credibility in Arab 
world.  By some accounts, America’s “passionate” commitment to Israel has undermined 
its ability to act as a neutral mediator in the peace process, as argued by Naseer Aruri: 
...Arabs and Palestinians have had to contend with a dangerous illusion; 
that the United States was capable of delivering a fair, just and durable 
peace in the region.... Assuming the role of referee and principal 
conciliator, however, simultaneously with the role of Israel’s chief 
diplomatic backer, bank-roller and military supplier, the United States has 
placed itself at odds with the global consensus, which called for a political 
settlement with an international framework and sponsorship. As ally and 
protector of Israel, the U.S. was simply unable to credibly discharge its 
self-assigned mission as the catalyst for peace.51 
These contradictions have become increasing obvious during the 1990s as the United 
States tried, and failed, in its efforts to convince the intransigent Benjamin Netanyahu 
government (1996-99) and the Ehud Barak government (1999-2001) at Camp David to 
make concessions needed to implement the Oslo Peace Process.  It is clear that the United 
States has developed a compartmentalized relationship with Israel. 
 During the post-Cold War period the “special relationship” has grown stronger 
than ever.  The two countries signed a “Joint Statement of Strategic Cooperation” in 
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1996.52   While Israel certainly offers the U.S. some strategic benefits (as Steven Spiegel 
and Gerald Steinberg note above), this review make it clear that strategic value can not 
fully explain the unique relationship between the United States and Israel.  Defined in the 
strictly geo-strategic and economic terms, which they usually are, the United States 
seems to be acting against its own national interests by establishing and maintaining a 
“special relationship” with a state that consistently refuses to accommodate make 
concessions that promote American interests in the region.   American officials have 
consistently trumpeted Israel’s strategic importance, and ignored the strategic difficulties 
that the alliance often creates for the United States in the region.  Thus Israel’s strategic 
value is mostly as a result of being in “special relationship” with the United States rather 
than a cause for need to maintain the alliance.  The U.S. did not maintain its “special 
relationship” with Israel, because Israel was a tremendous strategic asset as much as 
Israel’s position as a strategic asset has continued to expand, because of the existing 
“special relationship.”  So the relationship takes on a self-perpetuating quality enhanced 
by military and intelligence ties, personal relationships, shared outlooks, and a certain 
level of inertia.  
The U.S. has undoubtedly attained some strategic benefits -- like those noted by 
Spiegel and Steinberg above -- from its alliance with Israel, but it is, at best, a highly 
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questionable proposition whether the benefits of the “special relationship” – which are 
often marginal and tactical rather than broadly strategic – have outweighed the strategic 
burden that it created since 1974.  Much of the scholarship documenting the strategic 
relationship seems to bend over backwards to emphasize the ways in which Israel is a 
strategic asset while mostly ignoring the ways in which it is a strategic burden. 
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, much of the American strategic rationale for maintaining a close strategic 
relationship with the State of Israel appears to have evaporated.  With the Cold War over, 
the U.S. is left with two major strategic goals in the Middle East, maintaining 
international access to Arab oil and stabilizing the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1991 Gulf 
War made it even clearer that Israel had become a political and a strategic burden.  
Israel’s vaunted military capabilities could not be used, because that would have 
endangered the coalition with moderate states against Iraq; in fact, the United States had 
to expend an extensive diplomatic effort in order to prevent Israel from responding 
militarily to Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel to preserve coalition against Iraq.    Israel could 
play an active role in the military phase of the war, because of Arab objections.  
Furthermore, Israel became a strategic burden, because the U.S. had to assign Patriot 
Missile crews to Israel to defend it against Iraqi scud missile attacks.   
The post-Gulf War policy of Bush and Baker pressuring Israel over the issue of 
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories seemed to be a step in the direction of 
pursuing America’s strategic goals.  However, this policy resulted in a political firestorm 
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on the American domestic scene.  In the end, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir held 
his ground against U.S. pressure, but was defeated in his 1992 re-election campaign and 
replaced by the Rabin government which was much more receptive to U.S. view of West 
Bank settlement expansion. 
 Following the September 11th attacks in the context of current “Global War on 
Terrorism,” the George W. Bush administration has continued to deepen its defense of 
Israel and its policies in the Occupied Territories even though these policies – along with 
the invasion of Iraq – have reinforced the hostility towards the United States in the Arab 
and Islamic world.  Instead of addressing the issues of U.S. policy that have created 
popular support for al-Qaeda, the U.S. has pursed policies around the Israeli-Palestinian 
that increase and reinforce widespread hostility towards the United States. The neo-
conservative view taken by the administration has been that U.S. interests in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict are synonymous with the policies that Israeli government chooses to 
pursue.  In so doing, the administration has appeared to puts its loyalty and support for 
Israeli policies and supporting its policies ahead of its strategic interest in achieving a 
comprehensive Middle East peace.   The Bush administration has essentially ignored the 
well-known views of foreign policy establishment views, such as those contained most 
recently reiterated in the December, 2006 bipartisan Iraq Study Group report that have 
called for active U.S. engagement in the conflict.  The ISG report’s call for “sustainable 
negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of President Bush’s two-
state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, 
Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict” reflects the long-established views 
 
 -39-
the foreign policy establishment have been supported rhetorically and ignored in practice 
by the current administration.53   
However, in the years since that time, the “special relationship” has not only 
survived, but in the Post-Cold War/Gulf War era it has grown even stronger.  The Clinton 
and George W. Bush administrations have further strengthened and expanded America’s 
“special relationship” with Israel despite the fact that there are few obvious strategic 
benefits and numerous strategic liabilities to such a policy.  This leads us to conclude that 
it is not strategic factors that hold the U.S.-Israel relationship together.  If it were merely 
strategic factors, the relationship would have come apart at the end of the Cold War and 
following the 1991 Gulf War.  Instead, it has become stronger.  This leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that while the relationship was (and often still is) publicly defined 
as based on strategic concerns, its real foundation is in political and cultural factors that 
we will consider further below.  Thus not only is the realist explanation of Israel’s 
strategic value unable to completely explain the compartmentalization of the U.S.-Israel 
“special relationship,” but it is completely unable to explain why the “special 
relationship” still exists in a post-Cold War reality. 
During the early decades of the relationship, when political and cultural pressures 
were minimal, strategic factors dominated.  However, more recently, political factors 
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have become predominant.  As we shall see, the strategic importance of Israel to United 
States does not dictate American policy towards Israel so much as it acts as a default 
factor upon which policymakers can rhetorically defend and justify their decisions when 
political pressures are insignificant or offsetting.  Thus, we must begin to expand our 
concept of “national interests” and consider not only the strategic reality in which a 
country finds itself, but also how domestic political factors, the so-called “soft” factors, 
contribute to the decisions of American foreign policymakers and indeed to America’s 
definition of its “national interests” in the Middle East.  In this regard, we will as we 
move through this analysis that the greatest difficulty with the realist approach is its 
attempt to define “national interests” in purely objective, economic, geo-strategic terms.  
The “national interest” is ultimately a subjective quality that emerges as much (and 
sometimes more) from America’s values and ideas as from the international balance of 
power concerns. Thus, despite the insistence of policymakers as to the primacy of geo-
strategic factors, it is often politics and political culture that has, at least in recent 
decades, dictated policy decisions regarding America’s highly “passionate attachment” to 
Israel. 
 The Interest Group Approach.  There is a significant school of thought that 
contends that the United States relationship with Israel is typical of those that have 
emerged in the Post-Cold War era.  Samuel Huntington and Yossi Shain, in separate 
articles, use the pluralist interest group model of politics to argue that this relationship is 
merely one of many recent cases of U.S. foreign policies being shaped by ethnic 
Diasporas.  Huntington argues that the combination of the end of the Cold War and the 
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rise of multicultural ethnic politics in the United States have led to a “domesticization of 
foreign policy.”54  Huntington writes: 
…[D]iasporas can influence the actions and policies of their host country 
[the U.S] and co-opt its resources and influence to serve the interests of 
their homeland.  Ethnic groups have played active roles in politics 
throughout American history.  Now, ethnic diaspora groups proliferate, are 
more active, and have greater self-consciousness, legitimacy, and political 
clout.  In recent years, diasporas have had a major impact on American 
foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey, the Caucasus, the recognition 
of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions against South Africa, aid for 
Black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO expansion, sanctions against 
Cuba, the controversy in Northern Ireland, and the relations between Israel 
and its neighbors.  Diaspora-based policies…are often pursued at the 
expense of broader interests and American relations with long-standing 
allies.  Overall, as James R. Schlesinger observed…the United States has 
“less of a foreign policy in a traditional sense of a great power than we 
have the stapling together of a series of goals put forth by domestic 
constituency groups….The result is that American foreign policy is 
incoherent.”55 
Yossi Shain adds that: 
As U.S. strategic interests become less clear than they once were, and U.S. 
decision makers appear unable to articulate or execute a coherent global 
strategy, foreign policy becomes more susceptible to pressures by 
diasporic lobbies.... Indeed, if America is becoming a multicultural society 
with powerful ethnic influences, one should expect to see strong 
ramifications in U.S. foreign affairs including a redefinition of U.S. 
national interests.56 
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While the critiques of Huntington and Shain offer considerable insight into the 
growing incoherence of American foreign policy, their analyses are broad 
generalizations, which do not fully account for the unique nature of the “special 
relationship” between the United States and Israel.  The “special relationship,” unlike the 
many other ethnic-based policy alliances described above, emerged during the heart of 
the Cold War and has been maintained for three-and-a-half decades.  Most other ethnic 
lobbies have merely shaped a relatively narrow U.S. policy towards a single country, not 
an entire region.  No other ethnic lobby -- with perhaps the exception of Cuban-American 
Foundation -- has been able to exert such a sustained effect on the U.S. foreign policy 
over such an extended period of time through administrations of both parties. No other 
ethnic lobby has allowed its favored state to collect anywhere near the amount of U.S. 
foreign aid or to attain anywhere near the number of advanced weapons systems as has 
been the case with this “special relationship.”  No other ethnic lobby has been able to 
promote the sustained passionate bipartisan defense of its country that has taken place in 
the case of Israel.  Finally, no other ethnic lobby -- with perhaps the partial exception of 
Tibetan cause, which is often promoted by non-Tibetan Buddhists and human rights 
activists -- has been able to win the level of emotional and heartfelt support of large 
numbers of Americans who are not part of its ethnic group. In a set of polls 
commissioned for Israel’s 50th anniversary celebration, 56% of non-Jewish Americans 
had a “very favorable” or “mostly favorable” opinion of Israel and 76% of non-Jews said 
that U.S. had “a vital interest in Israel.” 57  Clearly, there is something that makes the U.S. 
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relationship with Israel unique and different from other Diaspora-based alliances 
described by Huntington and Shain.   
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that U.S.’s consistent and overwhelming support for 
Israel and its policies are the result of “the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby.”  They 
define the Lobby as “the loose coalition of individuals and organizations who actively 
work to steer U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.”58  They further assert that “no 
lobby has managed to divert it [U.S. foreign policy] it as far from what the national 
interest would suggest, while simultaneous convincing American that the US interests 
and those of the other country – in this case, Israel – are essentially identical.”59  This 
brings this study to the role of American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the 
often-controversial and highly effective pro-Israel lobby.  Fortune magazine named 
AIPAC the second most powerful lobby in Washington behind the much larger American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP).60   It has been said that politics abhors a vacuum.  
A significant part of AIPAC’s success can certainly be attributed to the lack of 
significant, well-organized, well-funded opposition groups opposed to its policy agenda. 
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While this has slowly begun to change during the 21st century (as will be discussed in a 
later chapter), Mansour notes that the lobby “does not arouse the opposition of influential 
groups.”61  The corporate oil lobby, which might be expected to oppose AIPAC, has 
generally focused its extensive lobbying efforts on less controversial and less high-profile 
issues such tax policy, and mostly shied away from foreign policy issues.62  Whereas the 
pro-Israel lobby has been an expression of the political and organizational skills of the 
American Jewish community, the lack of a significant pro-Arab/pro-Palestinian lobby has 
been reflected the lack of such skills in the Arab- and Muslim-American communities.  
As Michael Suleiman notes: 
...the Zionists have the advantage of working in a society in which there 
was no equivalent countervailing pressure group.  Thus, especially in 
1948, but even today to a great extent, the absence of effective Arab 
associations working for Arab causes in the United States has made the 
Zionist task easier and the results of its efforts much greater.  The Arab 
effort in the United States has also been handicapped by the fact that 
Arab-Americans are relatively small in number, not well-organized, tend 
to be non-political, and are fractionalized into numerous sectarian and 
“ethnic” groupings based on their country of origin.63 
These communities have been growing in the years since Suleiman wrote this description 
due to both Arab and Islamic immigration and conversion to Islam; nevertheless, much of 
this analysis remains essentially accurate.   As a newer immigrant group many Arab and 
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Muslim-Americans have been far less integrated into the American political system and 
far more reticent about expressing political views (in part, because they have often been 
unfamiliar with democratic political culture) as compared to the Jewish community.  In 
addition, they have been more divided by internal political cleavages reflecting religious 
differences and nations of origin than the Jewish community.  Bard notes that of three 
million Arabs in the United States, “approximately 80 percent of them are Lebanese 
Christians who tend to be unsympathetic to the Arab lobby’s goals.”64  Those 
organizations that have been created to lobby against pro-Israel policies have often been 
small and ineffective.65  In this policy vacuum, it has been relatively easy for AIPAC to 
succeed, because there have often been few political incentives for politicians to oppose 
them and numerous incentives to listen to them. 
 AIPAC has also been able to act as the consensus “pro-Israel” organization for the 
American Jewish community.   In the 1980s, its primary intra-Jewish challenge came 
from the New Jewish Agenda (founded in 1980), a multi-issue left-wing group that 
attempted to organize “a Jewish voice on the Left and a Left voice in the Jewish 
community.”66  This organization could never challenge AIPAC in terms of funding and 
                                                 
64
  Bard, Mitchell. The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to 
Domestic Influence on United States Middle East Policy: 8. Bard’s figure of 3 million 
has probably increased since his work was published in 1991. 
65  For a general, if somewhat dated account of this issue, see Khoury, Nabeel A.  
“The Arab Lobby:  Problems and Prospects.”  Middle East Journal.  (Vol. 41, No. 3, 
Summer, 1987) 
 




organization.  Its multi-issue focus diluted its already limited resources. Its funding ran 
out in 1992.  The emergence of internet organizing and the outbreak of the Second 
Intifada has begun to produce a new wave of Jewish organizing on this issue, which is 
just beginning to emerge as an alternative voice in the Jewish community.  (This will be 
discussed in detail in a Chapter 7.) 
Though AIPAC dates back to the early 1950s (when it initially used the name the 
American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs), it remained a relatively minor political 
player until the early 1980s.67  There were, however, major Jewish campaign donors 
(especially as part of the Democratic coalition), who made significant donations to 
Presidential and Congressional campaigns before the rise of AIPAC.  These donors acted 
more as individuals than as an organized pro-Israel lobby.  It is, however, worth 
observing that Jewish friends, contributors, and advisors have influenced many U.S. 
Presidents to some degree -- although it is somewhat difficult to generalize on this point.68  
                                                 
67
  For an account of AIPAC early days, it may be useful to consult the biography 
of its founding director, I.L. Kenen’s who ran the organization from its inception until 
1974. I.L. Kenen. Israel’s Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington.  (Buffalo, 
NY: Prometheus Books, 1981)   
68
  Every recent president from both parties has had established ties to various 
confidents and advisors within the Jewish community.  Not surprisingly, Democrats have 
usually had more and often higher level Jewish contacts than Republicans.  Truman’s 
decision to meet with Zionist leader Chaim Weizman and, ultimately to recognize Israel, 
was influenced by his friend and former business partner, Eddie Jacobson.  On the 
Republican side, Max Fisher was a major donor to the Eisenhower campaigns. 
Eisenhower’s Jewish advisors included Lewis Strauss, Philip Klutznick, Maxwell Rabb, 
Arthur Burns, and Norman Cousins. Kennedy’s friends and supporters included Dewey 
Stone, Abraham Ribicoff, Eugene Rostow, Philip Klutznick, Abraham Feinberg, and 
Myer Feldmam.   Lyndon Johnson supporters and advisors included James Novy and 
Supreme Court Justices Arthur Goldberg and Abraham Fortas. Fisher also acted as an 
 
 -47-
Additionally, Presidents and their administrations have been influenced by an electoral 
calculus in which the Jewish votes in key states (such as New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California) have proved important -- especially to the 
Democratic Party.  Jewish campaign contributions have also been important to 
Presidential candidates -- particularly in the Democratic primaries.  Following his narrow 
victory in 1960, President Kennedy is even alleged (perhaps apocryphally) to have told 
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that, “I know I was elected because the votes of 
                                                                                                                                                 
informal advisor and diplomatic go-between for President Nixon.  Nixon’s Jewish 
advisors included Leonard Garment, Herbert Stein, Arthur Burns, William Safire, and, of 
course, his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  Nixon was also fond of then-Israeli 
Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin.  Ford maintained ties with the ubiquitous Max Fisher as well 
as Edward Levi, and Alan Greenspan.  Jimmy Carter was close to Admiral Hyman 
Rickover.  His Jewish appointees included Michael Blumenthal, Harold Brown, Philip 
Klutznick, Neil Goldschidt, Max Kampelman, Stuart Eizenstat, Edward Sanders, and 
Lloyd Cutler.    Reagan had a nearly endless list of Jewish contacts from his Hollywood 
days.  His Jewish political contacts included Milton Friedman, Ronald Lauder, Lenore 
Cohn Annenberg, Marshall Berger, Eugene Rostow, Max Kampelman, Richard Perle, 
Morris Abram, and William Kristol. George H.W. Bush’s Jewish advisors included Jay 
Lefkowitz, William Kristol, Robert Strauss, Dennis Ross and Paul Wolfowitz.  Bill 
Clinton’s had the longest list of Jewish political and policy advisors including Madeline 
Albright (who didn’t learn of her family’s Jewish background until 1997), Robert Rubin, 
Lawrence Summers, William Cohen, Daniel Glickman, Mickey Kantor, Robert Reich, 
Jacob Lew, Richard Holbrooke, Charlene Barshefsky, Stuart Eisenstat, Martin Indyk, 
Daniel Kurtzer, Felix Rohatyn, Dennis Ross, Roger Altman, Samuel Berger, Sidney 
Blumenthal, Lloyd Cutler, Lynn Cutler, Rahm Emanuel, Stanley Greenberg, Alan 
Greenspan, Mandy Grunwald, Ann Lewis, Ira Magaziner, Abner Mikva, Dick Morris, 
and Alice Rivlin.  During, his first term Clinton also established a close bond with Israeli 
Prime Minster Yitzhak Rabin – who was assassinated in 1995.  Finally, the current 
President, George W. Bush has had numerous key neo-conservative Jewish advisors in 
the area of foreign policy including Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Elliot 
Abrams, and William Kristol.  Bush was close to Israeli Prime Minster Ariel Sharon until 
he was incapacitated by a stroke in January, 2006. Except for the current administration, 
the Jewish advisors listed above are taken from various chapters on individual 
administrations in Dalin, David D. & Alfred J. Kolatch.  The Presidents of the United 




American Jews.  I owe them my election.  Tell me, is there something that I can do for 
the Jewish people?”69 
The expansion of American foreign aid to Israel -- that has come to signify the 
“special relationship” -- came under President Richard Nixon.  Ironically, Nixon was 
probably the American President who owed the least to the Jewish voters. 70  Nixon lost 
the Jewish vote to Hubert Humphrey by a large margin in 1968, and did not expect to do 
much better among this generally liberal constituency in the 1972 election.71  Nixon’s 
initial decision to expand foreign aid, as noted above, appears to have been primarily 
strategic, not political.72   In 1974, the introduction of what became known as the “oil 
weapon” shifted the strategic analysis.  The dramatic events of the oil embargo made 
                                                 
69
  Tivnan, Edward. The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign 
Policy. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987): 56.  Tivnan is quoting from Michael 
Bar-Zohar Hebrew biography, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977) 
70   It’s perhaps even more ironic that the Nixon tapes have revealed Nixon’s 
noxious streak of anti-Semitism. 
 
71
  In spite of the Democratic leanings of most American Jews, the Israeli 
Ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, informally endorsed President Nixon 
during the 1972 campaign and encouraged American Jews to vote for Nixon.  Nixon’s 
percentage of the Jewish vote rose from 20% in 1968 to 40% in 1972.  However, it 
should be noted that Nixon won in a landslide in 1972 against a weak Democratic 
opponent, George McGovern.  Raviv and Melman: 156 
72
  Ironically, despite the presence of key Jewish advisors like Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and speechwriter William Safire, there is at least some evidence of 
Nixon making anti-Semitic comments on the famous White House tapes.  Nixon’s anti-
Semitic vitriol appears to have been directed at the liberal New York Jews who opposed 
many of his policies and thus have been more political than personal in some sense. 
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clear -- strategically and economically -- what policymakers starting with Secretary of 
State George Marshall had insisted America’s best interest lay with the Arab states. 
However, in one of the ironies of history, it is in that same year that a new 
campaign finance system redefined the rules of American politics.  Following the 
resignation of President Nixon in 1974, Congress passed a sweeping campaign finance 
reform law that was intended to “clean-up” American politics after the excesses of the 
Watergate scandal.  Over the next few years that system dramatically altered the political 
incentives within the American electoral system.  Initially, many Jewish leaders opposed 
the campaign finance reform.  However, one of the many unintended consequences of 
this law was that it increased the power of the pro-Israel lobby and thus, over time, 
greatly strengthened the “special relationship” at a time when strategic factors would 
have led one to expect its decline.  The political action committee (PAC)73 system turned 
out to be a blessing in disguise for a pro-Israel lobby that initially looked in dismay at the 
reform process.  Tivnan writes that: 
Jewish fund-raisers soon realized that they could not have created a better 
power tool for the American Jewish community than PAC.... Creating 
political action committees turned out to be a snap for the American 
Jewish community, which already had in place the most impressive 
grass-roots fund-raising apparatus in history.... The move from the fund-
raising offices of the United Jewish Appeal or Jewish National Fund or 
Israel Bond Drives or local Federations of Jewish Philanthropies to setting 
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 It is commonly assumed that AIPAC is a PAC. The PAC in AIPAC stands for 
“public affairs committee,” not “political action committee.” AIPAC’s name predates the 
creation of PACs.  It is a registered lobby, but it cannot participate directly in fund-




up a pro-Israel political action committee was a baby step.  American Jews 
had actually gained a stronger weapon for influencing policy.74 
According to Tivnan, by the early 1980s AIPAC “seemed to own Capitol Hill.”75  
Several Congressmen and Senators who opposed AIPAC’s priorities were defeated in 
primary or general elections by opponents funded by AIPAC allied PACs.76  Richard 
Curtiss has argued that AIPAC has set up a network of “stealth PACs” to funnel money 
to its supporters in Congress in order to evade the campaign finance laws.77  AIPAC is 
officially only an information-gathering and lobbying organization.  However, a 
complaint filed with the Federal Election Commission by several former government 
officials contended that AIPAC steers donors towards a network of inconspicuously 
named PACs -- National PAC, Washington PAC, Joint Action Committee for Political 
Affairs among others -- which then donate that money to pro-Israel candidates.78  Many of 
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  Tivnan:  85-86. 
75
  Tivnan: 187.  
76
  According to Findley, Paul. They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions 
Confront Israel’s Lobby. (Westport, CT:  Lawrence Hill & Company, 1985), and Curtiss, 
Richard H.  Stealth PACs: Lobbying Congress for Control of U.S. Middle East Policy 
(Washington, DC: American Education Trust, 1996), these include Reps. Paul Findley 
(R-III) in 1982, Rep. McCloskey (D-CA) in 1982 Senate Primary, Sen. George 
McGovern (D-SD) in 1980, Sen. Roger Jepsen (R-IA) in 1984, and perhaps most 
dramatically Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Charles Percy (R-IL) in 
1984. 
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  Curtiss, Richard.  Stealth PACs. 
78
  Curtiss, Richard.  Stealth PACs. The complaint is described in the preface of 
Curtiss’s book, which was written by Andrew Kilgore.  The complaint was filed in 1988 
by Curtiss, a former chief of the U.S. Information Agency, Kilgore, former ambassador to 
Qatar, former Undersecretary of State George Ball, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi 
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the board members of AIPAC also serve on the boards of these PACs.  Since candidates 
can receive money from more than one of these apparently coordinated PACs in the same 
electoral cycle, critics argue that these actions amount to a violation of the spirit, and 
perhaps the letter, of the campaign finance laws.  Fund-raising by these pro-Israel 
“stealth” PACs increased dramatically in the 1980s, although it has declined and leveled 
off in more recent electoral cycles.  (For a chart of the levels of donations see Appendix 
C) 
Critics of American policy in the Middle East, such as James Bill, have argued 
that the “special relationship” stems almost solely from “the influence Israel is able to 
muster in the American political system” which has allowed it to establish what is 
“widely assumed to be its unassailable power base in Congress.”79  Edward Tivnan notes 
that the pro-Israel “Lobby is powerful enough to engender fear among dissenters in the 
uppermost levels of American government…”80 Former Rep. Paul Findley (R-IL) goes 
much further.  He endorses former California Congressman Paul McCloskey’s statement 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arabia James Akins, former Congressman Paul Findley, Robert Hanks, a former 
commander of the U.S. Navy’s Middle East Task Force, and former Amideast President 
Orin Parker.  On June 1, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court in F.E.C. vs. Akins ruled that the 
plaintiffs had standing to sue, and sent the issue back to a lower court to make a final 
determination.  Greenhouse, Linda.  “High Court Lowers Shield of Election Panel; Also 
Agrees to Hear Deportation Appeal.”   New York Times (National Edition).   June 2, 
1998. Page A16. 
79
  Bill, James A. and Robert Springborg. Politics in the Middle East (Fourth 
Edition) (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994): 363. 
80
  Tivnan: 12. 
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that “Congress is ‘terrorized’ by AIPAC”81  Findley goes on to argue that AIPAC has so 
effectively silenced those who oppose its positions that “many Americans do not feel 
they can speak freely on one of the most complicated and challenging current issues:  The 
Arab-Israeli dispute.”82 
 Critique of Interest Group Approach.  Upon closer examination, serious 
questions arise as to whether the campaign contributions can really provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the “special relationship.”  While lobbying clearly plays an 
important role in American foreign policy in the Middle East, it does not seem to be able 
to fully account for either the durability or the unique level of “passion” of this special 
alliance  Furthermore, this argument assumes that a small, albeit relatively wealthy, 
ethnic group -- representing well under 3% of the American population and 
approximately 4% of total campaign contributions83 -- can manipulate the American 
political system against the presumed strategic and economic interests of American 
public and the interests of some of its largest corporations.  If this is the case, one 
wonders why other ethnic and religious groups -- with far more total membership and 
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  Findley, Paul. They Dare to Speak Out:  26. 
82
  Findley, Paul. They Dare to Speak Out:  315 
83
  Mansour, Camille.  Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy.  (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994): 246.  This figure is from Fialka, John and 
Brooks Jackson.  “Pro-Israel Lobby: Jewish PACs Emerge As a Powerful Force In U.S. 
Election Races --- They Gave $3.6 Million in '84 And Helped Beat Percy; Still, Some 
Doubt Impact --- Too Tied to a Single Issue?” Wall Street Journal.  (February 26, 1985)  
The figure is for the 1984 campaign, which is a fairly typical year near the peak of pro-
Israel fund-raising totals in Appendix C. 
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wealth -- have not been able to manipulate American foreign policy just as successfully 
for their favored countries.  Thus these critics of the relationship seem to have 
exaggerated the power of financial influence of “the lobby” without truly examining the 
roots of its power within the American culture which will be examined further in later 
chapters. 
An extensive analysis of the campaign finance records from the Federal Election 
Commission and the Center for Responsive Politics shows that the 35 “pro-Israel” 
Political Action Committees identified with AIPAC donated roughly $3 million in 
2006electoral cycle spread out strategically among 59 Senate candidates and 219 House 
candidates.  Since the creation of the system of PACs in the mid-1970s, AIPAC’s stealth 
PACs have given roughly $43 million (or $66 million in inflation-adjusted 2007 dollars) 
to thousands of different candidates.  This averages out to roughly $3 million during each 
cycle since they got off the ground in the early 1980s.   Most interestingly, the level of 
donations from these PACs peaked with the 1987-88 electoral cycle; both the number of 
PACs and the amount donated has been decreasing sharply since that time – especially in 
inflation-adjusted dollars. (See Appendix C for total for each electoral cycle and the 
accompanying graph below.)  If the contributions were a really influential tool for 
influencing lawmakers, the expectation would be that the amount-donated would 


























































In the 2006 cycle, the largest Senate recipient was Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) 
who received $156,593 from 25 different PACs.  In the House, Rep. Mark Kirk (R-IL) 
received $75,064 from 14 different PACs.  (The largest recipients are listed in Appendix 
D).  The average Senate recipient of this money received about $27,000.  The average 
House recipient received just over $6000.  While these sums are not insignificant, they 
are relatively small in terms of the multi-million dollar House and Senate campaign 
budgets.  These PACs direct almost all of their money to incumbent Senators and House 
members whose voting record had already demonstrated their loyalty on AIPAC’s key 
issues.   They very rarely invest money in non-incumbents until they have demonstrated 
that they have a record of supporting AIPAC’s priorities.  Of course, there are other 
donations from individuals and bundled contributions, but these are more difficult to 
track than those being steered through PACs.  All in all, the logical conclusion is that 
money buys access to members of Congress and their staffs allowing them to arrange 
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meetings and make their case.  Contributions make it is easier to get access to the 
members and their key staffers much more easily than those who can not afford to make 
generous contributions.  In general, it allows them to make their case to incumbents who 
are already sympathetic to their position and already have voting records that demonstrate 
their positions.  There is little to indicate that most members of Congress vote in favor of 
AIPAC’s positions because of these campaign donations.  Rather they start receiving 
contributions from AIPAC’s allies because they agree with its priorities and continue to 
receive money as long as they continue to support its positions.  Thus the donations 
mostly act as reinforcement of existing positions, and the access that these donations 
provides serves as means of providing members with information that continues to 
reinforce their pre-existing sympathies.   
Another part of the financial contributions approach is the argument that AIPAC 
is able to defeat members of Congress in either primaries or general election who 
consistently disagree with their positions.   While there are a few celebrated cases, this 
mostly seems to be a myth created mutually by AIPAC’s friends to enhance their power 
and its critics who are attempting to demonize and exaggerate its influence.  This theory 
overlooks another very important aspect of American politics: the power of incumbency.  
In most electoral cycles, incumbent members of Congress are re-elected at a rate of 
upwards of 90%.  Most districts of the U.S. House of Representatives have been so 
gerrymandered that they are nearly locked in for one-party or another.  Most incumbents 
are also extremely difficult to defeat in intra-party primaries.  Even well-funded primary 
challengers rarely succeed. 
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While there are a few cases in which AIPAC has mobilized its support against 
members that it viewed as particularly strong political opponents in Congress such as 
Rep. Paul Findley (R-IL), Sen. Charles Percy (R-IL) in the early 1980s, and more 
recently Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), and Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R-RI), there is little 
indication that AIPAC’s resources were really decisive in most of these races.  The pro-
Israel PACs provided only $27,200 to McKinney’s opponent, Rep. Hank Johnson (D-
GA).  The Pro-Israel PACs provided Steven Laffey, Chafee’s Republican primary 
opponent, with $24,750 and his general election opponent Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse with 
$75,500.  While these sums are significant, they probably weren’t enough swing the 
balance in these campaigns.  Chafee is widely understood to have lost, because he was a 
Republican running in heavily Democratic state in a heavily Democratic electoral cycle 
when his seat was widely and correctly understood to be necessary to achieve a 
Democratic majority in the Senate. 
AIPAC and the Jewish lobby have only targeted and defeated a very small 
number of incumbent members of Congress over the years.  A fairly typical case is 
Georgia Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney who was widely known as a critic of Israel.  
McKinney was targeted and defeated by another African-American in a primary in 2002.  
But McKinney was incredibly vulnerable because of her penchant for controversial 
remarks including an outrageous statement that President Bush knew about the 
September 11th attacks ahead of time.  While the pro-Israel lobby played a role in 
financing her opponent and helping to defeat her, it was only able to do so because other 
factors had made her extremely vulnerable.  Ironically, McKinney was re-elected to 
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Congress in 2004 when the opponent that defeated her made an unsuccessful bid for a 
Senate seat. She was then defeated a second time in a Democratic primary in 2006.  
While AIPAC played a role in financing her opponent, her political situation was made 
much worse by her outrageous public statements and an incident in which she apparently 
hit a Capitol Hill policeman who stopped her while she was going through a security 
checkpoint.    
In general, the candidates that AIPAC has campaigned against were candidates 
who were already weakened for a variety of reasons that had little to do with their 
positions on Israel.  AIPAC can do little to threaten most members of the House of 
Representatives, because most members have been gerrymandered into safe districts.  
Most Senators are also well-protected by the advantages of incumbency although their 
statewide races are a bit more competitive than most U.S. House districts.  While Cynthia 
McKinney was an exception, most members are also well enough established to fend off 
a primary opponent.  As a rule, the power of incumbency would seem to provide a 
significant limit on the ability of AIPAC to “punish” most member of Congress as some 
of its critics have asserted.   
The argument that AIPAC had the power to defeat opponents was stronger when 
AIPAC was building its reputation in the 1980s and the giving of its network of PACs 
was at its maximum.  Its level of donation has been declining since its peak in late 1980s.  
(See the chart above and more details in Appendix C.)  In 1984, AIPAC’s director Tom 
Dine claimed that AIPAC was responsible for defeating Senator Charles Percy.  Records 
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indicate that its network donated over $300,000 to his successful opponent Paul Simon.84  
This may be one of the AIPAC strongest claims.  While there are some cases, where 
AIPAC’s and its network of “Stealth PACs” may have been the key actors in defeating a 
particularly lawmaker, these cases seem to be few-and-far-between.  In most cases, they 
seem to result from AIPAC spotting an opportunity to defeat a vulnerable critic and 
taking advantage of that opportunity.  Indeed, there are numerous members who have 
long records of criticizing Israel and U.S. foreign policy who AIPAC and its allies has 
never seriously attempted to challenge, because they know they wouldn’t be able to come 
close to mounting a successful challenge.   
While it is certainly clear that the money that AIPAC can use in elections 
provides to candidates gains access to continue to build relationships with members of 
Congress, there is little proof of the often crude arguments that AIPAC and its network of 
“Stealth PACs” have bought control of Congress and can use money to control how 
members or vote and defeat those who disagree with them.   
 Furthermore, this approach also seems to misunderstand the manner in which 
foreign policy is made in the United States.  Constitutionally, the nexus of foreign policy 
making is in the Executive Branch, not the Congress, so the assumption that contributions 
to Congressional campaigns shapes policies around crucial decisions around the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process seems highly problematic.  Congress acts mostly as an 
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intermediary filtering public opinion and transmitting it to the decision-making bodies in 
the Executive Branch. 
Perhaps, most importantly, theories of lobby’s effectiveness in influencing 
Congress are rarely able to explain the policies of the Executive Branch.  In a dated, but 
still useful account, Steven Spiegel, writing about Presidential decision-making, argues 
that: 
Domestic politics affects the timing and handling of [Presidential] 
decisions [regarding Israel] more than their actual content.  Presidents try 
to avoid antagonizing Israel’s supporters in an election year, especially a 
presidential election year.  They will delay decisions or manipulate 
announcements so they receive credit for favorable actions.  Yet they 
make decisions generally for reasons of state, largely unrelated to 
domestic politics and often in defiance of domestic groups.85 
Spiegel’s account tends to predate the full-scale development of the pro-Israel lobby and 
the full blossoming of the “special relationship.”  It is a useful description of the “special 
relationship” of the 1970s when strategic concerns still dominated, but proves less so in 
describing later periods.  In today’s political climate, it is easy to assume that campaign 
contributions have always dictated American foreign policy priorities in the Middle East 
or other parts of the world.  While many scholars (including Huntington and Shain 
above) believe that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy has been deeply 
influenced by ethnic campaign contributors, the question of whether or not the same 
explanation can be applied retroactively to preceding administrations remains a bit more 




complicated.  This straightforward pluralist explanation greatly underestimates the 
complexity of the issues and ideas involved.  No less a critic of American policy than the 
aforementioned Noam Chomsky argues that, “No pressure group will dominate access to 
public opinion or maintain consistent influence over policy-making unless its aims are 
close to those of elite elements with real power.”86 
While the pro-Israel lobby has proven itself very effective over the years, it seems 
hard to believe that the contributions of AIPAC’s “stealth PACs” can fully explain the 
“special relationship” at the level of the Executive Branch.  The pro-Israel lobby is 
demonstrably more influential facilitating passage of the foreign aid bill and pro-Israel 
legislation, such as the aforementioned Embassy Relocation Act and several acts placing 
sanctions against Iran, than it is at influencing the most important Executive Branch 
decisions around the Oslo peace process, which have been made primarily in the State 
Department and the White House.  By Constitutional design, the Executive branch 
institutions, not the Congress makes the most significant foreign policy decisions.  While 
these institutions are far from immune from political pressures, they have historically 
been somewhat more removed from the immediate fray of every day political pressures 
and by design and history far more able than the “people’s branch” to examine the 
broader array of interests that effect foreign policy decisions.  Many of the staff people in 
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these branches, particularly the State Department, are career professionals who are 
relatively immune to politics and lobbying.  Even the Congress recognizes this.  When 
they pass extremely political bills, such as the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act (which calls 
for the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem), or most recently the 
2006 Palestinian Anti-terrorism Act (A response to the Hamas victory in the Palestinian 
elections), they almost always included a national security waiver to allow the President 
to waive the bill that they passed.  In a sense this is Congress’s way of recognizing the 
inherently political nature of its actions and its inability to enact a coherent foreign policy 
separate from politics.  In the case of the Embassy bill, the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations have always exercised their national security waivers knowing that such a 
move would be detrimental to the peace process. 
At the level of the Executive branch, Presidential decision-making has been far 
less influenced by contributions.  Promises made by Presidential candidates in the heat of 
election campaigns -- such as Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign promise to relocate the 
American embassy -- are often broken once the election is over. There is always a 
significant gap between campaign rhetoric and the policy that Presidents and their 
administration enact once they are in office and can take a more careful look at the 
nation’s actual strategic interests in an environment that while not removed from political 
forces is far more insulated than on the campaign trail.  Campaign donations rarely seem 
to be the most significant factor in determining American foreign policy in such sensitive 
regions.  The Middle East is simply too strategically sensitive for contributions to 
completely shape American policy towards Israel and the region as a whole.   
 
 -62-
During primary and general election campaigns candidates are widely expected to 
conform with the rhetorical expectations of the Pro-Israel Lobby and commit themselves 
to support Israel particularly when address Jewish audiences.  Candidates who fail to tow 
the “pro-Israel” line, particularly in the Democratic primaries, are often severally 
criticized for doing so.  For example, in September, 2003, then-Democratic front-runner 
Howard Dean was widely criticized by supporters of Israel for saying, “the United States 
needs an even-handed approach in the conflict.”87  Since few serious candidates challenge 
party orthodoxy on this issue, and because no issue exists in a vacuum, it is difficult to 
say how important promising to conform on this issue is to attaining the nomination of 
either major party.  The biggest influence appears to be over the campaign rhetoric which 
then creates a structure of political commitments that winning candidates have committed 
to.  The fact that they have made these commits than to serves to impose limits on the 
political flexibility of each President to act once he is in office.  Such promises do not 
preclude a President taking an aggressive line on pressuring the Israelis to pursue the 
peace process, but they create an additional hurdle that makes such options more difficult 
to pursue. 
Thus, there appears to be an institutional partitioning of the relationship between 
the branches of government.  While Congress, and by extension the President, are 
influenced by campaign donations to appropriate extraordinarily disproportionate sums of 
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foreign aid to Israel, but the more strategically important diplomatic decisions are the 
purview of the Executive branch and its national security bureaucracy.  These 
bureaucracies and the political appointees that lead them may give a voice to pro-Israel 
lobby, but they do not allow them to shape policy decisions.   The pro-Israel lobby thus is 
able to play a dominant role over significant decisions on financial and symbol issues, but 
its ability to influence key strategic policy decisions around the peace process appears to 
be far more limited. 
Those who attribute the durability of the “special relationship” to AIPAC’s ability 
to direct contributions into the coffers of Congressional, and even Presidential, candidates 
are actually misunderstanding the nature of the American political system within which 
AIPAC operates.  AIPAC’s lobbying efforts do not occur in a political vacuum 
independent of American society.  There is plenty of evidence to suggest that some 
Congressional actions are directly influenced by campaign cash, but these issues are 
usually more low profile, usually domestic issues where Congress has more influence, 
and usually about financial and budgetary issues where Congress predominates. 
Of course, contributions do provide donors with access to members of Congress, 
but it is unclear whether that access does much more than the grassroots lobbying that 
AIPAC and its supporters use to pressure members of Congress. Furthermore, the 
enormous and highly sophisticated work of AIPAC and a wide variety of American 
Jewish groups to sell their ideas to both to the general public and the members of 
Congress suggests that they realize that while campaign contributions may be a useful 
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tool, it is far from sufficient to write a check to a member of Congress and expect that he 
or she will vote for your policies.  The so-called “legalized bribery” of campaign 
contributions to politicians can only take place within a cultural, moral, and ideological 
context that legitimizes the adoption of policies that are overwhelmingly sympathetic to 
the state of Israel.   
 In their highly debated article Mearsheimer and Walt assert “that the bond 
between the two countries [the United States and Israel] was based on shared strategic 
interests or compelling moral imperatives, but neither explanation can account for the 
remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the  US provides [to Israel].”88  
As noted above, they are essentially correct about the lack of synonymous strategic 
interests and that Israel may, in fact, be more of a strategic burden than a strategic interest 
in the context of the Global War on Terrorism.  However, their argument for the lack of 
“compelling moral” case in which they state that “viewed objectively, its [Israel’s] past 
and present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians”89 is far 
too simplistic.  In large part, this is because they assume in their own words that morality 
can be “viewed objectively” and they attempt to privilege their own moral standards over 
those of  held by a majority of the American public.  As will be discussed in detail in 
upcoming chapters, morality is to a great degree a subjective quality that is culturally and 
political determined.  While Mearsheimer and Walt don’t see an “objective” rationale for 
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supporting Israel millions of American Jews and Christians do see moral reasons for 
supporting Israel based on their interpretation of America’s values.  Mearsheimer and 
Walt may not agree with their moral interpretation of millions of Americans and their 
representatives, but it is too simplistic to dismiss their views as not being moral-
determined ones. 
 Mearsheimer and Walt instead explain U.S. policy as being, as noted above, the 
result of the “unmatched power of the Israel lobby.”90  They do an excellent job of 
presenting copious examples of this power without really explaining its origins in 
American society and culture.  In so doing, they fail to see that the Lobby is less of an 
explanation of the “special relationship” than a product of it -- after all, the Lobby didn’t 
become a dominant power in Washington until about a decade after the formation of the 
alliance in 1970.  The power of the Lobby itself rather than being a full explanation of the 
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this author, recognize that the pro-Israel Lobby has been much more concerned about the 
threats posed to Israel by Syria and Iran than those posed by Iraq.  As the administration 
moved towards war with Iraq, the Lobby appears to have supported the administration’s 
actions in the context of the post-September 11th Global War on Terror, but there is little 
indication that they were particularly influential in prompting the administration to move 
in that particular direction since they realized that Iraq was contained and posed a 




U.S.-Israel alliance really requires an explanation.  Thus it is to American society and its 
political culture that we must turn to for a fuller explanation of the motives of American 
policymakers.   As early as 1973, William Quandt perceptively recognized a phenomenon 
that was to become even more pronounced in the years to come.  As Quandt noted 
lobbying could not fully explain a phenomenon that was ultimately cultural: 
Probably the most important domestic factor in the United States 
policymaking in the Middle East consists of the widespread pre-
disposition among officials and the general public to favor Israel over 
Arab states.  This is not the result of specific pressures by pro-Israeli 
groups or the Zionist lobby, but rather it reflects the fact that for over two 
decades Israel’s side of the story has been heard repeatedly in the press, in 
schools, and in other mass media.  Since many Americans, including 
policy-makers, take for granted the merits of the Israeli case, it is not often 
necessary for pro-Israeli groups to use heavy-handed pressure.  Instead, 
they need to define issues, to keep Israeli security at the forefront of 
attention, and to provide political favors for specific congressmen.  When 
this is done, the rest can be left to friendly predispositions towards Israel 
and to the effective Israeli embassy in Washington.  President Johnson and 
his close advisors were not the object of pressure by pro-Israeli groups 
largely because they agreed with these groups on most basic issues.91 
Thus it becomes obvious that long before AIPAC or “stealth PACs” appeared on the 
Washington scene, policy elites (in both the Legislative and Executive branches) were 
predisposed towards treating Israel sympathetically.  Palestinian scholar Camille 
Mansour summarizes the issue quite well as follows: 
There is a remarkable disproportion between the intrinsic dimension of the 
[pro-Israel] lobby, limited after all in demographic and even financial 
terms, and its considerable power.  The lobby’s admirable organization, 
the multiplier factors of Jewish financial power, and the Jewish vote are 
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not sufficient in themselves to establish this power.  What would be the 
point of explaining American-Israeli relations by the power of the lobby if 
this power itself remained unexplained or unexplainable? .... The power of 
the lobby, rather than explaining the privileged character of American-
Israeli relations, needs itself to be explained.  And it can be explained only 
by factors external to the lobby -- factors that not only constitute reasons 
for its great success but also contribute in turn to explaining directly the 
special relationship between the United States and Israel.92 
The prevailing rationalist and pluralist explanations offered are not so much 
incorrect as they are incomplete and partial explanations of the U.S.-Israel alliance.  
While strategic factors are certainly important to the thinking of policymakers, they can 
not be viewed as fully objective rationale explanation of American behavior towards 
Israel.  While there is clearly an objective reality of U.S. strategic interest following it 
would not produce the policy results that we see.  Instead, it becomes clear that the 
definition of American strategic interests is determined by a set of existing political pre-
dispositions through which policymaking elites view the conflict.  Policymaking can 
never be fully “objective” or “rational,” because it can never be divorced from its 
political and cultural context that shapes the context of what policy-makers see as being 
strategically advantageous. 
Similarly, while pluralist theory offers a partial explanation of how the alliance 
functions and the importance of the role of the Pro-Israel lobby, it can not as Mansour 
suggests explain why the Lobby is so powerful and influential, because it doesn’t explain 
why it has so much money and so much political influence.  Only by incorporating a 
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broader political culture approach can we begin to see how the power of the pro-Israel is 
empowered by the cultural lens through which policy-making elites interpret the Middle 
East which make them initially sympathetic and receptive to both the Lobby’s arguments 
and its enticements before representatives from the Lobby ever approach them or offer 
them a single donation.  (The diagram on the next page presents this argument in highly 
simplified form.) 
 Now let us turn to trying to explain to a careful examination of the external 
cultural factors that underlie the American “predispositions” that have made the patron-
client relationship between Israel and the United States so unique, so durable, so 









Theoretical Logic of Competing Theories to Explain the 
U.S. Policymaking Process around the U.S.-Israel Alliance 
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Chapter 2 – Political Cultural Explanation 
“[The Holy Land] always brought to my mind a vague suggestion of a 
country as large as the United States.  I suppose it was because I could not 
conceive of a small country having so long a history.”  - Mark Twain, 
Innocents Abroad, 1867 
 As noted above, realist and pluralist interest group theories only tell part of the 
story of the U.S.-Israel alliance without providing the full explanatory context that 
incorporates cultural forces including the larger society’s moral values, images, ideas and 
ideologies which act as interpretive cultural lenses through which Americans have come 
to view both Israel and the Middle East.  These lenses distort the picture that is seen 
putting more emphasis on some aspects of reality and less on others.   As Mark Twain 
suggests, the image in the American mind of the “Holy Land” is very different from the 
one that he found when he actually arrived there in person.  
 These lenses predispose American policymaking elites to take a positive view of 
Israel -- as being similar to and compatible with America -- and predispose Americans to 
seeing the Arab and Islamic worlds negatively as opposite then themselves.  The basic 
perennial images of how Israel is seen in the United States was well established in the 
American mindset since the 1950s and 1960s and will be described in much greater detail 
below.  They have shaped the context in which U.S. administration have defined 
America’s strategic interests.  The images are filtered through a series of cultural 
institutions (film, TV, Media, Museums, educational institutions, religious institutions) 
within the society which over time adapt them to changing trends, ideas, and current 
events within the society.   The culture then shapes both mass opinion and elite opinion 
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which are further filtered through a variety of political institutions (lobbies, parties, and 
even Congress).  These political institutions help shape and reshape information fed into 
the Executive Branch which ultimately makes the key policy decisions.  Thus some of the 
images are strengthened and others weakened over time.  Some images are adapted to 
take on new meanings and layers of interpretation within new contexts.  As a whole, the 
broader cultural framework maintains a flexible, adaptive structure that adjusts to absorb 
new events and situations while maintaining a basic continuity. 
 The U.S.-Israel alliance has been built on this cultural framework which has 
shaped the alliance and its inner workings.  A series of dramatic cultural shifts, including 
the Civil Rights movement, the rise of the religious right, and the increased tension with 
the Islamic world following the Arab Oil Embargo, occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.  
These cultural transformations would ultimately, if largely unintentionally, affect the 
images that Americans held of Israel and the Middle East.    These immense events 
transformed the way in which American society has viewed the roles of American Jews, 
the political role of Christianity, and the relationship of America to the Islamic world.  
Thus cultural continuity and inertia acts as the glue that holds the U.S.-Israel alliance 
together while at the same time the alliance continues to adapt and adjust to new events 
and situations.  The two largest shifts in the strategic environment (1974 Arab Oil 
Embargo and the 1989 End of the Cold War) both resulted in brief periods of the 
retrenchment (under the administrations of Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, 




 As has been described in the Introduction and Chapter 1 above, the essential and 
distinguishing feature that separates a strategically-defined alliance from a culturally-
defined alliance between Israel and the United States is in the way in which policy is 
compartmentalized.  In the early years of emerging U.S.-Israel strategic alliance (roughly 
the 1960s) and the first decade of the U.S.-Israel “special relationship” (roughly the 
1970s), the United States premised the alliance on the strategic rationale that Israel was a 
strategic asset in the Cold War fight against communism and that a close alliance with 
Israel could be used as strategic leverage to advance the Middle East peace process (first 
with the Arab states and later with the Palestinians) which would resolve a nagging 
source of regional instability.  Thus the strategic alliance with Israel was a tool for 
advancing the peace process. 
 Beginning in the 1980s and particularly in the last two decades, the U.S.-Israel 
alliance has gradually became less of a utilitarian alliance designed to advance the peace 
process and stabilize the region.  Instead maintaining the alliance as a means of 
protecting Israel has more and more become an independent goal in to and of itself. (See 
chart on p.18 of the Introduction.)  The desire to protect and secure Israel has become a 
goal that is to be pursued regardless of how it affects broader U.S. strategic interests in 
the Middle East.  The result is that maintaining and strengthening the alliance in order to 
better secure Israel has become a goal of U.S. policy both rhetorically and in practice.  
Thus the U.S. strategic goal of advancing the peace process is separated, that is, 
compartmentalized, from the U.S. goal of protecting and securing Israel.   
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 As Al Gore said in the 1998 speech quoted above, “It [our special relationship 
with Israel] does not depend on the peace process, it transcends the peace process.”93  
Thus the goal of the peace process is placed in one compartment while the goal of 
protecting Israel is placed in another compartment.  Unlike the policies of Eisenhower, 
Ford, Carter, and George H.W. Bush by the time of the Clinton and the George W. Bush 
administrations, Israel’s alliance with the United States no longer depended on a mutual 
desire to advance the peace process.  U.S. strategic interests are thus redefined in such a 
way that advancing the peace process is at best a secondary goal that is to be advanced, if 
at all, on Israel’s timeframe and on its terms.   These policies which were emerging in the 
Clinton administration became deeply embedded in the post-9/11 neo-conservative 
framework adopted by the Bush/Cheney administration.  Gerald Steinberg notes that “the 
[U.S.-Israel] strategic relationship appears to be independent of the status of the political 
relations [and thus], is sufficiently robust in order to ride-out short-term policy 
disagreements.”94  Actually, Steinberg’s claim is perhaps too modest, the relationship 
appears to be able “to ride-out” long-term differences in strategic priorities as well.  To 
use the family analogy again, the United States seems to treat Israel like a beloved 
petulant child, who is loved and doted on despite his/her naughty behavior.  The child is 
praised when he/she does something positive and only lightly rebuked when it constantly 
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disobeys its loving and forgiving parent.  Essentially, the child is so loved that the parent 
is unable or unwilling to discipline it for its own good. 
The Role of Political Culture.  In this context, this study is designed to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of using political culture to better explain the decisions of 
the American political elites have made foreign policy decisions about the U.S.-Israel 
relationship.  Most political culture studies have their origins in Civic Culture, Almond 
and Verba’s seminal 1963 five-country study of the relationship between political culture 
and democratic stability and participation.95  Almond and Verba argued that America’s 
participatory civic culture led to greater democratic stability.  Almond and Verba defined 
the political culture of a nation as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation 
toward political objects among the members of the nation.”96   Elsewhere Verba defined 
political culture as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values 
which defines the situation in which political action takes place.”97  It is useful to state the 
postulates of the political culture approach up front and to note how these differ from 
those of the rational choice approach.  These postulates have been summarized by Harry 
Eckstein as follows: 
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Actors do not respond directly to “situations” but respond to them through 
mediating “orientations”....  Orientations vary and are not mere subjective 
reflections of objective conditions.... Orientations are learned through the 
agency of external “socializers”.... The process can be direct...or it can 
occur indirectly... Although learning is regarded as continuous throughout 
life...early learning....is regarded as a sort of filter for later learning.... To 
summarize, “cultural” people process experience into action through 
general cognitive, affective, and evaluative predispositions; the patterns of 
such predispositions vary from society to society, from social segment to 
social segment; they do not vary because objective social situations or 
structures vary but because of culturally determined learning.... 
Orientations are not superstructural reflections of objective structures, but 
themselves invest structures and behaviors with cognitive and normative 
meaning.98 
Robert Putnam’s study, Making Democracy Work, argued by studying the 
differences between the political cultures of northern and southern Italy that historically-
rooted political culture determined the nature and effectiveness of political institutions.99  
David Laitin’s review of Putnam suggests that his “pioneering work” has defined an 
entirely “renewed research program” for political science.100  Still Laitin argues that one of 
the weaknesses of Putnam’s study is that he needs to adopt a “richer notion of culture, 
one built upon a Gertzian framework.... [Which] will specify more precisely than they 
have in the past what particular forms of culture have what impacts on outcomes.” 101  
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This study is designed to pick up the challenge offered by Laitin by adopting a richer and 
clearer understanding of cultural predispositions and orientations and their impact on 
narrow set of policy outcomes over an extended period of time. 
While there are numerous ways to explain and define the essential structure and 
values of American political culture, it is useful to start with a general description, which 
will be developed further as this study progresses.  Any discussion of American political 
development must start with an understanding of America’s exceptional political 
development and the manner in which it has affected its foreign policy.  It has often been 
noted that unlike most countries America is as much an idea as physical place.  Richard 
Payne notes that: 
To a much greater extent than most other countries, the United States is 
not just a geographic entity; it is an ideology or a set of beliefs.  The 
dominant culture, which embodies that creed, profoundly affects the 
content of foreign policy, and directly and significantly shapes responses 
to international problems.  Public discourse, policy debates, all the abstract 
analytical models, and various methods of solving problems are ultimately 
anchored in the “American Way.”  The relative newness of the United 
States as a nation, its isolation from European quarrels, its endemic 
provincialism, its unmatched racial and ethnic diversity, and the fact that 
the country was founded as a set of beliefs have elevated historical 
experiences and ideology to a prominent role in foreign policymaking.  In 
many cases, culture, the means by which such a vast and often rootless 
society has the means by which such as vast and often rootless society has 
managed to retain its identity and global leadership, has been one of the 
most important determinants of foreign activities or the lack of them.102 
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Within this exceptional framework, Daniel Franklin concisely describes the 
central values of that American ideology, or “American way” as the: 
...More or less shared notions of individualism, equality, meritocracy, and 
a belief in democracy and the free market.  What draws Americans 
together is a common immigrant experience.103 
As will be explained below, this study is premised on examining a series of changes in 
political orientations that have occurred within American culture over the last several 
decades.  These changes have not affected the basic values of American political culture 
as much as they have changed the way in which the public and policy-makers interpret 
and apply those cultural values to their thinking about the Middle East.  Thus the changes 
occurring within a broad framework of overall cultural continuity serve as this study’s 
independent variable.  Whereas the political culture studies described above examined 
broad institutional issues, this one is designed to explain the relationship between 
changes in the interpretation of the political culture and a relatively narrow dependent 
variable -- the decisions of political elites about the development, maintenance, and 
consolidation of the American “special relationship” with the State of Israel, with a 
particular focus to evolution after the 1967 Six-Day War. 
From what has been described in the preceding discussion, it is clear that mono-
causal explanations do not do much to elucidate the behavior of the American political 
elite as regards the U.S.-Israel “special relationship.”  Since the American political elite’s 
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behavior can not be fully explained as acting in the country’s strategic interests, nor can it 
be completely explained as having been “bribed” by campaign contributors, we must 
consider why this group has adopted the policies that it has.  Ultimately, it will prove 
useful to view both strategic interests and domestic political contributions, not as 
independent variables, but rather as intervening variables that are best viewed through the 
lenses of political culture.  Anthony Rusonik summarizes the problem with the literature 
on the “special relationship” as follows: 
Both the pro-Israel and the pro-Arab advocacy literatures in the United 
States tend to be transparently partisan and to do scholarship a disservice.  
If the pro-Israel camp overestimates Israel’s strategic value to the United 
States as an explanation of US support, while the pro-Arab camp 
exaggerates the influence of the Israel lobby over decisionmakers, the true 
sources of US support for Israel may lie in moral factors.104 
Most studies of these issues do not examine the array of cultural “soft” factors 
that under gird the effectiveness of the American Jewish lobby in strengthening the 
“special relationship.”  Nor do they address how changes in the interpretation of 
American culture have often unintentionally served to preserve and strengthen the 
alliance even after the strategic rationale upon which it was originally premised has 
mostly dissolved.  The result has been that the strategic framework and rationale have 
become a rationalization for a deeper and more complicated cultural explanation that is 
harder for politicians and academics to both understand and articulate to their various 
constituencies.  This analysis suggests that both the understanding of Israel as a strategic 
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asset and the influence of the pro-Israel lobby have in fact evolved as products of the 
cultural connection between the two societies.  The survival and security of Israel has 
become a positive value, in and of itself, of American foreign policy rather than a means 
of accomplishing a specific strategic end for the United States.  The sympathetic 
treatment that the pro-Israel lobby receives has become an extension of Israel’s favored 
place in America’s moral lexicon.  
Shifting Elite Culture.  Since elites, by definition, are more powerful than the 
mass public, it worthwhile to try to extrapolate how it is that a democratic public is able 
to influence decisions made by political elites.  Robert Putnam suggests four methods by 
which the mass public can affect the decisions of democratic elites.105  Each of these four 
methods is helpful for understanding the process by which the relationship between the 
mass public and the elites are conceptualized in this project. 
First, Putnam argues that “the elite may be like the non-elite in crucial respects.”106  
This argument suggests that on some issues similarities between the background the elites 
and the mass public may lead the elites to advocate the policies that the public believes 
in.  This argument is somewhat limited by the fact that all kinds of studies have shown 
that political elites are better educated, wealthier, more likely to be male, and less likely 
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to belong to a racial minority than the general public.  Nevertheless, political elites often 
share many of same basic values as the mass public.  Both elites and the public are 
receptive to many of the same cultural stimuli.  Research has shown, for example, that in 
the United States both elites and the general public overwhelmingly support American 
Constitutional system.  There is a shared consensus on democratic rights such as free 
speech, free press, and freedom of religion.107  Elites and non-elites in the United States 
share a common belief in the capitalist system.  In addition both groups generally share 
similar understandings of many events in American history and a common commitment 
to a shared “Judeo-Christian” heritage.  In terms of entertainment, elites and the mass 
public may often watch many of the same TV programs, watch the same movies, and 
read the same bestsellers.  They have often been educated in much the same way with 
similar textbooks.  They read (or more likely watch) much of the same news 
programming.  News events are often reported similarly in both the elite and more 
regional press who may rely on the same news services.   Still, these similarities in 
background can only account for part of the reason that elites are responsive to the 
general public.  The gap narrows even more when one focuses on the voting public, 
which is more middle class and better educated than the general public as a whole.  As 
McClosky notes, the opinions of elites and non-elites tend to be closer in the abstract than 
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when these principles are applied to specific issues and problems.108  As Dahl notes, it is 
the “common tendency of mankind ...to qualify universals in application while leaving 
them intact in rhetoric.”109  In any case, while this extent of value congruence does not, in 
Putnam’s words, “actually involve the mass influence on elites,” it sets the stage for the 
other mechanisms described below.  Without some sense of a shared background and 
values, all of the other mechanisms by which mass public influences elites could not 
function effectively.  In the context of the views of the U.S.-Israel alliance and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, there is widespread continuity between elite and non-elite views of 
the world helps to explain the high level of support for Israel and Israeli policies both 
among the mass public and the policy-making elite.  Broadly speaking, elites and non-
elites share many of the same values when it comes to their view of Israel, the Middle 
East, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
Putnam’s second method by which non-elites affect elites is that the “support 
from the non-elite may be an important resource or credential for members of the elite.”110  
Here he is discussing primarily the need for elected political elites to garner the votes of 
the citizens to promote their own electoral ambitions.  Putnam notes that, “political 
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ambition is associated with heightened sensitivity to voters’ wishes.”111  This is clearly the 
case in this case where the political elites need votes and contributions from supporters of 
Israel in order to continue to advance their political ambitions.  Even if the Jewish 
community doesn’t have the resources to end a politician’s career they can make it much 
more difficult through active opposition of a well-organized political savvy voting bloc 
that is willing to loudly raise questions that can undermine a politician’s credibility and 
judgment.  Conflict-adverse politicians are often willing to pursue the path of least 
resistance and adopt the position of potential cantankerous interest group. 
Putnam’s third method is that non-elites may affect elites because “Influential 
intermediary groups or institutions may link elites and non-elites.”112  Putnam discusses 
the role of political parties, interest groups and patron-client networks.  Patron-client 
networks are an extensive part of the process through which politicians raise money to 
support their politician campaigns.  Putnam notes that there is downward flow of ideas 
and influence from the elite to the masses as well as reverse information flow via the 
members of the “attentive public” who act as intermediaries.113  Some examples of how 
this process has influenced the “special relationship” especially within the Democratic 
Party. 
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Both major American political parties take strongly pro-Israel positions for 
political reasons explained below.  The parties serve as mechanisms to transmit pro-Israel 
images held by the rank-and-file up to the party leaders.  Interestingly enough, this means 
that the leaders of the two parties will tend to receive different images of Israel.  The 
strongest pro-Israel constituencies within the Republican Party are to be found among 
philo-Semitic Christian groups, Veteran’s groups, and economically conservative Jews.  
The former transmits images of Israel as the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy and an 
extension of Judeo-Christian values.  Veteran’s groups tend to see Israel as a key military 
ally in the Middle East.  While political conservative Jews are likely to focus on Israel’s 
increasingly capitalistic hi-tech economy.  On the other hand, the Democratic Party is 
more closely tied to the larger more liberal segment of the Jewish population.  This group 
is likely to emphasize images of Israel as a liberal democracy and a haven for Jewish 
refugees.  Both Jewish constituencies also emphasize the image of Israel as a strategic 
asset to the United States.  This helps to account for the somewhat different tone of 
sympathy within the two parties and the continued emphasis of both on Israel’s strategic 
importance.  (The role of political parties will be discussed further in Chapter 6.) 
Most importantly for this study is the role of special interest lobbies.  As noted 
earlier, the lobbies (or at least PACs) serve a role of collecting and distributing donations 
to those who are sympathetic with their positions.  However, they also serve another role 
that is, for our purposes, far more important.  They create an intellectual climate in which 
donors feel comfortable in giving to their cause and recipients feel comfortable receiving 
donations.  They try to show both their donors, as well as the broader public, that the 
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policies they advocate are not just good for their “special” interest, but that these policies 
also serve the broader “national” interest and conform to America’s most sacred and 
fundamental values.  It is much easier for legislators and policy elites to defend a “special 
interest” policy if they can at least rationalize that the policy in question both serves the 
national interest and conforms to the nation’s core values. 
Some recent examples of how some domestic lobbies do much the same thing 
may be illustrative.  The National Rifle Association (NRA) does not frame its public 
campaign as merely the defense of the rights of its members (gun owners) or a defense of 
the interest of gun manufactures.  The NRA argues that its policies are part of an effort to 
defend the basic American values of individual liberty and smaller government.  The 
NRA also frames its argument as a defense of “the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms” as stated in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; and thus 
appeals to the American faith in the U.S. Constitution. Thus the right to carry a machine 
gun becomes a defense of the American Constitutional system.  In 1998, the tobacco 
lobby executed a successful campaign to defeat the tobacco settlement by arguing that the 
legislation conflicted with the fundamental American values such as small government 
and low taxes.  The insurance lobby used a similar argument to defeat President Clinton’s 
health care legislation in 1994.  Both of these groups understood the essential American 
distrust of big government and bureaucracies.  The National Education Association, 
which is a union representing many teachers, tries to frame its policy proposals as 
defenses of America’s children.  After all, almost everyone cares about the future of the 
nation’s (or at least their own) children.  Environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club 
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and the Environmental Defense Fund, argue that their legislation priorities -- such as the 
Endangered Species Act -- are good for everybody, because they are protecting the 
natural environment as a universal (as well as an American) value.  The American Legion 
and the Veterans of Foreign Wars link support of Veterans benefits to patriotism.  The 
Christian Coalition explicitly argues that they are the defenders of the country’s 
“Christian” (or sometimes “Judeo-Christian”) values. 
In the context of our present discussion, the pro-Israel lobby has linked America’s 
“special relationship” with Israel to a variety of American values and ideals that will be 
described extensively below.  Lobbies are thus able to provide a key link between the 
public and political elites.  One of the primary roles of any successful lobby is to create 
an intellectual climate in which the mass public believes that the “special interest” 
policies that they advocate are congruent with the “national interest” and the nation’s 
values.  By framing their policies in this way, they create an intellectual climate in which 
the public does not object to policies that favor a “special interest” group and the 
politicians can justify spending taxpayer dollars for a “special interest.”  Thus the lobby 
creates a moral argument that their policies conform with and reinforces consensus values 
of the American people.  The lobby does not change the political culture so much as it 
positions the policies that it supports within the political culture and attaches them to 
consensus values.     
In other words, the lobby and its friends and supporters interpret the policy 
implications of the political culture for the public and the policymakers.   Over time, they 
 
 -85-
also adjust the placement and the positioning of their ideas as new issues and social 
trends arise.  The great success of the pro-Israel lobby and its supporters is not in raising 
money from supporters of Israel, but in interpreting American political culture so that it is 
relatively easy to raise, and effectively distribute money in manner that can effectively 
influence American policy towards Israel.  (We will explore the role of the Jewish 
community and the pro-Israel Lobby further in Chapter 7.) 
  Putnam fourth and final means through which the public can affect is that, 
“Members of the elite may believe they ought to be responsive to the needs and wishes of 
the non-elite.”114  Most political elites have a psychological need to believe that their 
leadership is based on moral right and not merely on a cynical quid pro quo.  In order to 
do so, they need to believe that they are articulating the legitimate values of their 
constituents.  Thus while they accept money from “special interests” most politicians 
convince themselves that their votes and decisions are made in the “national interest.”  
The lobbies have a need to convince themselves that their policies are in the best interests 
of the American people and the politicians have a psychological need to believe that the 
policies that they follow are in the interest of their constituents.  Thus both the lobbyists 
and politicians want to believe that they are working for the greater good rather than for 
strictly parochial interests.  Policy advocates and the politicians are able to work together 
to forge an elite-mass consensus in which their ideas (and their contributions) are at least 
in their own minds congruent with the nation’s values and ideals. 
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The U.S.-Israel “special relationship” is an almost ideal example of this process at 
work.  The lobbies, political parties, members of the media, and other opinion leaders 
have created positive images of Israel and linked these in public psyche to core values 
within American political culture.  Thus the public’s understanding of its “national 
interest” is adapted so that it coincides with that of the “special interests.”  It should be 
noted that such efforts rarely express attempts to conspire to deceive the mass public, 
only to educate others in a democratic manner about what they themselves believe is in 
the “national interest.”  Indeed, much of the process described is uncoordinated and 
reflects the acts of individuals who share a broad set of goals, values, and beliefs and seek 
to use their country’s political system to achieve goals that they deeply believe in and are 
deeply committed to.  Thus since elites are usually committed to the approach that they 
ought to be responsive to the beliefs and values of the larger public that they represent 
they often absorb the values of the mass public as part of the framework for  their policy 
decisions.  They are more likely to articulate the views of those segments of the larger 
public that are most outspoken and articulate.  When it comes to Middle East policy, they 
hear most clearly and most often from representatives of the Jewish community and tend 
to reflect those views in their policymaking. 
The beginnings of the U.S.-Israel alliance was initially established during the late 
Eisenhower/early Kennedy administration, strengthened under President Johnson and 
developed into a major axis of American Middle East policy during the Nixon 
administration primarily for strategic reasons.  As time went on, campaign contributions 
became a primary motivation for politicians -- particularly members of Congress -- to 
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adopt policies supportive of Israeli actions.  However, since neither strategic interests nor 
skilled lobbying can fully explain the pattern of executive decision-making in the U.S.-
Israel relationship.  The hypothesis proposed here is that a comprehensive explanation 
requires considering the degree to which the American public (and through them the 
American political elite) perceive themselves as sharing a common set of political, 
cultural, and religious values with Israelis.  The entire structure of the relationship is in 
reality built on this perceived set of shared cultural values.  As Israeli scholar Gabriel 
Sheffer perceptively writes: 
A special interpretation is needed to explain this incomparably special 
position [the U.S.-Israel relationship], since most conventional 
interpretations are at best only partially applicable. Such interpretations 
tend to focus on common national or strategic interests between patron 
and client.... In this case, however, none of these interpretations seem 
sufficient.... The answer may lie in shared values of the two countries -- 
that is, various soft and intangible factors that serve to influence the U.S. 
administration in favor of Israel....115 
Camille Mansour reaches a similar conclusion in Beyond Alliance, his study of 
the “special relationship.”116  Mansour’s study is probably the most thoroughly researched, 
carefully documented, non-polemical research on this subject to date.  After carefully 
exploring several alternative explanations on their own terms and rejecting them as 
incomplete, Mansour concludes that “The mutual identification of the United States and 
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Israel involves on the one hand, a perception in American society of the place of the 
Jewish community within it and is related, on the other hand, to the ideological and 
cultural basis of the American attitude toward the state of Israel.”117  Let us now consider 
the images through which Americans perceive Israel which serve as the framework for 
American policy towards Israel. 
 Sheffer and Hofnung have identified several positive images of Israel within 
American society that form the basis for a shared set of ideological and cultural values. 
They describe images of Israel as a pioneering democracy, a Jewish refuge, a leading 
opponent of terrorism, and a scientific, economic, strategic, and military partner of the 
United States.118  All of these popular images allow Americans to relate to and empathize 
with Israel and its citizens.  Let us briefly consider each of these images as well as a few 
that these authors have overlooked.  
 
Images of Israel and Closely Related Values in American Political Culture 
 
Images of Israel    American Values 
Pioneering image  Frontier spirit; rejection of the “Old World”; 
Sympathy for pioneering; Belief in 
“manifest destiny” 
 
Democratic image  Attachment to democracy; liberalism;  
     Constitutional liberties - freedom of speech, 
      press 
 
Underdog image Sympathy for the weak; David vs. Goliath 
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Image of Successful Underdog Protestant work ethic; American Dream 
 
Image of friend and partner Western values; capitalism; racial sympathy 
 
Image Humanitarian refuge Freedom of religion; freedom of 
Immigration; 
   
Biblical Image Shared Judeo-Christian heritage; Exodus 
story; Belief in a Chosen people 
 
All of the images presented above are to be understood as images that the 
American public -- and particularly the more politically active and broadly middle class 
elements of the public -- holds of Israel.  Such images that are held by the public as a 
whole are often highly superficial and incomplete depictions of reality.  Indeed images 
are, by definition, simplifications of political reality.  Throughout the discussion below 
some of the flaws in the images are brought out, but no attempt has been made to fully 
demonstrate the inaccuracies within them as compared to an objective political reality – if 
such a thing can even be defined.  The point rather is to attempt to explain those images 
that exist in the mind of the public and ultimately the policymaking elites.  The American 
public is both woefully uninformed about, and basically uninterested in, the Middle East 
and thus quite willing to accept the images of faraway places that are presented by 
politicians, the media, and mass popular culture.  Thus, most of the public accepts these 
popular images of Israel relatively uncritically. 
Israel as a “Pioneering Democracy.”  Sheffer and Hofnung’s first image of 
Israel is that of a “pioneering democracy.”  This image actually seems to draw on several 
distinctive elements of American political culture that are best discussed separately.  The 
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image of Israel as a nation of pioneers is both a fairly accurate description of parts of the 
early Zionist experience and a carefully maintained image.  The image of Israelis as 
brave pioneers who escaped from hardships and persecution of Europe to settle a land 
that was given to them by God -- a sort of Middle Eastern “manifest destiny” -- resonates 
with Americans.  The pioneering image evokes America’s own sense of its own 
romanticized pioneering exploring the frontier.  In the 1960s, John F. Kennedy spoke 
glowingly of the need for Americans to open up the new frontier of space and Americans 
enthusiastically supported the daring effort to place a man on the moon.  It was a way in 
which a new generation of Americans could vicariously explore a new frontier where a 
physical one no longer existed.  Today, the same metaphor of “new frontiers” is often 
used in reference to developing new forms of technology. 
Early Zionist settlers in the Yishuv (Zionist settlements in pre-state Palestine) fled 
religious persecution in a spirit not unlike the pilgrims and other early American settlers 
who fled from religious persecution in Europe.  The romanticized image of the Israelis 
kibbutzniks settling the land seemed to parallel that of the early American pioneers who 
settled much of what became the United States.  Sheffer and Hofnung note that in the 
early years of Israeli statehood, “the most widespread image of Israel was that of a 
frontier state struggling to establish its borders and develop its newly acquired 
territory.”119  This image was actively promoted and indeed glorified in American culture 
by books and movies such as Exodus.  This book and its dramatic movie adaptation -- 
                                                 
119
  Sheffer and Hofnung: 14. 
 
 -91-
starring Paul Newman as the heroic Ari Ben-Canaan -- presented many sympathetic 
images of the Zionist struggle (and mostly, although not entirely, unsympathetic images 
of Israel’s Arab antagonists).  One observer noted that Exodus “accomplished the feat of 
supplying the world’s Jews overnight with contemporary cowboy ancestors.”120  By 
associating with young Israeli state, Americans could similarly take part in the vicarious 
construction of new state, which in many ways harkened back to their own national 
development.  In a sense, Israel’s pioneering experience can be understood as an 
extension of America’s desire to discover new frontiers to explore, settle, and develop.  
Americans can relate to the settling of the land, the hardships experienced by immigrants, 
and the difficulties pioneers faced in dealing with the “natives.”  These are all parts of the 
American experience and they find a familiar and reassuring echo in the Israelis 
experience.  It may also help explain why many Americans (and secular Israelis for that 
matter) initially felt a certain sense of kinship with Israeli settlers building settlements on 
Israel “new frontier” of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 War.  Israeli 
settlements of the West Bank (often referred to by its ancient geographic names as 
“Judea” and “Samaria”) seemed to hearken back to a romantic sense of a nation fulfilling 
its God-given “manifest destiny.” 
The subjugation of the “natives” was a part of the narrative epic, which has long 
been rationalized as a necessary part of the fulfillment of America’s “manifest destiny.”  
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While revisionist historical accounts have begun to describe the American conquest of 
the continent in terms of colonialism and genocide, most Americans still have not fully 
absorbed the darker side of their national narrative.  Historically, Native Americans were 
viewed as an “uncivilized” and not fully human.  They were seen as posing a threat to the 
advance of American civilization in general and particularly to American women and 
children.  These images have been reinforced in literally dozens of American Westerns.  
Thus use of violence against the “natives” has long been viewed as justified, defensive, 
and often heroic.  Although most Americans think of their nation as peaceful, concepts of 
force and violence are deeply imbedded and often glorified within American culture.  
This historical experience and view of violence allows Americans to easily accept that 
the view that the native peoples of Palestine posed a similar threat to the early Zionist 
settlers and later the youthful Jewish state.  The natural sympathies of Americans were 
with the “civilized” European settlers who left their native land to settle, build up, and 
carved a new homeland out of the wilderness rather than the “less civilized” displaced 
native peoples.   The similarities of Israel’s pioneering narrative allowed Americans to 
sympathize with Israelis and disregard Palestinians.  The association with the Israeli 
narrative has allowed Americans to reinforce their own belief in the justice of their 
narrative and helps to displace any lingering doubts about their own history.  By contrast, 
empathizing with the Palestinian narrative might open up Americans to exploring the 
skeletons in their own historical closets that they’d prefer not to explore.121 
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Indeed the dark side of the pioneering myth was its justification of the use of 
force and violence.  In American history, the use of violence might have been regrettable, 
but it has been relatively easy to justify as a necessary evil if there was a threat to national 
priorities.  Richard Payne argues that: 
Although most countries have been shaped by violence, to greater or lesser 
degrees, the United States was the first modern nation to obtain its 
independence through revolution.  Violence therefore became an integral 
component of nation-building and under girds America’s self-definition.  
Almost every major aspect of political, social, and economic development 
in the United States was accompanied by officially sanctioned, as well as 
unofficial, violence.  Expanding westward, maintaining slavery, 
preserving national unity, emancipating enslaved Africans, and securing 
various political, social, and economic freedoms were accomplished 
through force.  If violence is generally viewed as the lifeblood of freedom 
in democratic societies, that idea has been constantly rejuvenated in the 
United States and maintains a potency that is rare elsewhere.122 
Given an American context where the use of violence is widely rationalized by 
the state as necessary and defensive, it is easy to understand why many Americans could 
easily accept the Israeli argument that use of violence in the Occupied Territories is 
always defensive or necessary in order to preserve national security.  Indeed, Israeli use 
of violence has long been seen in romantic and positive terms.  As one scholar notes 
                                                                                                                                                 
is useful, but p. 45-51 and Chapter 5 directly addresses what Rogin calls the “Indian 
Question.”  See also Payne: 32-34. 
122
  Payne, Richard.  The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force 




aforementioned Exodus was “responsible for creating the noble sabra myth of Israel as a 
nation of handsome, morally upright warriors and dark-haired, lusty beauties.”123 
The pioneering image has generally been quite enduring in America’s 
consciousness.  Raising serious questions about Israel’s use of violence in any given 
situation would raise implicit questions about America’s use of violence in analogous 
situations.  Accepting Israel’s explanation for the use of violence reinforces America’s 
own rationalization about the use of violence throughout much of American history. 
Since the U.S. lacks a single predominant ethnic group, American identity has 
been closely connected to its Constitutional system and democratic ideals.  Americans 
perceive Israel as the only stable democracy in the Middle East.124  Israel has maintained a 
functional, if at times chaotic, parliamentary system with a free and open press in region 
known for autocratic regimes.125  Sheffer and Hofnung note that, “pro-Israel groups stress 
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the contrast between Israel and the non-democratic Arab states.”126  Israel’s election of a 
woman, Golda Meir, as prime minister in the early 1970s enhanced Israel’s image as a 
free open democratic society.  Her election played into the American belief in equality 
during the heyday of the Women’s rights movement at time when very few women had 
served as heads of elected Democratic governments.127  Golda Meir still ranks highly 
among the American survey of well-known Israelis.  Page and Shapiro bring in the 
economic element, noting that, “most Americans came to feel a cultural and political 
identification with... [Israel as a] largely European, democratic, and capitalistic outpost of 
Western values.”128  Israel, while founded on a socialist basis, has gradually moved 
towards a more deregulated American-style capitalistic economy.  This plays into the 
American faith in the free-market system. 
Sheffer and Hofnung also note that there are some negative and ambivalent 
images of Israel that stem primarily from policies of the Israeli government.  They point 
to a series of related images of Israel as “an occupying power,” a violator of human 
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rights, a “supporter of reactionary regimes,” and as being intransigent in the peace 
process.129   Israel’s democratic image has become a bit frayed since the beginning of 
Palestinian Intifada (Uprising or more literally “shaking off” in Arabic) in 1987 which 
has increased the focus on Israeli violations of the rights of Palestinians living in the 
Occupied Territories.  The adoption of hawkish policies of settlement expansion and 
political intransigence by various Israeli governments over the last quarter century has 
undermined Israel’s image as a democracy.  More recently, reports of non-Orthodox Jews 
being denied full religious rights may have also affected this image.  While reports of 
Israeli human rights violations have weakened Israel’s democratic credentials, they have 
not significantly undermined its overall democratic image -- especially as compared to its 
far more autocratic antagonists in the region.  While this image belies many other 
difficulties in Israeli society, it has provided a positive link between the two societies that 
continues to strengthen the “special relationship.”  American political leaders continue to 
laud the democratic nature of Israeli society.  For example, Vice-President Gore 
remarked in 1998 that “the Jewish love of justice has built a powerful democracy.”130  
House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) stated that: 
This [United States] is a nation conceived in liberty.  This is a nation that 
has a Declaration of Independence that said that all people are created 
equal; endowed by their Creator with certain liberties -- life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness.  Israel also is a democracy based on those ideals.  
And today we celebrate 50 years of democracy in a part of the world that 
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has very little democracy.  We thank Israel for preserving those 
principles.131 
As noted above, the belief in the abstract principles of democracy, equality and 
the free market are essential elements of American identity.  The Constitution is a sacred 
document within America’s civil religion which enshrines America’s democratic 
principles.  The religious dimensions of these principles were further expanded during the 
Cold War. The Cold War was widely viewed by most Americans as a Manichean 
struggle between the forces of light (the democratic West) and the forces of darkness (the 
atheistic communism).   Israel’s self-defined role as a beacon of democracy in an 
authoritarian region reinforced the American belief that it was succeeding in its Cold War 
struggle and therefore served to further strengthen the political-cultural bond between the 
two countries.  The importance of America’s belief in democracy as the best form of 
government has not waned in Post-Cold War period, thus neither has this bond.  In fact, 
in the Post 9/11 era, the Bush administration has reemphasized its commitment, not only 
to American democracy, but to bringing democracy to the rest of the world.  In his 
Second Inaugural Address on January 20, 2005 President Bush argued that: 
America’ vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of our 
Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and 
dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and 
earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, 
because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these 
ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our 
fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation’s security, and the calling of our 
time. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
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movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in our world. 
132
 
The Bush administration’s rhetoric defines the task of bringing democracy to the rest of the world as being 
an act of enlightened self-interest, but also at a deeper level suggests that it is part of America’s sacred 
religious mission or “calling.”  Clearly this sort of language is suggestive of the reasons underlying 
American’s special commitment to Israel as the “the only democracy in the Middle East.” 
Israel as an Underdog.  The image of Israel as “pioneering democracy” is 
closely interrelated what we will call the “underdog” image of Israel.  This is the image 
of Israel as weak, struggling underdog fighting against great odds for its survival against 
much more powerful forces that are dedicated to its destruction.  In this image, Israel is 
seen as a young immature nation in need of assistance until it can grow up and become 
mature member of the community of nations.  Writing about the crisis that led up to the 
1967 war, Eytan Gilboa credits Israel’s image as an underdog as a major reason that 
Americans sympathized with Israel.  He writes that “during the crisis that preceded the 
war there was real fear -- both in Israel and abroad -- that the Arabs might succeed this 
time in their attempt to annihilate the Jewish state.”133  Israel was seen as being the 
Biblical David trying to overcome a massive Arab Goliath. (This leads into the concept 
of Biblical imagery, which will be discussed further below.)  Today, despite Israel’s 
military successes, the grisly menace of terrorism -- this ironically is the weapon that the 
weak use against the strong -- continues to evoke the image of Israel as vulnerable and 
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endangered.  Those who wish to emphasize this image often emphasize Israel small 
physical size, while downplaying its position as the dominant regional military power.  
Former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott’s remarks a few years ago are a good example 
of this kind of imagery.  The Republican Senator observed that: 
I had the occasion a few years ago to go to Israel....And it was a 
transforming experience for me, because I realized how small Israel really 
is.  I realized how quickly an enemy can cross that small, narrow band and 
strike any part of Israel.  I learned to appreciate the significance of the 
Golan Heights it would be if we turned them over to enemies where they 
could so whatever they chose.134 
In recent years, the combination of renewed terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada, 
the election of the Palestinian militant group Hamas to a majority in the Palestinian 
parliament (January, 2006), and the bellicose rhetoric of Iran’s President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad -- particularly his statement that he would “wipe Israel off the map” -- have 
reinforced the mostly incorrect impression that Israel faces existential threat to its 
survival.  Israel has been able to use the perception of its own perceived weakness and 
vulnerability as a pretext for taking extraordinary efforts in defense of its own broadly-
defined security interests. 
 At least under certain circumstances, Americans seems to sympathize with those 
who are weak and defenseless.  While this is obviously not always true and “weakness” is 
clearly a subjective category, the perception of Israel as weak, young, and needy has 
reinforced the relationship.  The constant emphasis on Israel as a young state in the 
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political discourse seems to reinforce this sense of Israel’s youthfulness, weakness, and 
need for protection.  Perhaps this empathy arises from America’s own sense of itself as a 
relatively youthful state which was always fighting for its survival first against the older 
more established states of Europe and more recently against the dangers of Fascism and 
Communism.  America has often seen itself as an underdog (even when it has become the 
wealthiest and best armed country in the world) and thus can empathize with Israel’s 
sense of itself as an underdog. 
Israel’s victory in the 1967 war began a shift of the conflict from one between 
Arabs and Israelis to one between Israelis and Palestinians -- who lived in the territories 
that Israel has occupied since that war.  After 1987, the First Palestinian Intifada seemed 
to complete the shift as the TV networks began to transmit images of heavily-armed 
Israeli “Goliaths” shooting Palestinian “Davids” armed only with stones.  The 
combination of Israel’s successful economic and military strength -- which have turned it 
into a regional military and economic power -- has undercut, but hardly erased, the image 
of Israel as a weak, small, youthful, pioneering underdog; however, as these images have 
partially, but by no means fully, faded out they have been replaced by other images that 
are just as positive and sympathetic. 
The image of Israel as an underdog that has overcome hardships and succeeded 
against great odds is inevitably connected to American perceptions of the success and 
achievements of American Jews.  If the American Dream of economic success and 
cultural integration are the overriding paradigm of American life, then American Jews 
 
 -101-
have emerged as a group that is emblematic of the possibility of achieving that dream.  
Jews have developed an image/stereotype as “educated,”  “wealthy,” and “successful.”  
The American public seems to admire hard work -- a value ironically associated with the 
Max Weber’s “protestant work ethic”135 -- and success.  American Jews are seen as 
exemplars of American meritocracy.  These images are enhanced by the economic 
achievements of American Jews and the economic and military successes of the State of 
Israel.   Of course, this may be a double-edged sword, because economic success has 
often produced resentment against Jews.  These images are closely related to anti-Semitic 
stereotypes of Jews possessing power and wealth -- as portrayed in the infamous 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion.  (See below for a discussion of the decline of anti-
Semitism in Chapter 3.)  Indeed, the idea of Jews having great power seemed patently 
absurd after the revelations of the Holocaust.136  Nevertheless, some remnants of these 
stereotypes still proliferate on the left and right fringes of the American political 
spectrum.   
Yet another interrelated interpretation is that Israel’s successes in its numerous 
wars present a stronger, more macho, picture of Jews than some of the stereotypes still 
associated with their American cousins.  Indeed, American literature and films have often 
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portrayed American Jews as a weak, wealthy, neurotic people typically seen in Woody 
Allen films and Philip Roth novels.  Thus the American public may have adopted some 
of the stereotypes common in Israel that view Israeli Jews more positively in contrast to 
some of the images of the rather negative stereotypes that they hold about American Jews 
as “weak” and “powerless.”  An important component of this is that almost all healthy 
secular Israeli Jews serve in the Israel Defense Forces while the vast majority of 
American Jews do not participate in any form of military service.  Oz Almog in 
describing the development of Israeli identity writes that “the repudiation of the Diaspora 
and the Diaspora way of life, and especially the stereotyping of the Diaspora Jew, 
indirectly sharpened the boundaries of the Zionist national religion and stressed  its 
superiority over traditional Jewish religion.”137 
Israel as Stable Ally, Partner, and Refuge.  The image of Israel as a stable ally 
in an unfriendly part of the world has also been part of the concept of Israel in the 
American mind.  The strong and continuing links between the American Jewish 
community and the state of Israel have served to promote and perpetuate the image of 
Israel as friendly ally.   This was enhanced further by the grandmotherly image of the 
aforementioned Golda Meir -- who grew up in the Midwest,138 not the Mid East.  In 1982, 
a TV miniseries, A Woman Called Golda, starring the beloved Ingrid Bergman (in her 
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final role) cemented her image as the American grandmother who became an 
international leader.  This is further enhanced by the former Israeli Prime Minister, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, who grew up, went to college, and started a career in the United 
States, and speaks English like a telegenic American politician without any trace of a 
foreign accent. 
The elements of stability and friendliness were particularly important during the 
Cold War context.  Speaking again of the 1967 war, Gilboa notes that: 
Israel’s swift and decisive defeat of three armies was seen [by Americans] 
not only as a dramatic victory but an American gain as well, since both 
Egypt and Syria were close allies of the Soviet Union and their defeat was 
interpreted as a major blow to the Kremlin’s prestige in the region.  This 
blow was all the more important in view of the concomitant American 
failures in Vietnam and the psychological need of Americans to identify 
with a winning cause.139 
Both sides in the Cold War viewed the conflict as a Manichean struggle between 
good and evil.  Americans saw Israel as one of the “good guys.”  While anti-Western 
third world nationalist movements were often seen as the “bad guys” – as was the case in 
America’s war in Vietnam.  Even after the Cold War, this image has remained although 
the definition of who the “bad guy” is has now become far more ambiguous.  In the early 
years of the Cold War, Israel was viewed as a natural ally against Arab nationalism -- 
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embodied in Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.140  More recently, with the end of 
the Cold War, and particularly following 9/11, Islamic fundamentalism has replaced Arab 
nationalism as the new “bad guy” in the region.  (This phenomenon will be discussed 
further in Chapter 3.)  In sum, as the perceived threats to American security in the region 
have changed the image of Israel as a reliable Middle Eastern ally has adapted to the new 
situation.  Israeli leaders themselves often reinforced the image of Israel as both a partner 
and as dependent on American friendship and protection.  Just before his first visit to the 
United as Israel’s leader, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the New York Times, “I feel 
that I come to my senior partner [President Bush], and I hope that he is ready to accept 
me as his partner.”141  While Israel will often follow its own policy prerogatives that may 
run counter to American interests in the region – particularly as related to Middle East 
peace process – its leaders almost always try to project an image of deep partnership with 
and, sometimes as in this case, also grateful subservience to the United States. 
As noted in the discussion of Israel’s democratic image, some of the policies of 
recent Israeli governments have affected its image as a stable friend and ally of the 
United States.  Policies such as land confiscation, demolition of Palestinian homes, the 
use of “moderate physical pressure” -- an Israeli euphemism for torture -- against 
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suspected terrorists,142 and the expansion of settlements in the Occupied Territories143  have 
undermined the overwhelming positive of image of Israel that most Americans hold.  The 
widespread beliefs that Israel has a “secret” nuclear arsenal and its apparent willingness 
to sell arms to repressive regimes makes it appear to be a rogue state that ignores 
international norms.  These problems were further aggravated by Israel’s friendly 
relationship with South Africa’s Apartheid regime which may have undermined its 
support among groups critical of that regime -- most obviously African-Americans.  
When Israel’s policies run counter to the interests and desires of the American 
government, it tends to tarnish the image of Israel as “friendly” to the United States.  
Nevertheless, the damage that such policies cause is limited by the aforementioned 
widespread image that Israel is weak and threatened.  Furthermore, the groups most 
concerned about issues like the violation of human rights have tended to be fringe 
political groups with little access to the mainstream media or influence over policy-
making elites.  While these images do exist, and do affect Israel’s standing with some 
subgroups within American society, they run counter to the overall picture that the vast 
majority of Americans hold of Israel and thus are generally not focused on by the public, 
the policymakers, and much of the media. 
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Sheffer and Hofnung have identified several interrelated positive images of 
partnership and friendship including Israel as a scientific, technological, and trading 
partner.  Americans have tended to admire Israel’s ability to achieve economically in 
spite of its heavy defense burden.  Recently, Israel’s successes in high-tech fields -- many 
of which are spin-offs of defense investments -- have enhanced the image of Israel as a 
valuable military ally and economic partner.  Related to this image is the previously 
discussed view of Israel as a strategic asset.  This image initially emphasized Israel’s 
value as a military and intelligence asset and more recently its scientific and 
technological prowess.   Remarkably, the cognitive dissonance between the image of 
Israel as a “strategic asset” and Israel as needy “underdog” is rarely noted by observers 
and thus these contradictory images manage to coexist in the public mind. 
Sheffer and Hofnung cite an image of “Israel as a Jewish refuge.”  This image of 
Israeli society is enshrined in the Israeli “Law of Return” which extends immigration 
rights to any Jew anywhere in the world and is specifically designed to protect Jews from 
anti-Semitic persecution.  The immigration of persecuted Jewish Diasporas from a wide 
variety of countries has maintained and fostered this image.  In the pre-state days, 
German and Polish Jews fled Hitler seeking refuge in Mandatory Palestine.  In the 
immediate post-war period, the United States was deeply involved in the debate over 
allowing the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust to immigrate to Palestine.  Following the 
creation of the Jewish state, hundreds of thousands of Mizrahi (or in Hebrew Eastern) 
Jews immigrated to Israel mostly from Arab countries.  Since the 1960s, the primary 
focus has been on allowing persecuted Soviet Jews (and more recently Ethiopian Jews) to 
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immigrate to Israel. The American Jewish community made the issue of Soviet Jewish 
immigration into a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War.  The passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the early 1970s tied 
Most-Favored-Nation trading privileges to freedom of immigration for Soviet Jews.   
The view of Israel as a land of refuge for persecuted Jews -- which is closely 
related to American guilt over the Holocaust -- has strengthened American sympathies 
for Israel.   As noted in the discussion of the pioneering image above, the sense of Jews 
fleeing religious persecution in Europe resonates with a deeply-held American belief in 
the right to be free from religious persecution. Both countries see themselves as nations 
of immigrants persecuted for their religious beliefs who have absorbed “your tired, your 
poor, your huddled masses yearning to breath free”144 from countries that did not want 
them.  The parallel between the American and Israeli efforts in this regard has led 
Americans to admire Israel’s humanitarian efforts and to see Israel as fulfilling a similar 
mission as the United States. 
Along the same lines, both Americans and Israelis share a common sense of being 
victims of European persecution.  Both American nationalism and Zionism were in effect 
attempts to repudiate the negative aspects of the “old world.”  In the words of Former 
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD):  “We both invented ourselves.  We both 
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offered a home and opportunity to people who were not wanted anywhere else.”145  The 
establishment of the Jewish state so shortly after the “Old World” had attempted to 
exterminate the Jews only reinforced this sense of empathy for the Jews as victims of 
European persecution.  American events and symbols from the Revolutionary War era 
(the Boston Tea Party, Patrick Henry’s “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death” Speech, and 
the Liberty Bell) resonate with the same sort of rebellion against European tyranny and 
persecution.  Conversely, some Americans may have favored the creation of a Jewish 
state in the immediate post-Holocaust period, because they did not want large number of 
Jewish refugees immigrating to the United States.  Nativist feelings, anti-Semitism, and 
early Cold War anti-Communism -- since Jews were associated in the public mind with 
Communism and Socialism -- may have actually reinforced the desire of some Americans 
to see the Jews establish their own state in a far away corner of the globe.146 
Israel’s Biblical “Super Story” All of these positive images are rooted in a 
deeper cultural connection -- which Sheffer and Hofnung overlook in their otherwise 
fairly comprehensive discussion -- that frames and strengthens all of the other images 
above.  It is fair to say that these positive images of friendship and partnership would not 
be possible if they did not reinforce a pre-existing set of cultural affinities.  Robert Bellah 
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has associated these cultural affinities with “civil religion.”  He argues that the 
“separation of church and state has not denied the [American] political realm a religious 
dimension.”  He added that “certain common elements of religious orientation are shared 
by the great majority of Americans.”147 New York Times Correspondent Thomas 
Friedman offers an insightful explanation of the manner in which American identity is 
tied to the Israeli experience.  Friedman attempts to explain why the American media 
focuses on Israel far in excess of its actual importance to world affairs.  In so doing, he 
also offers a crucial insight into Israel’s role as a pillar of American civil religion.  
Thomas Friedman writes: 
Men have never taken the world just as it comes; our minds are not just 
blank pages upon which reality paints itself. Whether that reality is Israel 
or anything else, it is always filtered through certain cultural and historical 
lenses before being painted on our minds.  Israeli political theorist Yaron 
Ezrahi calls these lenses “super stories.”  A super story, says Ezrahi, 
consists of a collection of myths, or ideological constructs, tied together 
by an overall narrative.  This super story helps us to explain the world to 
ourselves, to determine what information we will treat as significant and, 
most important, to record our experiences and shape our values.  Like any 
colored lens, it lets certain rays of light in and blocks out others.  Religions 
are the most popular super stories, but so, too, are universalist ideologies 
such as Marxism.  As it happens, the oldest, most widely known super 
story of Western civilization is the Bible:  its stories, its characters, and its 
values constitute the main lens through which Western man looks at 
himself and at the world.  The Jews -- the ancient Israelites -- are the main 
characters in this biblical super story.148 
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This connection, perhaps more than any other, personalizes the connection of 
Americans to Israel.  As a society, America is far more religious than other advanced 
industrialized states.149  Religious imagery is deeply imbedded in American political 
rhetoric.  In 1998, Vice-President Al Gore spoke of his personal connection to several of 
the images of Israel described above.  Gore stated, “I was born in 1948, and when I was 
growing up watching world events, I saw in Israel a democracy surrounded by enemies, 
threatened with extinction, fighting for existence, sharing our values and my Bible.”150  
The Vice-President’s description is typical of the way in which many Americans have 
come to view Israel.  Many American Christians have come to see Israel and the Jews as 
sharing with them a common “Judeo-Christian” heritage which is recorded in Hebrew 
Bible or “Old Testament.”151 
Since the early days of Jewish statehood, the Israeli national narrative of the 
Jewish return to the ancient “Promised Land” has been widely known and accepted 
among the American public as the normative historical narrative of the region.  If one 
makes the reasonable presumption that normative discourses within the wider society are 
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extensions of those often initiated in academia, then it is useful to consider Keith 
Whitelam’s critique of the underlying assumptions of Biblical studies.  Whitelam 
contends that: 
The reason for the heat of the recent debate [over the possibilities of 
writing a history of early Israel] is to do precisely with the political, 
cultural, and religious implications of the construction of ancient Israel.  
These are, invariably, hidden elements in the discussions and, like most 
fundamental domain assumptions, very rarely appear upon the surface.  
The problem of the history of ancient Palestine remains unspoken, masked 
in the dominant discourse of biblical studies which is concerned 
principally with the search for ancient Israel as the locus for understanding 
the traditions of the Hebrew Bible and ultimately as the taproot of 
European and Western civilization.152 
Thus Biblical scholars, for the most part subconsciously, focus on the history of ancient 
Israel, because that discourse is meaningful to them as key to understanding their own 
civilization.  Conversely, the history of ancient Philistines and Canaanites  -- that is, the 
non-Jewish civilizations that existed alongside the ancient Jewish kingdoms -- have been 
ignored, because they offer little in terms of present-day meaning to modern scholars. 
The same process which Ezrahi and Friedman speak of in the media and 
Whitelam describes in the academy thus occurs, partially as a by-product and partially of 
its own momentum, in the public at large.  Americans -- both Jewish and Christian -- feel 
a special attachment and interest in the story of the birth (or “rebirth” from this 
perspective) of Israel which appears to be a modern reenactment of the Biblical Exodus.   
The heroic archetype of the journey from slavery to freedom touches a nerve of 
 
 -112-
familiarity within the psyche of many Americans who have grown up reading the stories 
of the Hebrew Bible.  Bellah notes that behind American “civil religion at every point lie 
Biblical archetypes: Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrificial 
Death and Rebirth.”153  It is easy to see how these archetypes, which are so prominent in 
the American psyche, enhance the ability of Americans to empathize with Israel. 
Conversely, the Arab, and specifically the Palestinian, historical narratives -- 
which are widely accepted and understood in much of the Islamic world and developing 
world -- have remained almost unknown among the general public in the United States.  
As mentioned above, the Israeli narrative was popularized and exalted within American 
popular culture by the remarkable success of the Exodus -- which obviously evokes the 
aforementioned Biblical metaphor of the journey from enslavement to the Promised Land 
-- and reinforces the pre-existing cultural tendency of many American Christians to 
visualize modern-day Israelis as the direct religious heirs to the ancient Hebrews.  The 
modern Jewish journey from slave labor and attempted extermination in Hitler’s 
concentration camps to a reborn Jewish is deeply evocative of a modern Exodus.  The 
dramatic Biblical epics, especially in the 1950s, most prominently Charlton Heston as 
Moses in Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments (1956), implicitly drove home the 
link between the modern Jewish people and their ancient homeland. 
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The Israeli government, in the process of constructing the national identity, has 
focused a great deal of time and effort on the archeological exploration of ancient Israel.  
These efforts have not only literally dug up more information on their own history, but 
they are a means of emphasizing their own connection to the land as the successors of the 
ancient Israelites.  In so doing, they have often ignored or downplayed the archaeology 
and therefore the historical narrative of other peoples that once lived in the region.  In a 
discussion of the opening of a controversial archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem in 1996, 
Palestinian-American scholar Rashid Khalidi critically describes the process that he sees 
at work: 
Statements by Israeli spokesmen make it clear that this tunnel is meant to 
showcase only one of the 22 archeological strata that make up Jerusalem’s 
rich history.  Such attempts to grant privileges to one stratum over the 
others are predicated on a belief that one layer is “superior” and that the 
past can be manipulated to affect the present by “proving” this superiority.  
Thus, if one stratum of a city can be privileged, if one set of names 
derived from it can be given pride over all others below or above it, then a 
certain contemporary reality claiming roots in the past can be imposed on 
the present.154 
The emphasis on the Biblical connection to the land is particularly significant to 
Americans who often see the region through a Biblical lens.  The American media has 
furthered this process by using Biblical images and analogies to relate present day events 
to their American audiences. 
                                                                                                                                                 
153
  Bellah, Robert. “Civil Religion in America.”  Daedalus.  (Vol. 97, No. 1, 
Winter 1967): 18. 
154
  Khalidi, Rashid I.  “What ‘Final Status’?”  New York Times.  October 3, 
1996. Page A23 
 
 -114-
The unique significance of “Israel” in American Protestant theology and popular 
culture is crucial to understanding the universe of shared values that shapes the “special 
relationship.”  The Bible has long been one of the primary elements of the American 
political culture.  Wilson Carey McWilliams argues that: 
The Bible is the great gate to Western culture, an indispensable key to our 
language, meanings, and thought.  Scripture, moreover, has a special 
importance in American political thought and history.  The Bible...has 
been the second voice in the grand dialogue of American political culture, 
an alternative to the “liberal tradition” set in the deepest foundations of 
American life.155 
Since the ancient Hebrews are the primary protagonists in the Bible, the modern-day 
actions of their Jewish descendants resonate in a unique manner to American Christian 
ears.  The struggle to build a Jewish state in the ancient Holy Land naturally drew the 
interest and attention of Christians. 
The deep connection between American identity and the Bible also reinforces 
American support for Israel.  From the earliest days, America has had a deeply-seated 
cultural connection to the Biblical narrative.  The early American settlers saw “the new 
Israelites in the promised land of the New World.”156   Americans saw themselves as a 
“chosen people” and America as their “Promised Land.”   Puritan minister John Winthrop 
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told Americans that “we must consider that we shall be a city upon a hill, the eyes of all 
the people are upon us.”157  At the time of the American Revolution, many Americans 
accepted the view that the Colonies had become Israel and George Washington had 
become Joshua.158   Ben Franklin would later proposed that image of Moses crossing the 
Red Sea be emblazoned on the seal of the United States.  The United States has long seen 
itself from early on as “one nation under God.”  American political discourse has long 
contained references to God and prayer.  American identity has long contained a 
missionizing quality especially in relationship to its faith in democracy and freedom.   
More recently, Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric seemed to speak to this quality.  He 
renewed the image of America as a “City on a Hill” blessed by God.  In a 1983 speech, 
Reagan told a convention of religious broadcasters that: 
I have always believed that this blessed land was set apart in a special 
way, that some divine plan placed this great continent between the two 
oceans to be found from every corner of the earth -- people who had a 
special love for freedom and the courage to uproot themselves, leave their 
home land and friends to come to a strange land.159 
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In a 1983 message to Congress proposing a Constitutional amendment on school prayer, 
he stated that “our liberty springs from and depends upon an abiding faith in God.”160  In 
1984, Reagan pledged to an American Legion convention: 
...To keep America a beacon of hope to the rest of the world and to return 
her to her rightful place as a champion of peace and freedom among the 
nations of the earth...we Americans cannot turn our backs on what history 
has asked of us.  Keeping alive the hope of human freedom is America’s 
mission, and we cannot shrink from the task or falter in the call of duty. 
From this language, it is easy to see how Israel’s Biblical origins and the sacred quality 
that Americans attaches to individual liberty and democracy have led Americans to 
sympathize with Israel.  Israel seems to act as an extension and example of America’s 
sacred mission in a region where democracy is rare.  There is a compatibility between 
Jewish idea that the Jews were chosen to be a “light unto the nations” and America’s own 
commitment to its own democratic mission.   Indeed, there is an optimistic messianic 
quality in the language of both American nationalism and Zionism.  In the context of all 
of the other images described above, the rebirth of Israel as a modern democracy seems 
to reinforce the American belief in their own self-defined democratizing mission.  
Many American Christians, especially evangelical Protestants, viewed the early 
Zionist settlers sympathetically as the natural successors of the heroic ancient Hebrews 
whom they read about in their King James Bibles.161  American Christian Fundamentalists 
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have a complex, and somewhat abstract, relationship with Jews and Zionism.  Yaacov 
Ariel’s description of their attitude before 1967 is illustrative: 
The premillennialist attitude toward the prospect of the return of the Jews 
to their land and toward the Zionist movement was mostly instrumental.  
Premillennialists regarded the settlements of Jews in Palestine and the idea 
of establishing a Jewish state there as necessary steps in the advancement 
of eschatological developments.  On the whole, insuring the survival and 
well-being of the Jews was not part of what motivated them in supporting 
these developments.  They observed the movement of Jewish national 
restoration with much interest and joy.  Although dispensationalism 
criticized the secular character of Zionism, they saw in it a fulfillment of 
prophecies and a confirmation of their understanding of God’s plans for 
humanity.162 
Thus for many American Christians, particularly for Christian fundamentalists, American 
support for Israel reinforces their religious identity and their connection to and support 
for the American government that could be seen as doing “God’s work” by assisting the 
God’s “Chosen people” in redeeming the holy land and helping to bring about the Second 
Coming of their Savior. 
 American Orientalism.  Yet another overlapping framework that reinforces the 
other frameworks described above is that of Orientalism.  Unlike the more uniquely 
American frames described above, Orientalism is more of a European import.  While the 
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other frameworks above describe how Americans interpret and understand Israel, 
Orientalism provides an intellectual construct for understanding Israel’s Arab and Islamic 
adversaries.  In a context that creates sympathy for Israel, Orientalism creates a context 
for seeing Israel’s adversaries as America’s presumed adversaries as well. Thus antipathy 
and distrust for the Arab and Islamic countries of the Middle East becomes the basis for 
even greater empathy and support for Israel. 
 Orientalism, of course, was built on a foundation of conflict between the West 
and Islam that is almost as old as Islam itself.  The West has long perceived Islam as a 
threat to its survival and prosperity.  Over a period of centuries, European rulers launched 
Crusades to liberate the Holy Land from Islamic “infidels.”  Over time as Europe became 
stronger vis-à-vis the Islamic world, the threat of Islam became more of an opportunity 
for European expansion in terms of both population and resources.  European rulers 
expelled the Muslims from Spain (in 1492) and repelled the invading Turks from the 
gates of Vienna (in 1529 & 1683).  Conflicts continued into the 18th and 19th centuries as 
European colonial invaders expanded into the Muslim world, mostly at the expense of the 
gradually shrinking Turkish-based Ottoman Empire.  In this context, Europe has 
constructed an image of the Orient, which America would eventually inherit and 
reconstruct for its own purposes. 
 In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Orientalism was understood as a 
respected academic discipline for the study of Eastern cultures.  Over the last several 
decades, particularly since the publication of Edward Said’s now classic study, 
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Orientalism, it has taken on a more pejorative connotation as a discipline of thought that 
has been used to define a negative stereotype of the “Orient” and the “Oriental” in the 
minds of the dominant Western culture in order to establish and perpetuate Western 
domination of the so-called Orient.   Said defines the “Orient” as “almost a European 
invention, and has been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting 
memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences…..one of its [Europe’s] deepest and 
most recurring images of the Other.”163   He defined Orientalism as “the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, 
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over 
the Orient.” 164   He goes on to further define Orientalism as a “systematic discipline by 
which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, 
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-
Enlightenment period.”165   More intriguingly, Said argues that European identity and 
culture, particularly of the dominant colonial powers, France and Britain “gained strength 
and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even 
underground self.” 166   Said argues that the European view of the “Oriental” became the 
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intellectual basis for justifying the European colonial power structure throughout the 
region.  By defining the “Oriental” as weaker and inferior the Western Christian, 
Europeans were able to intellectually justify  European domination and control of the 
Orient – and its natural resources – as a responsibility that Europe must take up for the 
good of the people of the Orient.  Kipling would later describe this, in a famous poem – 
as taking up the “White Man’s Burden.”  While there were certainly aspects of truth in 
the Orientalist description of the East, as a whole the mythology of Orientalism was in 
essence a rationalization for power and domination, much as the widely held American 
racial beliefs of the 18th and 19th century were used to justify and rationalize the practice 
of American slavery.  To Said, the Orientalist discourse is a manifestation of political and 
economic power and a means of enforcing the cultural hegemony of the Occident over 
the Orient.  Beyond the dimension of power, Europeans were able to use the on-going 
conflict with the Orient as a means of defining themselves as “civilized” and their 
adversaries as “barbaric.” 
 The United States, also an intellectual product of European thought, inherited 
Europe’s cultural prejudices towards the Orient and made them its own as it developed its 
own intellectual tradition and relationship with the Middle East.  America’s relationship 
with the Islamic world was defined almost from the beginning as one of competition and 
conflict.  The early conflicts in the late 18th and early 19th centuries were over the 
American desire to expand its shipping routes into the Mediterranean Sea and the 
demands of Barbary pirates of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli for tribute in 




exchange for safe passage. When the Americans refused to pay the tribute the Islamic 
states took American sailors as hostages.  This conflict climaxed in a war in which the 
United States defeated Tripoli (1801-05).  However, as Robert Allison points out, this 
struggle was far more than just a contest for trade routes.  This war took on far deeper 
meanings for the young American republic: 
Americans at the time saw these episodes as part of the contest between 
Christians and Muslims, between Europeans and Turks or Moors, and 
ultimately, between what came to be called civilization and what the 
newly civilized world would define as barbarism.  The Americans 
inherited this understanding of the Muslim world and pursued this enemy 
more relentlessly than the Europeans imagined themselves doing what the 
nations of Europe had been unable or unwilling to do: beating the forces 
of Islamic despotism and piracy.  This war proved to Americans their real 
status as a nation and affirmed that theirs was to be a different kind of 
nation -- different both from the nations of Europe, which were content to 
pay tribute to the Barbary states, and from the Muslim states ravaged by 
their rulers and torn apart by their impoverished and savage people.  For 
the Americans, the war had a significance far beyond military objectives.  
Pope Pius VII said the Americans had done more in a few years than the 
rest of Christendom had done in centuries.  They had humbled the Muslim 
states of North Africa.  The war against Tripoli was meant to do this, but it 
was also meant as a lesson to Europe.  The Americans had proved that 
they would behave better than the Europeans, that they would not stoop to 
the demands of Tripoli or use the Barbary States to drive their own 
competitors from the sea.  The war inspired the American people with a 
renewed sense of their mission and destiny...167 
During these same years, American culture reinforced the images and fears that 
Americans had about the Muslim world:  
A flood of books on the Muslim world poured from American presses in 
the 1790s: captivity narratives; histories, including two biographies of 
Muhammad; novels and poems; and the first American edition of the 
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Arabian Nights.  This literature conveyed a consistent picture of the 
Muslim world, an inverted image of the world the Americans were trying 
to create anew.  The ability to create the world anew gave the Americans 
endless chances to improve people’s lives but just as many chances to ruin 
them.  In the literature on the Muslim world, Americans saw what could 
happen to people who made the wrong choices.  Muhammad had offered 
people a chance to chance to change, and change they did, adopting a new 
religion, building new states, and empires, reorganizing family life.  But 
each change had been a tragic mistake. The once prosperous peoples of 
Egypt, Turkey, Mauritania, and Syria were impoverished by bad 
governments, and their fertile lands turned into deserts.  In Algiers, Tunis, 
and Tripoli, honest commerce was perverted in piracy by avaricious deys 
and pachas. Everywhere, women were debased in harems and seraglios, 
the victims of unrestrained sexual power.  The Muslim world was a lesson 
for Americans in what not to do, in how not to construct a state, encourage 
commerce, or form families.  Power had to be controlled, liberty had to be 
secured, for men and women to prosper and for societies to progress.168 
America’s early encounter with the Islamic world helped shape America’s nascent 
national identity.  As in Europe, the Islamic world had become America’s “other” by 
which it could continue to define itself against what it was not.  While most Americans 
have forgotten, if they ever knew, the Tripolitan War -- except perhaps for the Marine 
fight song’s now obscure reference to fighting America’s battles from “the Halls of 
Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli” -- the images initially formed in this period have 
become a central part of the American image of a corrupt, decadent Islamic world that 
would remain a large part of America’s image of Middle East.   
 These images would be further carried over in the 19th century by illustrated 
editions of The Arabian Nights and later by Mark Twain’s 1869 account of his journey to 
the Holy Land, Innocents Abroad in which he described the Muslims as “a people by 
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nature and training filthy, brutish, ignorant, unprogressive [and] superstitious.”169  In the 
1920s and 1930s, the negative images of the Muslim world would be carried forward in 
American magazines, particularly the Orientalist images conveyed in the ubiquitous 
National Geographic Magazine.170  And as we explore later, once the moving pictures 
were created the images of the Muslim world would ultimately the cultural fodder 
perpetuated by Hollywood. 
 The place of the Jews in the Orientalist picture of the world is somewhat peculiar.  
In Europe over many decades and into the early Twentieth century, the Jews remained a 
widely despised minority.  They were the largest non-Christian minority in most parts of 
Europe and suffered centuries of persecution and segregation on the basis of religion and 
later racial pseudo-science.  In Europe the Jews were outsiders, sometimes literally 
beyond the pale.  In Europe, the Holocaust would become possible due to the indifference 
of the vast majority of Europeans to the fate of the Jews.  But in the context of European 
Imperialism, the Zionist movement became in part an extension of European imperial 
ambitions in the Middle East.  Ironically, in the context of Europe the Jews were broadly 
despised, but in the context of the Middle East, the Jews could be understood as more like 
the Europeans than the natives of those truly foreign lands. In a peculiar twist of fate, 
while the Zionists would see themselves as the victims of European persecution 
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unwanted and persecuted in Europe, the Muslims would come to see the Jewish Zionists 
as an extension of European efforts to dominate and control Palestine.   
 In Post-World War II America, the view of the world would be constructed 
around the Manichean Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union.  Over time, Israel would 
find its place within this struggle, initially mostly, as a client of its American patron, but 
also as an independent actor with its own interests and through its cultural ties and 
political influence within America via its sometimes uneasy relationship with the Jewish 
Diaspora in the United States.   The Cold War would coincide with massive cultural 
shifts caused by these massive economic and political changes within and external to 
American society.   These shifts included the civil rights movement, the rise of Christian 
fundamentalism, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the international economic 
shifts caused by decolonization.  Each of these cultural shifts affected America’s 
relationship with Israel in unintended and unexpected ways and in so doing have 
transformed American foreign policy in the Middle East.  It is to these cultural shifts that 




Chapter 3 - Changes in American Political Culture 
“The answer to the question must be neither one thing nor the other, but partly 
both one of those unsatisfactory truths with which history so often defeats its 
interpreters.”  --  Barbara Tuchman171 
As noted previously, the “special relationship” was established on strategic 
grounds in the early 1970s.  Since that time the Arab oil embargo, the end of the Cold 
War, and the 1991 Gulf War have all weakened the argument that Israel’s status as a 
“strategic asset” is the primary basis for the “special relationship” with he United States.  
During the 1980s, the Likud-led Israeli governments remained intransigent about the 
advancing the Middle East peace process.  Many of the positive images of Israel, for the 
reasons stated in the previous chapter, have weakened to some degree.  And yet since the 
early 1980s, the “special relationship” has grown stronger, not weaker.  Indeed, 
predictions of many observers than the end of the Cold War would lead to the end of the 
“special relationship” have not been fulfilled.  The pro-Israel lobby has become and 
remained one of the strongest lobbies in Washington.  The only way to explain this 
paradox is that a combination of mostly unrelated circumstances has led to a new set of 
cultural and ideological trends over the last several decades that have helped maintain 
and strengthen the pre-existing positive images that might otherwise have faltered as the 
strategic rationale for the relationship deteriorated over time. 
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While this transformation was difficult to observe at the time, because of the 
strategic framework of the Cold War overshadowed everything else, this analysis will 
seek to show that during the last decade of the Cold War the U.S.- Israel “special 
relationship” was gradually transforming from a strategic alliance into cultural-political 
alliance.  This process seemed to begin during the Reagan administration and come to 
full fruition under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.  (We will examine 
the historical progression in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5.)  We shall see once its 
strategic rationale dissolved at the end of the Cold War, the alliance remained as strong as 
ever – suffering only a relatively brief crisis during the George H.W. Bush 
administration. Several otherwise unrelated social and cultural trends within American 
society seem to have acted in unison to strengthen the existing images and sympathies for 
Israel within American political culture.  These trends seem almost entirely independent 
of any coordinated efforts on the part of the State of Israel, AIPAC, or the American Jews 
to influence the American political system.  While Israel, AIPAC, the Jewish community 
and their allies have often attempted to enhance and exploit these trends for their own 
benefit, they had little to do with creating them.  They have, however, often successfully 
managed how these even are interpreted and the significance and meaning that was 
attributed to them so that they would help enhance Israel’s positive image within the 
larger American political culture. 
The Decline of Anti-Semitism.  In recent years, the decline of anti-Semitism has 
furthered the integration of Jews into the multi-cultural mosaic of American society.    As 
noted by Mansour above the status of the Jews within American society has a great deal 
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to do with American perceptions of Israel.  In the years since the Second World War, the 
status of Jews has changed greatly.  Horrifying revelations of the Holocaust combined 
with the civil rights movement led to the de-legitimization of anti-Semitism in the 
American context.  Anti-Semitic beliefs which had been within the mainstream of 
political spectrum of the 1930s (embodied in such figures as Charles Lindbergh and 
Father Charles Coughlin), have moved to the fringes of American politics by the 1960s.172  
A 1940 survey found that 63% of Americans believed that Jews had “objectionable 
qualities.”  By 1962 this figure had dropped to 22%.173  In 1958, 61% of Americans said 
that they would vote for a Jew for President; by 1987, that figure had risen to 89%.174  In 
2000, a slim popular vote majority supported Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) for Vice-
President.175  Just as importantly, after the novelty had worn off, Lieberman’s religious 
faith did not seem to be a reason, at least publicly, for most Americans to oppose his 
candidacy.  Something that would have been impossible a few generations before -- for 
Americans to vote for a non-Christian for the 2nd highest office in the land -- had become 
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essentially unremarkable.  In some real sense, America had completed its transition from 
what many Americans would have called a “Christian” nation two generations before to 
one that could now widely be labeled with the peculiar moniker “Judeo-Christian.”   
The idea that Jews formed a distinctive racial group was de-legitimized by the 
Holocaust.  Between 1946 and 1962, the percentage of Americans who viewed Jews as a 
race dropped from 42% to 23%.176  During the 1950s, the Jewish quotas which had 
restricted Jewish access to America’s elite universities were lifted.  Indeed, most of the 
overt forms of anti-Semitism that had once existed in the United States began to fade 
away.  Furthermore, the wave of suburbanization in the 1950s meant that many millions 
of American Jews moved out of the Jewish neighborhoods of the major East coast cities 
and moved into integrated suburbs. Jews have moved into prominent positions in 
professional fields as diverse as entertainment, journalism, medicine, law, politics, and 
the academy.  Jews were no longer seen as a distinctive racial group (as they had been in 
the early part of the century), but as an ethnic group, with a shared religion, within an 
increasingly multicultural American mainstream.  Matthew Jacobson notes the ironic 
effects of the combination that the Second World War, the Holocaust, the civil rights 
debate, suburbanization, and the creation of Jewish state had on American Jewry: 
…The feverish and self-conscious revision of “the Jewish race” was at the 
very heart of the scientific project to rethink the “race concept” in general 
-- the racial devastation in Germany, that is, was largely responsible for 
the mid-century ascendance of “ethnicity.”  Changes wrought in the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
176
  Stembler, Charles Herbert and Others.  Jews in the Mind of America: 50. 
 
 -129-
social order by the [the Second World] war and by the early Cold War, 
too, helped to speed the alchemy by which Hebrews became 
Caucasian....the steady but certain ascendance of Jim Crow as the pressing 
political issue of the day brought the ineluctable logic of the South’s 
white-black binary into play with force in national life.  Postwar prosperity 
and postindustrial shifts in the economy, too, tended to disperse Jews 
geographically, either to outlying suburbs or towards sunbelt cities like 
Los Angeles and Miami -- in either case, to places where whiteness itself 
eclipsed Jewishness in racial salience....Jews became simply “white or 
anglo” in the regional racial schemes of the sunbelt; and racially tilted 
policies like the GI Bill of Rights and Federal Housing Authority’s 
“whites only” approach to suburban housing loans re-created Jews in their 
new regime of racial homogenization.   Nikhil Singh has rightly called the 
postwar suburban boom a case of “state sponsored apartheid”; its 
hardening of race along exclusive and unforgiving lines of color held 
tremendous portent for Jews and other white races.  And finally, 
ironically, if racialism has historically been an important component of 
Zionism, the establishment of a Jewish state ultimately had the opposite 
effect of whitening the Jews in cultural representation of all sorts: 
America’s client state in the Middle East became, of ideological necessity 
and by the imperatives of American nationalism, a white client state.  This 
revision was popularized not only in mainstream journalism, but in 
Technicolor extravaganzas on Middle Eastern history like The Ten 
Commandments and Exodus.177 
All of these factors led to Jews becoming more and more integrated into the mainstream 
of “white” middle class society.  Interestingly enough, the creation of a Jewish state may 
have helped this process.  The very fact that American Jews had a homeland -- even if 
most of their families had emigrated from Eastern Europe, not Israel -- made them more 
like other white ethnic immigrant groups.  The establishment of a Jewish state hastened 
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the transformation of the perception of Jews as a white ethnic group rather than a 
distinctive racial group. 
 Michelle Mart portrays the process in slightly different terms to essentially the 
same effect.  She sees the Jewish position shifting within the gender discourse; whereas 
they had previously been defined as “outsiders,” they now became “insiders.”  She argues 
that: 
In the first half of the twentieth century, Jews were described in American 
culture by a whole set of stereotypes that set them apart as different and 
made them “outsiders” in American culture.  Many Americans used the 
outsider images to scapegoat Jews for imagined or real ills in their lives.  
Anti-Semitism in the United States peaked soon after World War II and 
the popular postwar images of Jews, therefore, were informed by these 
stereotypes.... In the popular culture and political speech of the mid-to-late 
1940s, Jews and Israelis were treated -- relative to their depiction – as 
“outsiders.”  Yet, within a decade, Jews and Israelis had become 
“insiders” and, thus, subject to a different set of political assumptions.  
This transition from outsider to insider status was reflected in the 
Jewish/Israeli role in cultural discourse.  In the mid-1940s, for example, 
traditional American stereotypes of Jews and Israelis questioned the 
masculinity of Jewish men.  As Jews became insiders, these stereotypes 
were replaced by another set of images emphasizing Jewish masculinity 
and similarity to other American men.  There is an inherent connection 
between the construction of Jewish/Israeli masculinity and the perception 
of Jews as insiders, as similar to Americans, to be judged by similar 
political and social ideals:  Israelis would not have been seen as insiders if 
they had not measured up to an image of traditional masculinity.  
Moreover, the emergence of Israelis as “insiders” had a powerful effect of 
the political assumptions of U.S. policymakers.178  
In a society where the primary distinction among groups have remained racial, this 
transition from a racial “outsiders” to “white” ethnic “insiders” can not be 
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underestimated.  In many ways, American Jews have come to be seen as more American 
than Jewish.  Through their efforts at cultural assimilation and political integration, 
American Jews have been politically empowered -- not just as individuals, but as a group.  
Ironically, the economic and political reasons that most Americans Jews pursued such 
efforts at integration probably had almost nothing to do with a desire to influence U.S. 
policy towards Israel.   Rather, it reflected their desire to integrate into American society.  
In fact, their desire to integrate into American life reflects some aversion to being 
identified with Israel – which could lead to the questioning of their loyalty and 
patriotism.  Yet their integration into American society established much of the 
underlying socio-cultural infrastructure of the “special relationship” between the United 
States and the State of Israel. 
As Jews have become integrated into American society, they have become more-
and-more willing to take stands on specifically Jewish issues.  In the 1930s and 1940s, 
most Jews were averse to raising the issue of Jewish persecution in Europe, because they 
feared an anti-Semitic backlash.  They believed -- probably correctly -- that anti-
Semitism and isolationism were too widely accepted for their grievances to have much 
impact.179  By the mid-1970s, the children and grandchildren of the 1930s generation were 
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far better integrated and economically established as part middle class professionals 
within the mainstream of American society.   They were much more willing than earlier 
generations to advocate for pro-Jewish American policy.  The defining case of this was 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment to help win immigration rights for Soviet Jews by tying 
Most-Favored-Nation trading status to human rights.  At about the same time, and partly 
in response to the aforementioned 1974 campaign finance reform, American Jews began 
to organize publicly to lobby Congress on behalf of Israel.  This reflects the new self-
confidence and sense of personal security that American Jews felt within the United 
States. 
Related to this feeling of security, American Jews have also undergone a process 
of growing commitment to the State of Israel.  Before the Second World War, most 
American Jews did not support Zionism.  Many traditionally-observant Jews often 
rejected Zionism on theological grounds since it brought about the creation of a secular 
Jewish state before the coming of the Messiah.  Many less observant Jews, especially 
within the Reform movement, rejected the national connection of Jews to their ancient 
homeland.  The tragedy of the Holocaust and the creation of a Jewish state quickly 
transformed the views that most Jews had of Zionism; most American Jews came to see a 
Jewish state as a bulwark against anti-Semitism and as a necessity for the immediate 
resettlement of European Jewish refugees.  Over time, Israel’s military, economic, and 
social successes became a source of pride and communal unity for American Jews.  The 
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triumph of the Six-Day War and particularly the reunification of Jerusalem -- which 
contains Judaism’s holiest sites -- greatly increased American Jewish sense of 
identification with Israel.  Furthermore, their integration into American society has been 
so complete that few American Jews fear, as they once did, that support for Israel will be 
interpreted as disloyalty to the Untied States.  Indeed, the willingness of many American 
Jewish organizations to defend convicted spy Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew who 
was convicted of spying for Israel in the1980s, indicates the degree to which many 
American Jews feel comfortable with their place in American society.  Bernard Reich 
writes: 
Zionism is a focus of Judaism....The American Jewish community debated 
the very necessity of a Jewish state before Israel’s independence, and 
diverse perspectives...developed and were sustained even after 1948.  The 
Six Day War and the crisis that preceded it dramatically altered the 
importance of Israel in American Jewish thinking.  The threat to Israel’s 
existence galvanized American Jews, and ambivalence within the 
American Jewish community virtually ended....After the war...the 
interdependence of Israeli Jews and Jews of the Diaspora, especially 
American Jews, became more obvious.  The Yom Kippur War reinforced 
the “Zionization” of the American Jewish community.  Israel’s fate has 
become inextricably intertwined with American Jewish life and 
identification with Israel became a central characteristic of American 
Jewry.  Support for Israel dominates American Jewish public life, is part 
of the American Jewish consensus on what it means to be a Jew, and is 
voiced by a large majority of American Jews.  News about Israel 
dominates Anglo-Jewish newspapers and periodicals and is the mainstay 
of community annual fund-raising campaigns of Jewish philanthropic 
organizations.  On the other hand, only a small proportion of American 
Jews express a passionate involvement with Israel, and fewer still think 
about immigrating to, and settling in, the country.  In general, many 
American Jews do not have a detailed and differentiated knowledge of 
developments in Israel nor is its culture a significant part of their lives.180 
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Thus American Jews have developed a deep dedication to Israel’s existence and security 
as part of their Jewish identity, while maintaining a relatively superficial understanding 
of the realities and complexities of Israel.  Most American Jews are deeply committed to 
romanticized heroic image of Israel that often has little to do with the reality of Israeli 
life. 
The integration of Jews into American society and their growing commitment to 
Israel have served as two of the key socio-cultural pillars of the “special relationship.”   
While the U.S.-Israel “special relationship” really predated well-organized, well-funded 
public efforts by the Jewish community on behalf of Israel, there can be little doubt that 
in later years their efforts reinforced and ultimately strengthened it.  As Bar-Siman-Tov 
observes: 
...Although the American Jewish community and the Jewish lobby have 
played an important role in the special relationship, the real rationale of 
the relationship remained independent of them.  Indeed, their role became 
more important after the special relationship was established; probably the 
relationship strengthened their role rather than vice versa.181 
The active political role of the American Jewish community is not the only factor that has 
strengthened the “special relationship.”  Indeed, the transformation of a much broader 
segment of the American population has also played a crucial role in the development of 
the America’s “passionate attachment” to Israel. 
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The Rise of the Religious Right.  Over the last several decades, there has been a 
broad social transformation in the attitudes and activities of Christian fundamentalists.  
Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the organized Christian right -- first in the 
form of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority and later through Pat Robertson’s Christian 
Coalition -- began playing a more active role in American politics. The religious right 
appears to have emerged in response to the perceived moral decay of American society, 
which was embodied for them in the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion-on-
demand.  While their primary interest has been in domestic social issues, they have also 
taken an active interest in U.S. foreign policy.182  Inspired by the belief that the creation of 
Israel and especially the 1967 reunification of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty 
prefigured the Second Coming of Christ,183 Christian fundamentalists have come to:  
“...See the events in the Middle East as an indication that history proceeds according to 
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their understanding of God’s plans for humanity. The history of the state of Israel 
provides them with encouragement and hope.”184 
Thus the dramatic history of the State of Israel over the past several decades has 
served to reinforce the identity and beliefs of Christian fundamentalists.  This sympathy 
has led much of the Christian right to advocate policies sympathetic to the State of 
Israel.185  They have been particularly sympathetic to the Israeli right with whom they 
share the religious goal of “redeeming” the West Bank, which both groups often call by 
its Biblical names -- Judea and Samaria.  This friendly relationship may well have been 
enhanced by the coincidence that the right-wing dominated Israeli coalitions throughout 
the 1980s while the American religious right was gaining influence in United States.186  In 
recent years, support for the Israeli right has become a staple of right-wing talk radio 
shows, most prominently, Rush Limbaugh, who shares some of the economic and 
political predispositions of the Israeli right. 
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While the rise of the religious right has clearly strengthened sympathy for Israel 
among American Christians, Ronald Stockton has argued convincingly that the 
“Christian Zionist” phenomenon goes well beyond Christian fundamentalists.  In a survey 
that he conducted, 46% of his respondents were defined as “Christian Zionists” because 
they agreed with the statement that the creation of the state of Israel was the “fulfillment 
of Biblical prophecy.”187  Stockton goes on to argue that: 
Christian Zionism -- while associated in certain peripheral ways with the 
New Religious Right -- deviates in major respects from that movement.  It 
is particularly significant that while the New Religious Right is a partisan 
political movement, Christian Zionism is more a mainstream cultural 
theme linked to American self-identity and to the perception of America 
as a moral community....While Christian Zionism is disproportionately 
associated with the evangelical Christian base from which it historically 
sprang, the survey data indicates that it transcends these origins and has 
support in all religious, ideological, and political strata.188 
Stockton’s analysis reminds us of the importance of Robert Bellah’s concept of civil 
religion and Ezrahi’s Biblical “super stories” as mechanisms for allowing American 
Christians -- both fundamentalists and non-fundamentalist -- to relate to the Israeli 
experience.  Conversely, Americans share few cultural, historical, or religious bonds with 
Arabs, Muslims, and their historical discourse. 
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The “Islamic Threat.” 
The American Orientalist view of the world, described above, has served as a 
foundation for modern American images of the Arab and Islamic worlds.189 Since the 
1970s, events in the Middle East have seemed to reinforce the view of Islam as a threat 
and therefore indirectly reinforced Americans’ natural pre-existing sympathies towards 
Israel.190  During that decade, the emergence of violently anti-Western Pan-Arab and later 
Islamic extremist movements in the Middle East came to be perceived by many 
Americans as a threat to their interests and values.  A spate of hijackings and high profile 
terrorist attacks -- such as the Black September attack (1970), the attack on Israeli 
athletes at 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, and the Entebbe hijacking (1976) -- 
cemented a deeply-rooted sense of distrust of Muslims and Arabs in minds of much of 
the American public.191  This distrust was reinforced by the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo that 
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At this point, there is little evidence to suggest that this incident is an important 
turning point in American perceptions of the Middle East.  By contrast, the 
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greatly frustrated and inconvenienced the American public.  The Iranian Revolution and 
the holding of American hostages for over a year (November, 1979 to January, 1981) at 
the American embassy compound in Tehran further deepened the American hostility 
towards the Islamic world.  Ironically, the holding of American hostages by an Islamic 
adversary was not a new image of Muslims, but unbeknownst to most Americans a 
revival the experience of one of America’s earliest encounters of the Muslim world 
during the mostly-forgotten Tripolitan War (1801-1805) 
In the 1980s, this antipathy was deepened by the 1983 bombing of Marine 
barracks in Lebanon, the holding of American hostages in Lebanon, and Ayatollah 
Khomenei’s fatwa against Pakistani-born author Salman Rushdie.  During the l990s, 
these negative images of a violent Arab world have been further reinforced by Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the first bombing of the World Trade Center, and the 
horrific terrorist attacks by Islamic militants against Israeli civilians.  In the early 20th 
Century, the Sept 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center followed 
by the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cemented these images in stone.  Shain 
writes that Americans have held Arabs “collectively...accountable for the repudiation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Munich Olympics massacre and other terrorist attacks in the 1970s which seemed 
to establish a much more significant perceptual link between “Palestinians” and 
“terrorism” in public consciousness.  The political significance of the Robert F. 
Kennedy assassination and its relationship to American perceptions of the Israeli-




America in Arab and Muslim countries and for terrorist activities of Islamists in the 
United States.”192  
Edward Said argues in Covering Islam that Americans interpret political events in 
the Muslim world in a manner that presents Muslims in a highly negative light.  He 
writes: 
Today Islam is defined negatively as that with which the West is radically 
at odds, and this tension establishes a framework radically limiting 
knowledge of Islam.  So long as this framework stands, Islam, as a vitally 
lived experience for Muslims can not be known.  This, unfortunately, is 
particularly true in the United States, and only slightly less true in 
Europe....the canonical, orthodox coverage of Islam that we find in the 
academy, in government, and in the media is all interrelated and has been 
more diffused, has seemed more persuasive and influential, in the West 
than any other “coverage” or interpretation.  The success of this coverage 
can be attributed to the political influence of those people and institutions 
producing it rather than necessarily to truth or accuracy.  I have also 
argued that this coverage has served purposes only tangentially related to 
actual knowledge of Islam itself.  The result has been the triumph not just 
of a particular knowledge of Islam but rather of a particular interpretation 
which, however, has neither been unchallenged nor impervious to the 
kinds of questions asked by unorthodox, inquiring minds.193 
Thus the much of the media and the academy will often implicitly (and sometimes 
explicitly) present Islam in a distorted, negative manner.  This results from several social 
phenomena involving the Arab and Islamic community.  There are relatively few Arabs 
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Fall, 1995): 82.  Shain is speaking of the Arab-American Diaspora in the United 
States and its role in American politics, but his point is clearly generalizable to the 
way in which Americans view all Arabs inside and outside of the United States. 
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or Muslims in the media or the academy.  Most Muslims are relatively recent immigrants 
to the United States and thus often lack the education, skills to compete in these fields.  
New immigrants groups are also least likely to be familiar with the intricacies and culture 
of American politics and media -- especially when they come from countries that lacked 
democratic institutions and uncensored media.  Furthermore, Arab- and Muslim- 
Americans have often been divided by religious, ethnic, and national cleavages, which 
have made it difficult for them to organize effectively to lobby political institutions and 
present themselves positively to the public.  The few organizations dedicated to these 
goals have generally-speaking often been under funded and ineffective. 
The stereotypes and negative images of Islam that exist in the media are often 
further amplified by popular culture.   Jack Shaheen noted in 1998 that “since 1970, more 
than 300 major films have vilified Arabs.”194  Beyond the movies, television and comic 
books also have a long tradition of portraying Arabs and Muslims in negative stereotyped 
ways.  Arab women have been portrayed as veiled and exotic.  They are often seen as 
either belly dancers or members of harems.  Arab men are regularly portrayed as violent, 
fanatical, wealthy, scheming, dirty, and lascivious.  They are usually dressed in turbans or 
Yassar Arafat-style kaffiyehs.  The most popular stereotypes are of either oil sheiks or 
terrorists.  Images of camels and deserts also abound.  It is also worth noting that while 
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negative images of Arabs and Muslims are common in popular culture, positive or even 
“normal” ordinary images of Arabs and Muslims are very rare.195 
As noted above by Said, Europe defined itself against the “other” of the Orient.  
Sociologically, it is not unusual for nations to define themselves against “others” in order 
to promote national unity and group cohesion.  Sociologist Lewis Coser describes this 
phenomenon as follow: 
Rigidly organized struggle groups may actually search for enemies with 
the deliberate purpose or the unwitting result of maintaining unity and 
internal cohesion.  Such groups may actually perceive an outside threat 
although no threat is present.  Under conditions yet to be discovered, 
imaginary threats have the same group-integrating function as real 
threats.196 
The United States, which, unlike most European states, lacks an ethnic basis for national 
identity, has according to some scholars been particularly needy of “others” through 
which to unify its diverse and often fractious polity.  Michael Rogin argues that: 
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  Lewis Coser, “Conflict with Out-Groups and Group Structure.”  





...The creation of monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by 
inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political foes.  These 
monsters -- the Indian cannibal, the black rapist, the papal whore of 
Babylon, the monster-hydra United States Bank, the demon rum, the bomb 
throwing anarchist, the many-tentacled Communist conspiracy, the agents 
of international terrorism -- familiar in the dream-life that so often 
dominates Americans politics....American demonology has both a form 
and a content.  The demonologist splits the world in two, attributing 
magical, pervasive power to a conspiratorial center of evil.  Fearing chaos 
and secret penetration, the counter subversive interprets local initiatives as 
signs of alien power.  Discrete individuals and groups become, in the 
countersubversive imagination, members of a single political body 
directed by its head.  The countersubversive needs monsters to give shape 
to his anxieties and to permit to indulge his forbidden desires.  
Demonization allows the countersubversive, in the name of battling the 
subversive, to imitate his enemy....American countersubversion has taken 
its shape from the pervasiveness of propertied individualism in our 
political culture; expansionist character of our history; and the definition 
of American identity against racial, ethnic, class, and gender aliens.197 
Thus Rogin argues the subversive “other” must be powerful, unified, well-coordinated 
and dangerous.  This sort of analysis does not intend to suggest that in some or all of 
these cases that there may not be a genuine threat to American interests -- albeit perhaps 
not an existential threat to American survival that is sometimes perceived.  Indeed, a real 
threat is far easier to explain than an imagined one.  Nor does this analysis suggest that 
those who are trying to convince others that such a threat is real are disingenuous; indeed, 
it is most likely that they themselves are convinced that an existential threat exists.  This 
sort of analysis merely suggest that there is, within the American identity, a great need to 
summon up powerful threatening demons in order to preserve national unity against 
internal fissures, regardless of whether they actually exist. 
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John Esposito and other scholars have argued that the end of the Cold War and 
the defeat of the monolithic enemy of Soviet Communism, may have led Americans to 
demonize Islam as America’s next monolithic enemy.  Esposito fears that Americans are 
making many of the same mistakes that they made during the Cold War.  Writing almost 
a decade before the September 11th attacks, he contends that: 
Celebration of the unraveling of communism and the victory of democracy 
has been tempered by questions that go to the heart of our ability to 
understand, analyze, and formulate policy.  Delight at the triumph of 
democracy has been accompanied by a growing realization of the extent to 
which fear and demonizing of the enemy blinded many to the true extent 
of the Soviet threat.  Viewing the Soviet Union through the prism of the 
“evil empire” often proved ideologically reassuring and emotionally 
satisfying, justifying the expenditure of enormous resources and the 
support of a vast military-industrial complex.  However, our easy 
stereotypes of the enemy and the monolithic nature of the communist 
threat also proved costly.  Despite an enormous amount of intelligence and 
analysis, few seemed to know that in the end the emperor had no clothes.... 
The exaggerated fears and static vision which drove us to take herculean 
steps against a monolithic enemy blinded us to the diversity within the 
Soviet Union and the profound changes that were taking place.  Similarly, 
in understanding and responding to present-day events in the Muslim 
world, we are again challenged to resist easy stereotypes and solutions.... 
The easy path is to view Islam and Islamic revivalism as a threat -- to posit 
a global Pan-Islamic threat, monolithic in nature, a historic enemy whose 
faith and agenda are diametrically opposed to the West.... Just as 
perceiving the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the prism of the 
“evil empire” had its costs, so too the tendency of American 
administrations and the media to equate Islam and Islamic activism with 
Qaddafi/Khomeini and thus with radicalism, terrorism, and anti-
Americanism has seriously hampered our understanding and conditioned 
our responses.198  
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Thus as America searches for a new enemy, it also searches for allies.  Israel -- 
previously an ally in America’s struggle against the Communism -- has long been viewed 
as an adversary of Arab regimes and by extension of Islam.  Thus if Islam is to be 
America’s next enemy, then it is logical within such a bifurcated and polarized 
worldview that Israel is to be perceived as an especially close ally.  Clearly, the distrust 
of Americans for Arabs and Muslims has served indirectly to strengthen the sympathy of 
Americans for Israel, which many Americans view as a strategic bulwark against a 
violent and hostile Arab world.  As Sheffer and Hofnung note, Israel is perceived in this 
context as a military partner and an effective and aggressive ally in the “War on 
terrorism” that helps defend American interests in the hostile Middle East.  They add that 
“the [1976] raid on Entebbe...is still favorably recalled by many Americans.”199  The 
Entebbe Raid, which spawned at least three movies,200 is emblematic of one of the few 
times in which a government has successfully struck back at terrorists.  Given the general 
frustration and sense of helplessness that Americans feel about their country’s inability to 
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do much about terrorism, Entebbe reinforces Israel’s image as an important and 
successful ally in the “War on terrorism.”   
The disconnection between Americans and Arab-Muslim experience is increased 
further by the inability of Americans to relate to the colonial discourse that has shaped 
Arab and Muslim perceptions of their relationship with the West.  For most people in the 
developing world, the creation of Israel seems to closely parallel actions of colonial 
powers.  While the Israeli experience is in many ways distinct from a traditional colonial 
project, it is through these eyes that most people in formerly colonized nations view the 
modern Israeli state.  While Americans have become increasingly aware of their own 
mistreatment of Native Americans, they have not really made the intellectual leap to 
perceive the United States as having colonized the American continent.  Americans 
prefer to view themselves as anti-colonialists who defeated the British Empire than as 
colonizers themselves.  It is far easier for most Americans to relate to and sympathize 
with the Israeli immigrant experience than for them to relate to the Arab experience of 
having been victimized by colonizers. 201  The polling data below from Eytan Gilboa is 
highly suggestive of the stereotypes that Americans have about Arabs and Israelis. 
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Images of Israelis and Arabs202 
 
Does each world apply more to Arabs or more to Israelis? 
 
 More to  More to  To Both  To 
 Don’t 
 Israelis  Arabs  Equally  Neither Know 
 
Peaceful 41%   7%   9%  24%  19% 
Honest  39%   6%  13%  18%  25% 
Intelligent 39%   8%  26%    5%  21% 
Like Americans50%   5%   8%  17%  21% 
Friendly 46%   6%  15%  11%  23% 
Backward   6%  47%    7%  15%  25%  
Underdeveloped 9%  47%  10%  10%  25%  
Poor  21%  34%   9%  15%  22% 
Greedy   9%  41%  20%    7%  23% 
Arrogant 11%  37%  19%    7%  26% 
Moderate 33%  20%  21%    3%  24% 
Developing 33%  20%  21%    3%  24% 
Barbaric   4%  38%    8%  23%  28% 
 
Some scholars have also suggested that there is a racial element to this 
phenomenon in that the Israeli Jews are perceived as “white” and Arabs are “people of 
color” for whom it is harder for Americans to sympathize.  This fits in with the manner in 
which Jews came to be perceived as “white” in the postwar United States (as described 
above) and the negative perceptions of Arabs and Muslims.  A long list of film portrayal 
can be seen as reinforcing these racial stereotypes.  Michael Hunt, for example, contends 
that racial stereotypes are at the heart of American foreign policy in the Middle East.  
Hunt argues that: 
                                                 
202 Gilboa, Eytan.  American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli 




The paternalism and contempt evident in the Vietnam ‘adventure’ testifies 
to the continuing influence of culture-bound, color-conscious world view 
that still positions nations and peoples in a hierarchy defined at the 
extremes by civilization and barbarism, modernity and tradition.  It 
renders us sympathetic to forward-looking Israelis, seen largely as 
Europeans, at loggerheads with swarthy bearded, polygamous, fanatical 
Arabs.203 
Camille Mansour offers a somewhat more nuanced view of the political context.  He 
contends that: 
Israel perceives itself and is perceived as being part of European and 
Western culture.  It identifies and is identified with the West and its Judeo-
Christian heritage.  It is interesting to note in this regard that although 
Zionism and the creation of Israel signified in a certain sense the rejection 
of the Jews by Europeans and concomitantly, the refusal of Jews to 
assimilate in Europe, the Yishuv and Israel are nonetheless seen as 
belonging to Western civilization.... Perhaps the perception of the Arab-
Muslim world... as different and hostile helps them rediscover points in 
common with the culture they thought they had rejected.... The feeling of 
being part of a European “we,” although it contains many cultural 
elements in common, does not express a common and uniform culture... as 
a cultural identification which is, as we have seen, of an “ideological” 
nature, that is, voluntaristic and explicit.... Another factor reduces the 
extent of “orientalization” of Israel: the progressive Americanization of 
[Israeli] society, as manifested in film, television, modes of consumption 
and the liberalization of the economy.204 
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Thus it becomes clear that for a series of interrelated reasons, American public has 
continues to view the Arab and Islamic worlds in highly negative and adversarial manner.  
This cultural context further enhances the view that Israel is a necessary and loyal 
American ally in the Middle East. 
American Perceptions of the Holocaust.  Now we turn to the manner in which 
Americans perceive the Holocaust.  Many Jews have long-believed that the Holocaust 
was a unique event with no historical parallels, before or since; over time, this view has 
gradually been accepted by much of the American public.  In 1960s and 1970s, the 
Holocaust emerged as an important American historical memory.  Edward Linenthal 
describes the process as follows: 
What came to be known as “The Holocaust” was often indistinguishable 
in the immediate postwar years from the millions of non-combatant 
casualties due to terror bombings of civilian populations, epidemic 
illnesses, or starvation.  It was considered by most as simply part of the 
horror of war.  And, if the Holocaust “lived” at all in American culture, it 
did so in survivor memories, the displaced memories of those who had 
been characterized as “displaced persons” in American culture.  The 
Holocaust emerged gradually as a significant cultural memory in the 
1960s with the widely publicized trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel 
beginning in April 1961.  In 1967, the Six-Day War seemingly threatened 
Israel with annihilation, the announced goal of Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdul Nasser.  Another Holocaust seemed in the making, and the 
Holocaust became the backdrop against which many American Jews 
perceived the crisis.  The year 1978 was important in the development of 
Holocaust consciousness.  The highly publicized threat by American Nazis 
to march through Skokie, Illinois, home to many Holocaust survivors, 
brought the principle of free speech into the conflict with survivor 
sensibilities.  The Office of Special Investigation was created to bring to 
trial Nazi war criminals living in the United States.  NBC’s nine-and-one-
half-hour miniseries “The Holocaust” aired April 16-19, 1978, with an 
estimated audience of one hundred twenty million.  And it was in 1978 
that President Jimmy Carter announced his intention to create the 
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President’s Commission on the Holocaust....The formation of the 
Commission signaled that the Holocaust had moved not only from the 
periphery to the center of American Jewish consciousness, but to the 
center of national consciousness, as well.205 
The 1980s and 1990s seemed to further the American fascination with the 
Holocaust.  The horrific genocide in Bosnia helped stir a renewal of interest in the last 
genocide in Europe.  The growing awareness of and empathy for the Jews as survivors of 
the Nazi Holocaust has added to the support for Israel among Americans.  These 
sympathies were reinforced by the 1993 release of Steven Spielberg’s Academy-Award 
winning epic, Schindler’s List.206  This film brought the atrocities of the Holocaust into the 
movie theaters and ultimately the living rooms of a new generation of Americans.  It is 
not surprising that when the movie was broadcast on network television, a corporate 
sponsor and the network made the highly unusual gesture of underwriting the entire film 
as an uninterrupted commercial-free broadcast.207 
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The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in the United States. 
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Americans have accepted a certain sense of guilt and shame, perhaps 
disproportionately so, for their failure to help the Jews208 and for America’s own history of 
anti-Semitism.  Robert Abzug, speaking of Americans and American culture, writes: 
The Nazis could not be written off as products of some primitive 
culture...for they had grown up in one of the most advanced societies in 
Europe and shared with Americans and the rest of the West racial, 
religious and ethnic attitudes that were the precondition for Auschwitz.  In 
many ways they were us, and that was difficult to face.... Our culture has 
made scenes of the liberation and other evidence of what we now call the 
Holocaust into universal symbols of humankind’s inhuman capacities.  
They could not be more appropriate.  Yet the danger inherent in 
symbolizing “man’s inhumanity to man” with the dead and the dying of 
Buchenwald or of some latter-day tragedy is that it helps us to distance 
ourselves from both the specific victims and from the fact that each act of 
genocide or other mass murder or starvation has had its roots in very 
specific political, economic, and cultural conditions.209 
Thus American culture has privileged the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust.  This 
allows Americans to establish a unique relationship with Israel where Israel’s actions are 
rarely, if ever, challenged while her adversaries’ suffering can easily be ignored or 
downplayed because it is not as bad as what the Jews suffered in the Holocaust. 
The opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993 
has greatly increased the historical consciousness of the Holocaust among 
Americans.  The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which has 
been the busiest tourist attraction in nation’s capitol since its opening, was 
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constructed on the national mall -- a mere 400 yards from the Washington 
Monument.210  The Museum has served to sanctify the unique place of the 
Holocaust in the American national consciousness.  No other event that 
took place outside the United States and primarily effected non-Americans 
has achieved such a place of honor in America’s sacred national space.211   
 David Schoenbaum notes that “it is hard to think of another [foreign policy] 
relationship...where a national museum -- the National Holocaust Museum -- in 
Washington is also a foreign policy document…”212  The Holocaust has now achieved a 
unique significance in American political culture.  Jews have been portrayed in the 
American mind as having been uniquely victimized by the Christian world and have 
therefore become especially deserving of American patronage and practically 
unquestioned political support.  Thus the unique place of the Holocaust in the American 
national memory reinforces the American sympathy and support for the state of Israel.  
Mansour describes the place of the Holocaust in American collective consciousness: 
...The Jewish community, in appealing for defense of the Israelis as 
survivors of Nazism encounters a favorable echo with Americans, who 
have the collective memory of having fought the war to save the Jews 
from Nazi massacres -- which was not exactly true historically.... This 
echo is perhaps, by reaction more favorable among those who believe that 
                                                 
210
  Http://www.ushmm.org/misc-bin/add_goback/facts.html 
211
  The designers of the museum have attempted to reinforce the rather tenuous 
link between the Holocaust and the United States by putting recordings of the voices of 
the American soldiers who liberated some of the camps in the elevators that take visitors 
up to the beginning of the main exhibit. 
212
  Schoenbaum.  “Commentary: More Special than Others.”” Diplomatic 
History.  (Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring, 1998):  275.  The truth of this statement was 
demonstrated by the fascinating controversy that enveloped the museum in January 1998 
over whether or not to extend an invitation to visit the Museum to Palestinian Authority 
President Yasir Arafat. 
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the United States did not do enough for the Jews during the war.  One 
cannot stress enough the importance of American (and Western) 
experience during World War II -- the massacre by the Nazis of the 
European Jewish communities, the civilian and military loses suffered by 
the Allies in combat, but also the final victory -- as a factor explaining 
extreme sensitivity in American society regarding anti-Semitism.  This 
sensitivity is especially marked in veterans of the war and in certain 
“philo-Semitic” Christian groups deeply attached to the Old Testament.  
Members of the American sociopolitical elite are imbued with this 
sensitivity, which has become a central and even sacralized value within 
the political system; it manifests itself positively in the fear of a return of 
the “demons” of Nazism and negatively in the fear of being labeled anti-
Semitic.  The American and Western rejection of anti-Semitism is thus not 
yet totally spontaneous and serene. Might this explain a certain 
compensatory attitude that leads Americans to acquiesce without criticism 
to the pro-Israeli appeals of the lobby?213 
Let us now consider how these changes in political culture have played out in the 
historical development of the U.S.-Israel alliance. 
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Chapter 4 – 
The History and Development of the U.S.-Israel Relationship during the Cold War 
 The U.S.-Israel Relationship has evolved greatly since its conception going thru a 
series of phases that will be described below.  The myth that the U.S. and Israel were 
close allies from the founding of the Jewish state is belied by the historical facts.  Despite 
President Truman’s oft-cited decision to offer de facto recognition of Israel only minutes 
after the state declared independence on May 15, 1948, and despite political claims of 50 
years of strategic partnership to the contrary, the strategic partnership between the two 
states did not develop during the early years of the Cold War.   Starting in the early 
1950s, Israel, under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, almost always sought to build a 
close alliance with the United States.  The close relationship developed gradually 
primarily as a result of a combination of strategic, cultural, and political factors within the 
United States.  This study divides the U.S.-Israel relationship into seven rough phases: 
1) The Pre-State Period, 1917 – 1948 
2) The Non-Strategic Period, 1948-1958 
3) The Emerging Strategic Relationship, 1958-1970 
4) The Strategic “Special Relationship,” 1970-1982 
5) The Late  Cold War Political-Cultural “Special Relationship,” 1982-1993 
6) The Post Cold War Political-Cultural “Special Relationship, 1993-2001 
7) The “War on Terror” Neo-Conservative “Special Relationship,” 2001-present 
The five Cold War phases will be discussed in this chapter and the final two Post-
Cold War phases will be discussed in Chapter 5.  From the start it is worth noting the 
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importance of key events in the narrative.  Numerous political and military crises [such as 
the crises in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (1958), the Six-Day War (1967), “Black 
September” (1970), the Camp David Accords (1978), the Iranian Revolution (1979), and 
the Lebanon War (1982), the first Intifada (1987-93), the First Gulf War (1991), and the 
2nd Intifada (2000-present] greatly changed the strategic analysis that was applied to 
Israel.  Each of these events has been interpreted to increase the strategic importance and 
commitment attached to Israel.  However, even events that might have defined Israel as 
more of a strategic burden [e.g.…the attack on the USS Liberty (1967), Arab oil embargo 
(1974), annexation of the Golan Heights (1981), the end of the Cold War (1989), Gulf 
War (1990-91), the September 11th attacks on the U.S. (2001)] tended to have little or no 
long-term effect on the U.S.-Israel Alliance.  Sometimes, the event caused a temporary 
period of dispute or tension, but the effects were never long-lasting.  The relationship 
would always snap back into place and often stronger than before.  Thus events in which 
Israel could be understood as a strategic asset were emphasized politically as strategically 
important to the relationship, while events in which Israel was more of a strategic burden 
were de-emphasized politically as insignificant to the overall health of the relationship. 
 Pre-State Period:  Before the Second World War, Zionism did not play a major 
role in American politics.  There were some organized efforts to gain U.S. support for 
creating a Jewish by early Zionist groups such as the Zionist Organization of America.  
The Zionist movement was relatively small before the First World War and most 
American Jews were recent Eastern European who had chosen to immigrate to the United 
States.  Most Jewish organizations were limited in their scope and most American Jews 
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were only just beginning to integrate into the American society.  Anti-Semitism remained 
a major threat and the strongest political movement among most American Jews was 
socialism.  Most Orthodox Jews rejected the Zionist movement, because of its secularism 
and for advocating a return to Zion before the coming of the Messiah.  The Reform 
movement rejected Zionism, because it rejected the Zionism view that Jews were living 
in the galut (exile) and that the Jewish future lay in return to the Holy Land.  For most 
American Jews, Zionism was a pipe dream.  Regardless, the Jewish community lacked 
the political clout to be a major political player at this stage.  There were some early 
efforts to recruit the support of the American political leadership for Zionism – notably in 
1918 following the publication of the British Balfour Declaration.  214   In 1922, the 
Republican controlled Congress passed a resolution sponsored by Sen. Henry Cabot 
Lodge (R-MA) and Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY) in support of Zionism echoing almost 
exactly the wording of the 1917Balfour Declaration: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That the United States of America 
favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious 
buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected.  (September 
21, 1922) 215 
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Nevertheless, this resolution seemed more of symbolic endorsement of the Balfour 
resolution and the British Mandate in Palestine than a real indication of an active 
American policy.  During the 1920s, 1930s, and particularly during the 1940s, every 
American President and hundreds of members of the House and Senate offered rhetorical 
support for the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine, 216   but there was little policy 
engagement since remained under a British Mandate and United States had moved into a 
phase of international isolationism.  
 While the Jewish community was a part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal 
Coalition, primarily as a result of economic concerns resulting from the Great 
Depression, there is little indication that the Roosevelt administration responding to 
Jewish concerns about the fate of European Jewry or Zionism.  The most infamous 
incident was the refusal of the U.S. government to allow S.S. St. Louis, a ship carrying 
nearly a thousand European Jewish refugees, to land in the U.S. in 1939.  President 
Roosevelt turned the refugees away under political pressure from Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull and Southern Democrats.217  This incident is indicative of how little 
influence the Jewish community had in the politics of the period.   This was a period 
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when the anti-Semitism of Henry Ford, Father Charles Coughlin, and Charles Lindbergh 
remained a prominent part of American political discourse.  This pattern tragically 
continued throughout the Second World War with a pattern of U.S. indifference to the 
unfolding genocide of European Jewry.218   
 Not surprisingly, the Roosevelt administration was just as indifferent to the efforts 
of the Zionists although they had begun to gain some influence in Congress.  In 1944, the 
issue of Zionism was raised in Congress in S. Res. 247 co-sponsored by Senator Robert 
F. Wagner (D-NY) and Robert A. Taft (R-OH).  They proposed a bipartisan resolution 
that read: 
Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take 
appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened 
for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full 
opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately 
reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth.219 
While hearings were held on these resolutions in the U.S. House, however, the committee 
decided that, “actions upon the resolution at this time would be unwise” after receiving a 
letter from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.  The Stimson letter read in part “it is the 
considered judgment of the War Department that without reference to the merits of these 
resolutions, further action on them at this time would be prejudicial to the successful 
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prosecution of the war.”220  While no explicit reason is given, it can be presumed that a 
Congressional resolution in support of Zionism would have caused anger in the Arab 
world which the Roosevelt administration assumed could be harmful to the war effort. 
  During 1941 and early 1942, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion came to 
Washington and spent 10 weeks attempting to get a meeting with President Roosevelt, 
but was repeatedly rebuffed.221  By contrast, Roosevelt did meet quite famously with 
Saudi King Ibn Saud on February 14, 1945 following the Yalta Conference 
demonstrating that the primary American interest in the region was in petroleum. As one 
might expect, President Roosevelt was clearly pursuing U.S. strategic interests in meeting 
with the Saudi king.  Roosevelt reportedly told the king that he would “do nothing to 
assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people”222  
Roosevelt clearly saw no similar strategic interest in supporting the Zionist efforts to 
establish a state in Palestine and a significant strategic interest in courting Saudi Arabia. 
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 Truman and the Founding of Israel, 1948.  Following the end of the Second 
World War and the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the startling public revelation of the 
death and devastation in the Nazi Concentration Camps, President Truman took a very 
different approach that explicitly rejected Roosevelt’s promise.  During the autumn of 
1945, Truman met with Saudi and other Arab diplomats in Washington and is alleged to 
have told them, “I’m sorry gentlemen…but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands 
who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have the hundreds of thousands of 
Arabs among my constituents.”223   Truman himself would later deny that his views on 
Israel were shaped by domestic political considerations, which would seem to contradict 
the possibility that he would so bluntly blame domestic politics for his actions.  Whether 
these words attributed to Truman are literally true or apocryphal attribution is less 
important than the complex political nexus around the U.S.-Israel relationship that such 
comments hint at.  The question of how much domestic political considerations have 
shaped American policy towards Israel has remained a core element in the relationship 
ever since.  The U.S.-Israel relationship had clearly begun to take on a domestic political 
element that involved consideration of Jewish opinion under Truman that had been 
essentially absent under President Roosevelt.  This was the beginning of a long 
transformation of American policy that would take a generation to complete. 
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 The Truman administration certainly took several positions more sympathetic to 
Zionist aims than the Roosevelt administration.  On October 4, 1946, Truman endorsed a 
recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to allow 100,000 Jewish 
refugees from Europe to immigrate to Palestine.  In November, 1947, the Truman 
administration supported the UN partition plan, and on May 14, 1948, President Truman 
ordered the immediate recognition of the Jewish state.  Each time, he overruled 
significant objections from the Arabist faction within his administration associated with 
Secretary of State George Marshall and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal.  There is 
certainly a record of extensive Zionist lobbying of Truman during this period, although it 
is not clear how effective it was since there are numerous reports that much of it annoyed 
Truman who is reported to have shouted at one meeting in 1946:  “They [The Zionists] 
somehow expect me to fulfill all the prophecies of the prophets.  I tell them sometimes 
that I can no more fulfill all the prophecies of Ezekiel than I can that other great Jew, 
Karl Marx.”224  Zvi Ganin notes that the Zionist lobbying “lacked the capacity for 
sustained effort against the formidable array of antagonists in and out of the Truman 
administration.” 225 
 To this day, President Truman’s decision to recognize Israel on May 14, 1948 
remains a controversial microcosm of the U.S.-Israel relationship containing all of the 
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themes that have continued to define debates about the motivations of U.S. policy ever 
since.  Secretary of State George Marshall and most of the leading members of the 
foreign policy establishment vehemently opposed President Truman’s decision to 
recognize Israel.  They argued that they should side with the Arabs and refuse to 
recognize the Jewish state.  They argued that recognizing Israel would undermine U.S. 
strategic interests in the region and endanger American access to Middle Eastern oil 
reserves in the emerging context of the early Cold War.  Marshall believed that Truman’s 
decision was made on the basis of domestic political consideration to attain Jewish 
support in the 1948 Presidential election.  Marshall’s official biographer, Forrest Pogue, 
writes that:  “At times, because of the necessity emphasized by White House advisors of 
winning the fall election, the White House became in effect the foreign office of the State 
of Israe1.226   
 Clark Clifford, Truman’s domestic policy advisor, who was the leading advocate 
for recognition within the administration, insisted that Truman’s decision was made on 
the basis of strategic, moral, ethical, religious, and humanitarian reasons or domestic 
politics.227  Clifford argues that Truman was influenced by his sympathy for the Jews in 
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the wake of the Holocaust and by his belief that among those left homeless by World War 
II, “the Jews had no homeland of their own to which they could return.”  Clifford wrote 
that from Truman’s “reading of the Old Testament he felt the Jews derived a legitimate 
historical right to Palestine.”  Clifford also argued that strategically in the Cold War 
context that in such an unstable, undemocratic region, “it is important for the long-range 
security of our country and indeed the world that a nation committed to the democratic 
system be established there, one on which we can rely.” 228  Clifford would further 
conclude in his autobiography, “Although domestic considerations are in fact a legitimate 
part of any important foreign policy decision, I never rested the case for recognition upon 
politics.”229  Clifford argues accurately that at the time the American Jewish community 
was deeply divided on the Zionist question and that there was no foreseeable political 
benefit to Truman in recognizing Israel.  Truman would go on to win an estimated 90% 
of the Jewish vote in his razor thin victory in 1948 (just as FDR had in 1944).   
Analytically, it remains difficult to judge whether Truman’s decision to recognize Israel 
played any significant role with a constituency that strongly supported Truman’s New 
Deal economic policies. It is even more difficult to determine whether Truman and his 
advisors would have reasonably anticipated any political gains from such a policy given 
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the existing divisions within the Jewish community over Zionism.  Truman ultimately 
lost New York to New York Gov. Thomas Dewey, but John Snetsinger notes that 
Truman won Illinois, Ohio, and California – states with significant Jewish populations -- 
by slim margins.230 
 Snetsinger concludes that Truman’s motives were entirely political, he writes that: 
 [Truman’s] “…policies were in accord with the Zionists’ program, he was 
motivated primarily, if not solely, by political exigencies.  With all its 
contradictions and vacillations, Truman’s Palestine-Israel policy offers an 
extraordinary example of foreign policy conducted in line with short-range 
political expediency rather than long-range national goals.231 
Michael Benson disagrees arguing that:  “Truman emerges from the historical record as a 
man acting out of moral, ethical, and sympathetic impulses on behalf of a persecuted 
minority despite both international and domestic strategy arguments made to the contrary 
by those whom he most respected and trusted.”232 
 Thus the complex set of competing explanations that has shaped much of the 
debate of U.S. policy around Israel for nearly 60 years is visible at this crucial formative 
stage of the relationship.  To what degree was Truman’s key decision shaped by strategic 
concerns as compared to domestic politics and humanitarian motivations?  The 
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competing explanations suggest that as in almost any policy nexus that all the different 
factors were involved, but discerning which were primary is extremely difficult.  It’s also 
likely that different policy actors had different combinations of motivations.  One policy 
actor’s perception of another’s motivations was likely colored by their own.  Marshall 
and some of his supporters perceived Truman’s motivations to be political, but Truman 
and his supporters publicly claimed their motivations were humanitarian, strategic and 
cultural.  Some of Truman’s supporters occasionally perceived some of Marshall’s 
supporters as being anti-Semitic.  Policy actors tend to want to remember their own 
contributions in the most positive light and those who disagreed with them in the most 
negative light.  Each policymaker’s memory is also likely to be colored by the passage of 
time and the influence of later events.  Thus we are left with many questions, but few 
clear explanations of why the Truman administration acted as it did.  
 A Non-Strategic Relationship, 1948-1958.   The issues during the next decade 
seem somewhat clearer.  During the next decade during the 2nd Truman and 1st 
Eisenhower terms, the U.S. policy towards Israel took a much more strategic approach.  
While the Truman administration eventually shifted its recognition of Israel from de facto 
to de jure, it never established a close alliance or relationship with Israel.  It established 
and continued to enforce an arms embargo on both Israel and its Arab adversaries.  While 
the Truman administration did provide a small amount of foreign aid to Israel -- about 




$65 million for refugee resettlement in 1951233 -- it did not provide significant diplomatic 
or political support for Israel during this period.  Nor was the rhetoric of the relationship 
was not particularly warm and friendly.   
 This trend continued under Eisenhower234 who seemed to lack Truman’s personal 
and political connections to the Jewish community.  President Eisenhower, like General 
Marshall, held a soldier’s view and had not spent a lifetime in the world of partisan 
politics.  His approach was, not surprisingly, much more the result of strategic rather than 
a political frame of reference.  By this time, the Cold War had taken center stage and the 
young Israeli state had little to strategic value to offer the United States.  The U.S. 
government was focused on maintaining the support of Arab governments against Soviet 
encroachment in the region.  This included the U.S.-U.K. covert effort to overthrow 
Iran’s reformist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and the formation of the 
Central Treaty Organization with Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran.  By 1954, the 
Eisenhower administration started to provide arms to Iraq as part of its Cold War 
strategy.235   Alteras describes U.S.-Israel relations in the following terms: 
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Generally speaking, the attitudes of Eisenhower and Dulles toward Israel 
were devoid of sentimentalism.  Their attitudes were rooted in practical 
interests, in how support for Israel served U.S. national interests in the 
context of the cold war competition with the Soviet Union.  From their 
perspective, morality went only as far as keeping the commitment for 
Israel’s existence, but it did not require supporting Israel’s case in the 
dispute with its Arab neighbors.236 
Interestingly enough, Israel’s primary Western ally and arms supplier in the 1950s was 
France which was engaged in a battle with Arab nationalist forces in Algeria, supported 
by Nasser’s Egypt, and saw Israel as a useful ally. 
 While there were, of course, small scale and individual efforts to lobby the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the lobbying institutions of the Jewish 
community were at this point in their formative stages and were not yet particularly 
effective.  In 1951, I.L. Kenen had established the American Zionist Committee which 
would be renamed as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1959, 
but it would take a quarter century to truly emerge as one of the most powerful lobbies in 
Washington.237  In 1956, apparently at the suggestion of Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, who wanted to be able to speak to one Jewish voice instead of being barraged by 
dozens, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish organizations was 
established under the leadership of Yehuda Hellman.  It too remained a fairly weak 
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organization until Hellman’s death in 1986.238  While the seeds of what would become 
influential Jewish lobbying organizations had been planted, it would take a generation for 
those seeds to flower. 
 In this phase of the relationship, President Truman imposed an arms embargo on 
Israel -- as well as its Arab adversaries -- in an effort to stop the fighting in the Middle 
East.  During the 1953 water crisis and the Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration 
imposed sanctions on Israel to force it to comply with U.S. demands. In 1953, the U.S. 
supported a U.N. Security Council resolution 101 condemning Israel’s raid against the 
village of Qibya in the then-Jordanian West Bank.239  The U.S. also temporarily 
suspended economic aid to Israel.  The key event of this period was the 
October/November 1956 Suez Crisis in which France, Great Britain, and Israel invaded 
the Sinai Peninsula in an attempt to overturn Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal 
and reassert the influence of the fading colonial powers in the region.  This attack was 
launched without prior consultation with the United States. The tripartite invasion 
succeeded militarily in occupying the Sinai Peninsula, but infuriated President 
Eisenhower.  The Eisenhower administration came down strongly against the invasion 
and pressured Israel with the threat of sanctions to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and 
the Gaza Strip in early 1957.  A United Nations peacekeeping force was assigned to the 
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Peninsula to separate Israel and Egypt in hopes of preventing further hostilities.  These 
events are historically significant, because it is the strongest position that any American 
President has ever taken in opposition to action by an Israeli government.  After the Suez 
crisis, Israel gradually moved towards an operation assumption that maintaining a good 
relationship with the United States was vital prerequisite for Israel’s security. 
Bar-Siman-Tov notes that Eisenhower’s administration “uniformly considered 
Israel a hindrance to U.S. political and security interests in the Middle East and 
elsewhere.... The divergence of interests prevented establishment of a special 
relationship, security cooperation, arms supply, or substantial economic aid.”240  Ben-Zvi 
adds that during Eisenhower’s first term, “the landscape of U.S.-Israeli relations was 
clouded by incompatible negotiating strategies, which reflected in turn fundamentally 
different priorities, concerns and objectives” 241  It seems fair to say that the Truman 
administration and the first Eisenhower administration were primarily operating on the 
basis of a strategic analysis of U.S. interests in line with the realist interpretation of 
policy-making.  U.S. policy during this period was substantially consistent across all 
issues of mutual concern.  There is little evidence of policy compartmentalization that 
will typify later phases of the relationship.  Nor was there much evidence of the 
“passionate attachment” that would later come to typify the relationship.  This is in large 
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part, because domestic politics had not become a major factor in shaping U.S. foreign 
policy on this issue during this period.  While the Eisenhower administration came down 
hard on the Israelis in the context the Suez Crisis and showed no particular empathy for 
the Israel, Israel’s military success against the Egyptians may have led them to begin to 
reconsider the growing military role that Israel could play as a regional strategic asset in 
the context of Middle East Cold War that was continuing to heat up. 
 The Emerging Strategic Relationship, 1958-1970.   While Israel sought to 
develop a strategic relationship that involved arms sales and security guarantees from the 
United States during these years in the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine -- in which the 
U.S. promised to support countries threatened by communist aggression, the U.S. 
administration expressed little interest during its first term.  The administration’s goal 
remained seeking an Arab-Israeli peace, although it recognized that this was unrealistic.  
The administration saw Israel as pro-Western, but believed that getting too close to Israel 
would undermine its ties to Arab states in the region. 
 After Israel’s impressive military performance during the Suez campaign, there is 
evidence that the administration began to alter its tune ever so slightly.  By the late 1950s, 
Egypt and Syria were moving closer to the Soviet Union orbit.  In July, 1958, Iraq’s pro-
Western King Faisal was killed as part of a Nasserist military coup.  The U.S. sent 15,000 
marines into Lebanon in response to a request by the Lebanese President to shore up the 
Lebanese regime.  King Hussein’s regime in Jordan, which was also threatened, was 
supported by British forces.  Under these circumstances, the U.S. administration began a 
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process of re-evaluating Israel’s strategic value to the U.S.  Having failed to win over 
Egypt’s Gamal Abdel-Nasser and facing a rising tide of Arab nationalism supported by 
the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration began to reconsider Israel’s strategic 
value.  Its approach remained entirely strategic, but the strategic calculus had changed 
enough to warrant a re-evaluation.  For example, a 1958 memo prepared by the National 
Security Council argues very bluntly that:  “If we choose to combat radical Arab 
nationalism and hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, a logical corollary would be 
to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East.”242   
While much of the literature on this period has suggested that the Eisenhower 
administration remained at odds with Israel’s strategic priorities throughout the 
administration and that the relationship only began to warn in the early Kennedy years -- 
primarily for political reasons to be discussed below -- declassified documents now 
suggest a different interpretation. The third phase, really a transitional phase, can 
probably be traced to approximately 1958 rather than 1962.   According to Ben-Zvi’s 
analysis, “the seeds of change in the very essence and intrinsic nature of American-Israeli 
relations had not only been planted [in the Second Eisenhower Administration, 1957-
1961], but also had begun to bear fruit.”243  Whereas, the Eisenhower and his advisors saw 
Israel as a strategic liability during the first term, by the last two years of the 
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administration, the strategic calculus appears to have changed.  This reevaluation appears 
to be related to the Iraqi Revolution, the crisis in Jordan, and the U.S. intervention in the 
Lebanese Civil War -- all in 1958.  The strategic calculus that had initially suggested that 
Israel was a liability that undermined U.S. access to Arab oil had begun to shift as the 
Eisenhower administration began, albeit cautiously, to view Israel as offering a potential 
Cold War strategic asset in a highly unstable region.  As Arab nationalism began to be 
seen as a threat and an ally of the Soviet Union, democratic and politically stable Israel 
could, at least tentatively, be seen as having a strategic value in the Cold War.   This 
reinforces a pattern that becomes more explicit in the 1970s and 1980s.  At each new 
phase of the “special relationship” it is initially strengthened for strategic reasons and 
then reinforced and expanded for political and cultural reasons. The language of strategic 
decision-making has continued to frame decisions that are essential political and cultural, 
not strategic. 
 At this stage, the administration was beginning to view Israel as a potential 
strategic asset with the deterrence capability in the region.  Nevertheless, U.S. policy 
towards Israel changed very slowly.  The Eisenhower administration didn’t make any 
significant arms sales to Israel although they seriously discussed selling Hawk anti-
aircraft missiles to Israel in 1960.  Ben-Zvi notes: 
It is clear that the second half of the 1950s witnessed a progressive change 
in the American perception of Israel.  With the initial vision of Israel as a 
strategic liability to American strategic designs receding into the 
background in the aftermath of the Jordanian Crisis of 1958, a new view 
had emerged, one that increasingly envisaged Israel as a potential asset of 
the U.S. by virtue of its ability to effectively deter the UAR [United Arab 
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Republic -- Egypt & Syria] from completely disrupting the Middle East 
balance of power.244 
U.S. policy would continue to move in the direction of seeing Israel as the strategic asset 
over the next dozen years across four administrations from both parties.  Change was 
gradual and evolutionary and motivated almost entirely by strategic concerns. 
 The tone of the U.S.-Israel relationship would take on much greater warmth 
during the Kennedy245/Johnson years (1961-1969).   It is during this phase that politics 
begins to interact with strategic calculations although decision-making would remain 
primarily strategic.  While the Kennedy administration’s calculations remained primarily 
strategic, it understood that there were domestic political benefits with a key Democratic 
constituency and sought to benefit politically from those foreign policy decisions. 
 The manner and degree to which the Kennedy administration changed the U.S.-
Israel relationship has been widely debated and, on occasion, like many issues around 
JFK, romanticized in the wake of Kennedy’s untimely death.  Warren Bass, for example, 
argues that: 
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The thousand days of the Kennedy presidency were enough time for a 
series of important shifts on Middle Eastern affairs.  The Kennedy 
administration removed several roadblocks to a full blown U.S.-Israel 
alliance…. [The Kennedy administration’s actions] laid the foundations 
upon which presidents from Lyndon Johnson to George W. Bush could 
build.  Harry Truman was the father of the U.S.-Israel special relationship; 
John Kennedy was the father of the U.S.-Israel alliance.246 
Bass’s comments seem to overstate the situation.  No real “special relationship” existed 
after Truman’s recognition of Israel.  While the distinction is semantic, it is not clear if 
the changes that occurred in the Kennedy era reflect the creation of a full-fledged 
alliance.  Rather, starting from the nadir of the Suez Crisis in 1956 there is a gradual 
upward progression in relations.  President Kennedy lifted the arms embargo and 
authorized the first arms sale to Israel -- sale of defensive anti-aircraft Hawk missiles to 
Israel in 1962.247  In making this decision, Kennedy reversed a decision of the Eisenhower 
administration, which had considered and rejected the same proposal in 1960. While 
there are some indications that Kennedy was aware of the domestic political benefits of 
the arms sales to Israel and the benefits of timing the announcement before the 1962 
midterm elections, there is little evidence that this was his primary motivation for the 
arms sales.  On the other hand, Kennedy attempted to make a real and concerted effort to 
strengthen ties with Israel’s greatest adversary, Nasser’s Egypt.  Kennedy was clearly 
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seeking “a balance of power” between Israel and Egypt – which was buying weapons 
from the Soviet Union. 248 
  Kennedy also applied heavy pressure to Israel around the Israeli nuclear program 
at Dimona in line with the administration’s broad commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation.249  The Kennedy administration felt that Israeli nuclear weapons 
development would be viewed negatively by the Arab states and could lead to a 
dangerous Cold War nuclear arms race in the region.   Kennedy insisted on U.S. 
inspections of Dimona and even directly confronted Israel on this issue.  In a now-
declassified letter from Kennedy to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, written on 
May 18, 1963, he wrote of that:  
We are concerned with the disturbing effect on world stability which 
would accompany the development of a nuclear weapons capability by 
Israel.  I cannot imagine the Arabs would refrain from turning to the 
Soviet Union for assistance if Israel were to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability – with all the consequences this would hold…. this country 
supports Israel in a wide variety of ways which are well known to both of 
us. This commitment and this support would be seriously jeopardized in 
public opinion in this country and in the West as a whole if it should be 
thought that this Government was unable to obtain reliable information on 
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a subject as vital to peace as the question of the character of Israel’s effort 
in the nuclear field.250 
While the nuclear confrontation was eventually resolved, it was clear that Kennedy was 
more concerned about nuclear non-proliferation and its affects within the context of the 
Cold War than about any impact this might have in terms of domestic politics.  
 On December 27, 1962, Kennedy told Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in a 
meeting in Palm Beach, FL, that the “special relationship with Israel in the Middle East 
[was] really comparable only to that which [the United States] has with Britain over a 
wide range of world affairs,” and added that “in case of an invasion the United States 
would come to the support of Israel.”251  On May 8, 1963, Kennedy repeated his 
commitment to Israel’s security in public somewhat obliquely at press conference when 
he responded that: 
We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit 
the Near East arms race which obviously takes resources from an area 
already poor, and puts them into an increasing race which does not really 
bring any great security.  We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat 
of force in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of 
communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy the 
independence of the people. This Government has been and remains as 
strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. 
In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or 
indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, 
adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such 
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aggression, which, of course, has been the policy which the United States 




However, on October 2, 1963, just a few weeks before his assassination, Kennedy turned 
down Ben-Gurion’s request for a formal U.S. Security guarantee in a letter to Ben-
Gurion’s successor, Levi Eshkol253   Kennedy thought that doing so might destabilize the 
region and instead stuck with “existing informal arrangements.”  While it is clear that 
Kennedy advanced the status of U.S.-Israeli relations, it was far from a full-scale alliance 
at the time of his death.  While proponents of development of a close U.S.-Israel 
relationship clearly had more access to both the Kennedy administration and to Congress 
during this period, Ben-Zvi’s quite fair analysis makes it “clear that cold and realistic 
calculations of the American national interest rather than idealistic notions and beliefs 
comprised, in the aggregate, the most powerful independent variable from which 
American policy in the Arab-Israeli sphere was continuously derived.”254  The U.S.-Israel 
relationship had greatly expanded during the Kennedy years with the rhetoric of the 
alliance seeming to somewhat exceed the content as a result of the increasing political 
dimension of the relationship. 
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 Following Kennedy’s sudden death, Lyndon B. Johnson suddenly succeeded to 
the Presidency.  While there was certainly a change of style, the administration’s 
approach to the Middle East remained pretty much along the lines laid out by the 
President Kennedy. President Lyndon Johnson, who saw Israel as a Cold War ally, 
continued to expanded American weapons sales to Israel. Of course, the issues of the 
Middle East would eventually be pushed to the back burner as the U.S. became 
increasingly entangled in the War in Vietnam.  Doug Little argues that “Johnson seems to 
have taken vicarious pleasure from Israel’s ability to thwart an Arab war of national 
liberation not unlike the one America faced in Vietnam.”255   Never-the-less, as the U.S. 
efforts to reach out to Nasser met with growing frustration as Nasser drew closer to the 
Soviets, hardened Cold War allegiances seemed to dictate the strategic logic of a 
strengthened U.S.-Israel allegiance during this period.  The Johnson administration 
continued to consolidate the U.S.-Israel alliance, which was both a strategically sound 
choice and good domestic politics for a Democratic President seeking to maintain his 
long-standing friendships in the Jewish community256 and long-standing ties to the 
emerging Israel lobby.  More so than Kennedy, Johnson seemed to have deep personal 
and political ties to Israel and its supporters.  He had, for example, opposed Eisenhower’s 
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efforts to pressure Israel to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza in 1956-1957.  In his memoirs, 
he writes that “I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, 
gallantly building and defending a modern nation against great odds and against the 
tragic background of the Jewish experience.”257 
 The Johnson administration authorized extensive weapons sales to Israel starting 
with M-48 tanks in 1965, A-4 Skyhawk Jets in 1966, and eventually F-4 Phantom Jets in 
1968.  But it did so in a context of trying to provide Israel with conventional deterrence 
capability in an attempt to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.  The 
administration believed that Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons would further 
destabilize the region.  The administration was also continuing to try to build a 
relationship with Nasser and began to supply arms to traditional Middle Eastern 
monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.  While the administration was certainly 
pressured by the influence of the growing pro-Israel lobby on Capitol Hill, it was clearly 
continuing to act based on strategic Cold War considerations with little special 
consideration for Israel’s interests.  The U.S. remained willing to criticize Israel.   For 
example, in November, 1966, the Johnson administration – much as Eisenhower had 
done following the Qibya incident in 1953 -- supported U.N. Security Council resolution 
228 condemning an Israeli raid on Jordanian-controlled West Bank village of Samu. 
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 The contours of the entire conflict would be dramatically redefined by the events 
of the seminal year of 1967.  Tensions between Israel and Egypt continued to build 
throughout the spring of 1967.  The Johnson administration cautioned Levi Eshkol’s 
government not to overreact and attempted to prevent an escalation of the conflict. 
However, on May 17, Nasser expelled the UN peacekeeping force and on May 22 Egypt 
closed the straits of Tiran – a move which Israel interpreted as an act of war.  While the 
Johnson administration was still attempting to prevent a war, Israel opted to launch a pre-
emptive attack on Egypt on June 5, followed by attacks on Jordan on June 6 and Syria on 
June 9.  The Israelis would ultimately capture the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from 
Egypt, Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.  
The United States efforts to prevent a full-scale war had failed. 
 The U.S. role in the Six-Day War remains controversial to this day as some have 
tried to argue that the U.S. green-lighted Israel’s pre-emptive attack.  William Quandt 
argues fairly persuasively that Johnson concluded a few days before the war, “that no 
purpose would be served any longer by trying to hold Israel back…As far as Johnson was 
concerned, Israel was, therefore, free to act, but on its own.  The red light turned yellow -
- but not quite green.  For the Israeli cabinet, that was enough.”258 
 The most intriguing and controversial episodes of the war remains Israel’s June 
8th bombing of the USS Liberty, an intelligence gathering ship, in which 34 American 
sailors were killed and 173 wounded.  The major controversy around this incident 
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remains whether the Israeli attack was intentional, or as the Israel has always insisted, 
accidental.  This remains unresolved and in some circles highly controversial and a 
source of a wide variety of contrasting speculative theories suggesting that Israel 
intentionally attacked the ship to prevent the U.S. from learning of its plans to attack the 
Golan Heights or some other goal.259  Whatever the truth about the Liberty incident, the 
reaction of the Johnson administration remains rather elucidating. President Johnson 
accepted Israel’s apology, explanation, and compensation with little question or 
argument.  This is an indication that, from his perspective, the emerging U.S.-Israel 
alliance was important enough that the administration had little interest in pressing for 
more information or clearer explanations of the tragedy.  In his memoirs, Johnson spends 
only a few sentences on the Liberty incident and characterizes it as a “tragic accident.”260    
 In the months following the Six-Day War, the administration continued to 
pressure Israel to on the issue of the territories captured during the war, on the need for 
Israel to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (November 22, 1967), on Israel’s 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and its refusal to join the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty 
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(NPT).  Despite political pressures to do so before the American election, Johnson did not 
approve the sale of F-4 Phantom Jets until November 25, 1968 – several weeks after 
Richard Nixon’s victory over Vice-President Hubert Humphrey.  This suggests that 
Johnson was trying to keep politics out of the decision.  It is widely believed that Israel 
finished its secret development of nuclear weapons during the period – roughly 1968 to 
1970.   The U.S. efforts to provide Israel with conventional weapons to provide it with a 
non-nuclear deterrent capability therefore failed to keep Israel from developing nuclear 
weapons.261  While the special relationship did not emerge fully during this transitional 
period, the strategic calculus had been changed by Israel’s dramatic victory in the Six-
Day War.  Bar-Siman-Tov notes that the “1967 War marks the first time in the 
relationship that U.S. and Israeli political and security interests significantly 
converged.”262    
 Over roughly the next decade, the capture of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
and the passage of UNSC 242 would be part of the gradual transformation of the conflict 
from an Arab-Israeli conflict to an Israeli-Palestinian conflict over how to create a 
Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories.  This would necessarily also transform the 
role that the United States played in the conflict.  Ever since the Six-Day War each U.S. 
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administration, some actively, some merely rhetorically, has attempted to play some sort 
of role in resolving the conflict on the understanding that doing so was in national interest 
of the United States. 
Nixon/Ford/Kissinger/Carter, 1970s.  The Nixon administration inherited the 
growing U.S.-Israel relationship in 1969.  William Quandt, a former National Security 
Council staff member, writes that before 1970, the U.S. pursued a relatively even-handed 
zero-sum Cold War policy designed in the belief that 
American support for Israel was an impediment to U.S.-Arab relations... 
[and that] by granting economic and military aid to the enemy of the 
Arabs, the United States was providing the Soviet Union with an 
opportunity to extend its influence in the Middle East....  In this view, 
Israel was more of an embarrassment for United States policy than a 
strategic asset.  Even if Israel was an impressive military power, that 
power could be used only to defend Israel, not to advance American 
interests elsewhere in the region.263 
Nixon and Kissinger would transform the U.S.-Israel alliance into the early phase of what 
has become known as the “Special Relationship.”  They did so as part of Henry 
Kissinger’s Realpolitik approach in the context of the Cold War.  In the process Nixon 
and Kissinger constructed an alliance that while initially built on strategic imperatives of 
the Cold War has been able to long survive and grow long after the dissolution of the 
Soviet threat that it was intended to counter.  Unlike the previous Democratic 
administrations, they received few votes from the Jewish community and did not have a 
strong political interest in the Jewish vote. 
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The administration’s initial foray’s into the conflict involved the Rogers Plan 
(December, 1969), which was an attempt implement UNSC 242.  This, however, was 
scuttled by the 1970 War of Attrition and Israeli refusal to accept a full withdrawal from 
the Occupied Territories.  At this time, the administration viewed Israel as an emerging 
strategic asset, as had the Johnson administration, but not one of special importance.  The 
key turning point was the Black September crisis of 1970 in which a civil war between 
Jordan’s King Hussein and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
threatened the survival of the pro-Western regime in Jordan.  Jordan was faced with the 
threat of an invasion by the pro-Soviet Syrian regime in support of the PLO.  Israel made 
the historic decision to mobilize its force against the threat of a potential Syrian invasion 
and in support of the Jordanian monarchy.  The crisis didn’t last long.    Syria opted to 
withdraw its forces and not to engage its air force rather than confront Israel, which had 
badly defeated it three years earlier.  While Israeli forces did not ultimately engage in the 
conflict, the Israeli action helped to stabilize the situation and resolve the crisis in a 
manner that was beneficial to the United States.  It was the first time that Israeli forces 
had been mobilized in support of U.S. strategic interests in the region and it changed 
Nixon and Kissinger’s view of the strategic situation and led them to reevaluate Israel’s 
importance as a vital strategic asset in the Middle East in the context of the Cold War.  
The Nixon administration now believed that Israel provided the U.S. with a 
highly-skilled and rapidly deployable force in a region whose stability was critical to the 
American position in the Cold War.  Along with the Shah’s Iran, which was attempting to 




fill the strategic vacuum left by the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Israel 
emerged in the early 1970s a leading American ally in the region.  Following the 
Jordanian crisis, the United States rapidly expanded economic and military assistance, 
arms sales and strategic cooperation with Israel.  U.S. Aid to Israel skyrocketed from 
roughly $100 million to roughly $1 billion annually. 264    (See Appendix A for foreign aid 
figures.) 
 As Donald Neff writes: 
[T]he historic argument of whether Israel was a strategic ally was 
substantially won by Kissinger.  After this, relations between Israel and 
successive administration grew progressively warmer and American 
largess more generous.  A new strategic relationship between the United 
States and Israel, which was finally signed formally in 1983 was well on 
the way to reality after Black September….The destinies of the United 
States and Israel were now irretrievably intermixed in the Middle East.265 
At this time, U.S. policy towards Israel began to be compartmentalized for the 
first time.  Short-term Cold War strategic interests outweighed the U.S.’s longer-term 
interest in stabilizing the region through a comprehensive peace settlement.  Thus the 
value of Israel as a strategic asset outweighed the difficulties caused by Israel’s policies 
of building settlements in the territories occupied during the 1967 war.  While the Nixon 
administration opposed these policies -- which ran counter to international law -- it did 
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little to compel Israel to change them.  On the contrary, the U.S. continued to increase 
foreign aid and strategic cooperation with Israel.  Israel’s value to the U.S. was more 
important than implementing the soon-forgotten Rogers Peace Plan which was essentially 
shelved when it became clear that the Israeli government would not accept it.  Thus those 
policies that developed Israel’s ability to act as a Cold War strategic asset -- that is, 
Henry Kissinger’s approach -- overshadowed those which favored pursuing a 
comprehensive peace settlement -- that is, Secretary of State William Rogers’s approach.   
By the second term Kissinger would officially replace Rogers as Secretary of 
State (while still wearing the hat of National Security Advisor as well).  While Israel had 
entered the early stage of a “special relationship” with the United States at this point, the 
primary rationale at this stage remained strategic, not political.  There is little indication 
that domestic politics or Kissinger’s Jewish heritage played any significant role in these 
events in Kissinger’s evaluation that Israel had emerged as a strategic asset, although, of 
course, observers are free to speculate about what went on, consciously and 
subconsciously, inside Kissinger’s head. 
The Nixon/Kissinger administration would also stand by the Israel during the dark 
days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War in which a surprise attack posed a grave threat to 
Israel.  A U.S. supply airlift would eventually prove vital to turning the tide in that war.  
While the United States has continued for decades to attempt to mediate the peace 
process, its strategic alliance with Israel has made it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to 
play the role of even-handed mediator.  In becoming Israel’s ally and indeed its protector, 
a process began in which the view that Israel as an important strategic ally would come to 
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eventually overshadow concerns about the Middle East peace process.  These two areas 
of concern would eventually be completely separated into different intellectual 
compartments. 
 While the decision to see Israel as a key strategic ally deserving of immense 
amounts of foreign aid and diplomatic support appears to have been based primarily on 
strategic concerns, there is evidence that political concerns about the Jewish community 
were present at least in the thinking of the Republican National Committee.  A March, 
1970 memo from Warren Adler to Nixon’s Domestic Policy Advisor Leonard Garment  -
- discovered in the National Archives and perhaps never before published -- paints a 
fascinating honest portrait of the role of the Jewish community and its reactions around 
Israel.    Adler writes: 
The Pompidou affair266 points up a glaring gap both in our method and 
manner of communication.  It also indicates an unawareness of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and character of the American Jewish Community, 
a complex organism of almost unlimited vitality and special expertise in 
working with media that is underestimated time and time again by parties 
in power.   
 
Among the multitude of national and local Jewish groups, there are sub-
groups, dissident groups, and anti-dissident groups, all somehow inter-
related and vocal, producing a never-ending cacophony of sounds that 
give one the impression that there is no real agreement within the total 
structure.  It is deceiving because it is quite true.   
 
EXCEPT ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL! 
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When Israel is threatened, American Jews – indeed, world Jewry – reacts 
like a porcupine: lethal quills go up and all the motor reflexes and energy, 
physical and cosmic, goes into the business of self-protection at all cost.  
This manifestation has clearly been operative in the Pompidou affair.  The 
reactions of the State of Israel are basically part of the same reflex.  Call it 
over-sensitivity if you will, but like Pavlov’s dog, it is easily predictable.   
 
In this reflex is a special potency that cannot be overlooked.  It can make 
itself felt in Congress, in the media, and in other countries. Experience, 
expertise, influence and affluence are its characteristics – a tough 
combination to counter.  That is why I have always maintained that this 
group does deserve some special attention, far beyond its numbers.  For 
the fact is that Jewish parochial interests in this country, in the context of 
today’s world, have – as we discovered last weekend – important 
international implications. 
 
Indeed, the American Jewish Community is unique in that it is the only 
recognizable group of Americans who actively and effectively lobby for a 
foreign government.  And it does this with a minimum of hang-ups about 
dual loyalty and with a positive conviction that the personal safety of 
every Jew in the world is somehow irrevocably tied to the fate of Israel. 
 
With such an articulate, passionate, dedicated “lobby” in this country, it is 
most difficult to conduct foreign policy in the Middle East along lines that 
are unacceptable to the Israelis.  It may be argued that what is good for 
Israel may not necessarily be good for the United States.  To a 
sophisticated American Jew of strong ethnic identification, against the 
tapestry of today’s international alignments, such an argument has little 
effect. 
 
Fortunately, the aspirations of Israel, American Jews, and this 
Administration are fundamentally parallel.  The President has been, in my 
opinion, exemplary in his public and private attitude towards Israel…. 
 
Summary:  Because of the ramifications of the international situation, the 
Jewish community must be considered formidable. 
 
Appropriate steps must be taken to meet the challenges of dialogue, 
confrontation and understanding with the Jewish community through a 
visible White House conduit with credibility, clout, and public visibility. 267 
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This memo is a strong indication that even an administration that had been elected with 
very little of the Jewish vote was beginning to realize that the political influence and 
potency of the Jewish community.  The description is one that has, if anything, become 
more truthful in the decades since Adler wrote it.  While it’s unclear who actually read 
this particular memo, it is clearly indicative of the changing thinking about the role that 
the Jewish community would play in shaping foreign policy for decades to come.  It also 
makes clear that during this period there was great continuity between the 
administration’s view of its strategic interests and its goal of pleasing an increasingly 
influential and outspoken ethnic interest group. 
Between 1970 and the Yom Kippur War, there was little strategic downside for 
the Nixon administration in supporting Israel and doing little to advance the Middle East 
peace process.  This changed dramatically when American support for Israel in the Yom 
Kippur War resulted in Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPAC) 
which lasted from October, 1973 to March, 1974.  The economic effects were dramatic, 
including a quadrupling of the price of petroleum and leading to inflation and recession.  
The Oil Embargo also made clear to the Nixon administration that the strategic balance 
had changed and that unfettered support for Israel could have serious negative political 
and economic costs. 
The view of Israel as a strategic asset appears to have emerged as a result of a 
unique set of post-1967 circumstances.  Kissinger’s assessment of Israel’s strategic value 
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did not survive the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the resulting oil embargo.   In Secretary of 
State Kissinger’s mind, Israel was no longer the crucial strategic asset that she had 
appeared to be in the early 1970s; Israel had again become more of a strategic liability as 
well as a partially counterbalancing strategic asset. The Israeli alliance was only valuable 
to Kissinger, in this stage, if Israel followed policies which helped move towards a 
regional peace settlement.  The new strategic balance would result in a more active 
engaged U.S. role in the peace process which would last through the remainder of the 
decade.  Henry Kissinger engaged in shuttle diplomacy over the next several years 
leading initially to ceasefire agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Syria during 1974-75.  
When peace talks between Israel and Egypt collapsed in early 1975 due to Israeli 
intransigence, President Ford and Kissinger launched a 3-month “reassessment” of U.S.-
Israeli relations in order to pressure Israel to be more flexible.  Following the 
reassessment, Kissinger resumed his diplomatic efforts leading to the Israeli-Egyptian 
Sinai II agreement which was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975. 
For the most part, the Carter Administration (1977-81) seemed to pick up where 
Kissinger left off.  President Carter was also willing to pressure Israel in order to 
convince Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to agree to the Camp David agreement 
with Egypt.  Both Kissinger and Carter viewed the importance of achieving regional 
peace as more significant than maintaining a friendly non-confrontational relationship 
with Israel.  American policy from 1974 to 1978 appears to have been strategically 
consistent and essentially non-compartmentalized.  While Israel had a so-called “special 




relationship” with the United States in terms of foreign aid and weapons acquisition, this 
did not overshadow the American goal of stabilizing the region through a comprehensive 
peace settlement.  During this period, the U.S. commitment to Israeli security actually 
acted to promote the peace process, because it allowed Israel to concede land to its Arab 
adversaries knowing that the United States remained its defender of last resort.  There is 
little indication that Carter’s born-again Christianity made him any more sympathetic to 
the Israel goals although his most recent book indicates that his faith has a lot to do with 
his sympathy for his post-Presidential sympathy for the Palestinian cause.268 
The election of new leadership in Israel and United States did not significantly 
change the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship.  President Carter continued to press the 
peace process despite and the negative and angry reaction of the Jewish community, 
which cost him politically.  President Carter chose to overlook the political consequences 
and pursue the U.S. strategic interest in Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  He engaged the peace 
process more directly and personally than any previous American President by convening 
the Camp David summit (September 5-17, 1978) between Begin and Sadat and pressing 
both sides to make concessions that resulted in the Camp David Accord and eventually a 
complete Israeli pullout from the Sinai Peninsula.  The accord also included clauses in 
which Israel agreed to begin negotiating an autonomy agreement with the Palestinians.  
One of the results of Camp David was a vast increase in Foreign Aid so that Israel would 
begin to get roughly $3 billion-a-year from United State (and Egypt about $2 billion). 
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As part of the process of trying to appease the Jewish community and sure up 
political support from key segment of the Democratic base, President Carter made an 
effort to try to empathize with the concerns of the Jewish community.  At a White House 
ceremony marking Israel’s 30th Birthday (on May 1, 1978), President Carter announced 
his plan to create the National Commission on the Holocaust (which was established by 
Executive Order on November 1, 1978).  The creation of the President’s Commission on 
the Holocaust eventually led to the creation of the United States Holocaust Museum 
which opened in 1993.  The Museum was built not in New York, America’s largest 
Jewish city, but in Washington, DC close to in America’s most sacred political space.  
Edward Linenthal notes that: 
The choice of the national’s capital would prove fortuitous.  A museum 
built in New York, even if national in intent, would clearly be perceived as 
a Jewish museum built in the heart of the Jewish community in America.  
Memory of the Holocaust would remain the province of American Jews.  
A national museum in Washington, on the other hand, made a more 
expansive – and controversial – claim on memory.269 
 
The decision to build the museum as part of America’s sacred space began a 
process by which memory of the Holocaust was both institutionalized and Americanized 
within the American historical experience.  Carter also created the Department of Justice 
Office of Special Investigations in 1979 to investigate and prosecute Nazi War Crimes.  
In so doing, he created two institutions, it would seem quite unintentionally, that have 
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helped to cement a special connection to Jewish suffering, which has served to 
institutionalize a special connection between the United States and the State of Israel. 
As described above, this period marks a vortex of crucial cultural change in the 
United States:  the decline of anti-Semitism and the assertion of political influence by the 
Jewish community, the increased fascination with the Holocaust, the rise of the religious 
right, and increased fear of Islam -- as a result of the terrorism, Iranian Revolution, and 
Iran Hostage Crisis. All of these changes, combined with the post-Watergate changes in 
the campaign financing laws, which served to further empower the Jewish community, 
would also transform the U.S.-Israel relationship during the Reagan administration. 
Reagan Administration, 1980s.  The carefully calibrated balance that promoted 
forward progress towards peace seemed to change in the years after the signing of the 
Camp David Accords (1979-82).  American foreign aid to Israel (and Egypt) increased 
dramatically as a result of the Camp David Accords.  The 1979 Islamic Revolution in 
Iran resulted in the ouster of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, America’s 
strongest and most trusted ally in the region.  Also, changes on the American domestic 
political scene were setting the scene for a different type of relationship to emerge.  
President Reagan commented that, “The fall of Iran had increased Israel’s value as 
perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which United States can truly 
rely.”270  In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December, 1979) resulted in the 
end of détente and the renewal of the Cold War in last year of the Carter Administration.  
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The new stage of the Cold War further escalated with the election of President Ronald 
Reagan whose administration was strongly committed to a much more aggressive policy 
of confronting the “Evil Empire.”  Also, the Iranian revolution had increased concern 
about the danger of an anti-American Islamic fundamentalist movement that could 
threaten U.S. interests and access to oil in the Middle East. 
It is in this period of strategic reassessment in the early 1980s that the U.S.-Israel 
relationship transitions to the fifth phase.  In the early days of the U.S.-Israel relationship 
and even through the first decade or so of the “special relationship,” the United States 
government was able to use its overwhelming power advantage to force the Israeli 
government to make strategic concessions in the peace process.  In 1957, before the 
development of the “special relationship,” President Dwight D. Eisenhower was able to 
use American diplomatic pressure to force Israel to give up the gains that it had made in 
the Sinai Peninsula during the 1956 War with Egypt.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Israel’s strategic dominance in the region and Arab intransigence seemed to justify 
American deference on the peace process.   In 1975, President Ford and Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger were able to use threat of a “reassessment” of the U.S.-Israel 
relationship and a freeze on arms sales to cajole the Israeli government to agree to the 
second disengagement agreement with Egypt.  In 1978, President Carter was able to use 
American influence along with the promise of a substantial increase in American foreign 
aid to convince Prime Minister Menachem Begin to agree to make significant 
concessions.  Begin ultimately agreed to the return of the entire Sinai Peninsula and 
reluctantly agreed to accept clauses pertaining to the granting of autonomy to the 
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Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories.  These events basically conform to the 
realist paradigm and its explanation of power politics. 
However, during the Reagan Administration, the Israeli government was often 
able to act unilaterally against American interests without suffering serious 
consequences.  Israel’s decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak (June, 1981) 
and to annex the Golan Heights (December, 1981) did not result in any serious sanctions 
against Israel.  The U.S. verbally criticized Israeli actions, but took no steps to encourage 
a change in attitude or approach -- beyond a brief suspension of a recently signed 
memorandum of strategic cooperation following the annexation of Golan.   Nor did the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon (June, 1982) significantly damage the alliance or result in a 
major application of U.S. pressure on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.  U.S. attempts to 
break the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians (the 1982 Reagan Peace Plan & 
1988 Shultz Peace Plan) were rejected by the Israeli government without serious 
consequences for the “special relationship.”  
 Throughout the Reagan years, the administration was unable to convince Israel’s 
Likud-led and national unity governments to accept any of its proposed peace plans to 
implement the Palestinian autonomy clauses that had been agreed to at the Camp David 
Summit, or to make any other significant concessions involving the peace process.  The 
rise of Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon in Israel made it even less likely that Israel 
would compromise on “Land for Peace,” but had little effect on the “special 
relationship.”  The troubled peace process was compartmentalized from the issues of 
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strategic cooperation between the states.   Not even the revelation that the Israelis had 
used a Jewish Naval Intelligence Officer, Jonathan Pollard, to spy on the United States in 
1985 seemed to disturb the continued development and improvement of the relationship.   
On the contrary, the United States expanded its strategic relationship with Israel in the 
1980s.  The expanded relationship was codified with the signing of that aforementioned 
Memorandums of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation in 1981 and a Memorandum 
of Agreement regarding Joint Political, Security and Economic Cooperation in 1988.271  
The Reagan administration had begun the process of compartmentalization in which the 
peace process was put in one box and the political, military and economic alliance with 
Israel was put in another box, and where support and friendship for Israel would not 
depend on the peace process as it had in the 1970s. 
The “Reagan Revolution” of 1980 marked the coming of age of the religious right 
in American politics.  Ironically, the Jewish community disagrees with and often fears the 
role of the religious right and has remained deeply concerned about its intentions of 
issues that affect the separation of Church and State (i.e.….prayer in schools, school 
vouchers, abortion rights, and more recently, stem cell research, etc.) and literally the 
place of Jews in American society. But oddly, in a particularly strange example of 
politics creating “strange bedfellows,” the Christian right -- for theological reasons that 
are starkly different from the Jewish community’s reasons – has emerged as a strong 
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defender of Israeli government policies and a strong opponent of the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process.  The alliance between American Jews and the Christian right over Israel 
remains controversial within the Jewish community – especially among the more socially 
progressive elements of the community. 
As mentioned above, early in the administration, Reagan responded somewhat 
critically to aggressive Israeli actions.  In June, 1981, the administration criticized the 
Israeli decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak.  In December, 1981, it 
criticized the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights.  It also fought a pitched battle with 
AIPAC that fall over the sale of AWACS spy planes to Saudi Arabia.  Although the 
administration won the fight in Congress, it realized the increasing influence of AIPAC 
with Congress.  Over time, it became much less interested in challenging AIPAC.  
AIPAC seemed to have lost the battle, and won the war. 
In the context of a renewed Cold War, there were clear strategic reasons to 
strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance.  The loss of strongly pro-American regime of the Shah 
of Iran left Israel as the most reliable American ally in the region.  The assassination of 
Sadat in October, 1981created concerns about the stability of Egypt as well.  Once Israel 
invaded Lebanon in June, 1982, Israel was seen as engaging in a proxy war with a pro-
Soviet regime in Syria.  Despite occasional public criticism, the U.S.-Israel strategic, 
military and intelligence cooperation continued to grow during this period including the 
aforementioned memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation that was signed 
by Israel and the United States on November 30, 1981.  This memorandum outlines a 
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high level of military cooperation in defense of mutual security interests.272  While 
somewhat critical of some Israeli actions during the Lebanon War, the administration 
remained a strong ally and supporter including a deployment of U.S. Peacekeeping forces 
which ended in disaster shortly after a Hezbollah suicide truck bombing resulted in the 
deaths of 241U.S. Marines in Lebanon on October 23, 1983.  This horrific attack on the 
soldiers would become an early marker in defining what is now called the “War on 
Terror” and, combined with the Iranian hostage crisis, would help define public anger 
and fear towards Islam and public support for Israel as an adversary of terrorism. 
The administration made several unsuccessful efforts to promote Middle East 
peace.  Reagan proposed what became known as the Reagan Peace Plan in a speech on 
September 1, 1982.  This plan attempted to pick up where Camp David had left off with a 
proposal to deal with the Palestinian issue by forming an association between Jordan, the 
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.  This was followed by several other efforts including the 
1983 Fez Plan, the 1986 Peres Plan, and finally the 1998 Schultz Plan.  The Schultz plan 
led to the first public U.S.  dialogue with the PLO, which lasted from late, 1988 until 
mid-1990.  All of these plans met stiff political resistance from hard line Israeli 
governments under first Menachem Begin and later Yitzhak Shamir.   Shamir personally 
torpedoed Shimon Peres 1986 peace plan.  While some of the governments were 
governments of National Unity, the Likud Party always had an effective veto over the 
various “Land for Peace” proposals. 
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This period suggests the limitations of U.S.  influence over Israel.  Although the 
United States was a superpower, it also believed that it needed Israel as a strategic ally in 
the region in the context of the Cold War.  Thus the Reagan administration for reasons of 
strategic value and domestic politics sought to pursue the peace process, but was 
unwilling or unable to use the major levers of diplomatic power to really compel a 
resistant Israeli government to give up the Occupied Territories.  The growing culture of 
public hostility and fear of Islam in the early stages of the “War on Terror” also seems to 
have made it less likely that the Reagan administration felt compelled to pressure its 
Israeli ally to make concessions to PLO which was widely viewed as a terrorist 
organization.  The so-called “Reagan Revolution” clearly enhanced the influence of the 
religious right on this issue within the administration.  The increasing power of AIPAC -- 
which undoubtedly is a reflection of cultural change, as well as changes within the Jewish 
community, organizational acumen and the new campaign finance laws -- was also 
clearly a factor in strengthening alliance.  The administration did little to address the 
issue of Israeli settlement growth in the Occupied Territories which had skyrocketed after 
Likud gained power in 1977.  The peace process would remain in a separate compartment 
from the burgeoning U.S.-Israel alliance so that the “special relationship” was not 
weakened by Israeli intransigence on the peace process.  The strategic alliance with Israel 
rather than providing the United States with the necessary leverage to advance the peace 





Chapter 5 – The U.S.-Israel Alliance in the Post-Cold War Period 
Two key events in the late 1980s that had the potential to reshape the U.S.-Israel 
alliance would ultimately demonstrate its continuity and strength.  First, the First 
Palestinian Intifada, which began in December, 1987, began a process of humanizing the 
Palestinians and seeming to reverse the David-Goliath imagery as the conflict finally 
completed its transformation from the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  For the first time the image of the Palestinians began to change from that of the 
“terrorists” to that of young boys throwing stones at the Occupying Israeli soldiers.  This 
had the potential to reduce the overwhelming support for Israel with the American public, 
but ultimately did not do so.  Unlike Europe, where support for Israel has dropped 
significantly, the cultural and political ties between Israel and the United States were 
stronger as was the political influence of the Jewish community.  The Intifada also led to 
Jordan’s King Hussein renouncing Jordanian claims to the West Bank, which essentially 
vitiated the various plans that had long been circulated calling for a “Jordanian option.” 
Potentially, even more importantly, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, 
the end of the Cold War, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, 
transformed the global political scene.  The U.S. no longer needed Israel to help contain 
the Soviet influence in the Middle East.  Thus the entire strategic basis of the U.S.-Israel 
relationship was suddenly thrown into question.  Many analysts thought that the 
relationship would not survive the loss of its key strategic rationale.  Ben-Zvi, for 
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example, noted a process “of erosion and decline in some components comprising this 
bilateral relationship.” 273    
George H.W. Bush and the Post-Cold War Transition.  With the Cold War 
over and the need to contain the spread of communism ended, the George H.W. Bush 
administration was left with two primary goals which they vigorously pursued: 
1) Maintaining access to the region’s oil reserves at a stable price; and 
2) Mitigation/Stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
This position seemed further strengthened by the Gulf War.  Israel had always been 
touted by AIPAC as America’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in case the United States had 
to fight a ground war in the Middle East.  But when that contingency occurred and the 
United States needed to build a coalition of allies to support its “liberation” of Kuwait 
from Iraq, the United States needed Arab allies, like Syria and Saudi Arabia, more than it 
needed Israeli bases and ports.  These states refused to join a coalition that included 
Israel.  In fact, Israel became a strategic liability rather than asset, because the United 
States ended up having to send Patriot missile batteries to defend Israel against Iraqi scud 
missile attacks. 
In this context, the administration of George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of 
State, James Baker, had much more strategic leverage to deal with the peace process.  
Shortly after the U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraq from Kuwait during the First Gulf War, 
they convened the Madrid Peace Conference (October 30 – November 2, 1991) in an 
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attempt to restart the regional peace process.  The Shamir-led Israeli government 
grudgingly agreed to attend.   The negotiating process that followed resulted in several 
rounds of fruitless peace talks in Washington between Israel and a joint delegation 
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, that indirectly, but not officially, represented the PLO. 
Bush and Baker having defended Israel against Iraq and no longer needing Israel 
as a Cold War asset, clearly opted to pursue policies akin to those used by earlier 
administrations to pressure Israel on the peace process.  They broke down the 
compartmentalization and tied the progress in the peace process to the U.S.-Israel 
“special relationship.”  The George H.W. Bush administration, unlike the Reagan 
administration, placed immense pressure on the Israelis around the issue of Israeli 
settlements in the Occupied Territories. Bush and Baker refused to authorize a $10 billion 
in loan guarantees (over and above the $3 billion in existing foreign aid) that Israel 
needed to finance a massive influx of post-Soviet immigrants, because of Israeli policies 
on settlement expansion in the Occupied Territories.  In this case, Israel was able to resist 
the demands of its superpower patron despite all that the United States had done to 
protect Israel.  Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir refused to change his policies and the 
issue remained unresolved.  The Bush administration had decided that in a post-Cold War 
world the strategic importance of the peace process exceeded the strategic importance of 
the U.S.-Israel alliance.274  Despite the immense pressure brought to bear by the Bush 
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administration, Shamir stood his ground and refused to make concessions to Israel’s 
superpower patron. 
Ultimately, in 1992, the Israeli public rejected Shamir’s hard-line policies.  The 
standoff between Israel and the United States ended when Shamir’s Likud Party was 
defeated by Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor Party.  Rabin quickly accepted the freeze on 
settlements sought by the Bush administration.   
These events ultimately prove to be the exception that proves the rule. The 
Bush/Baker policy harkened back to a pre-Reagan approach to foreign policy of strategic 
realism, but this turned out to be passing phase not a full-scale post-Cold War 
redefinition of U.S.-Israel alliance.  Here the U.S., which having just defeated Iraq in the 
Gulf War and defended Israel against Scud missiles, was in an exceptionally strong 
position to pressure Israel on the peace process.  Thus they briefly broke down the 
politically and culturally imposed compartmentalization that prevented the preceding 
Reagan Administration and succeeding Clinton Administration from pressuring Israel.  It 
is also not insignificant that Bush and Baker, being former Texas oilmen, were 
particularly sensitive to the need to maintain good relations with the Arab oil producers.  
Even so, they paid a heavy political price for pursuing a policy that reflected America’s 
strategic interest in discouraging settlements and encouraging a comprehensive “Land for 
Peace” settlement.   
Presidents Eisenhower, Carter, and George H.W. Bush are the three Presidents 
who have taken the hardest lines in putting pressure on the Israelis around issues of war 
and peace.  Eisenhower earned 40% of the Jewish vote during his re-election campaign in 
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1956.  When his Vice-President, Richard Nixon, ran to succeed him, Nixon received only 
18% of the Jewish vote and lost a close election to John F. Kennedy.  Carter received 
64% of the Jewish vote in 1976.  He received only 45% of the Jewish vote (in a 3-way 
race in which Independent candidate John Anderson took 15% of the Jewish vote) and 
lost his re-election bid to Ronald Reagan.   George H.W. Bush received 35% of the 
Jewish vote in 1988.  This dropped to 11% in his losing re-election campaign in 1992 
(with Independent candidate Ross Perot taking 9% of the Jewish vote).  In each of these 
cases, a President -- or his party -- who disagreed with Israeli policies and actively 
challenged them lost roughly 20% of the Jewish vote in the following election and his 
party was defeated.   The lost Jewish votes do not provide the margin of defeat in any of 
these cases.  In each of these cases, there are many other reasons that could be offered to 
explain the decline in the Jewish vote and the candidate’s overall defeat.  President Carter 
had both a weak economy and the embarrassing Iran hostage crisis to contend with.   
President George H.W. Bush was also dealing with a recession during his re-election 
campaign.  Both Bush and Carter were hurt by the presence of an Independent candidate 
whose challenge had little or nothing to do with Middle East policy.275 
Still the data suggests that in each case, the President suffered politically in the 
Jewish community when he put pressure on Israel.  In the latter two cases, there were 
angry public responses from the Jewish community over the incumbent President’s 
policies towards Israel.  The angry Jewish reaction also affected factors such as 
fundraising, voter turn out, and volunteering from within the Jewish community. 
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Although it is more difficult to track, these Presidents might have also been hurt with 
Christian supporters of Israel.  Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Jewish 
community’s anger over each President’s Israel policies was at least a factor in each of 
these elections, there is little evidence to suggest that it was necessarily the deciding 
factor in any of them.  Conversely, Presidents who are seen by the Jewish community as 
having been extremely supportive of the Jewish community such as Truman in 1948, 
Nixon in 1972, Clinton in 1996, and George W. Bush in 2004 generally maintained or 
increased their support in the Jewish community.  (See Appendix E for details of Jewish 
voting patterns.) 
Clinton and the Oslo Peace Process.  The Clinton administration was elected 
with nearly 80% of the Jewish vote on a strongly “pro-Israel” platform.  President 
Clinton went as far as promising to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem 
during his campaign.  They faced the same dilemma as many previous administrations:  
How could they be Israel’s best friend and closest ally and still act as an even-handed 
mediator to advance a peace process towards a goal of a two-state solution which has 
been widely seen as an American strategic interest for decades? 
Politically, the evolution of the Democratic Party shaped the Clinton 
administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The Democratic Party, while 
more concerned about Jewish votes and campaign donations, could until the 1980s take 
Jewish support somewhat for granted as a core constituency of their New Deal coalition 
until the 1980s.  The vast majority of American Jews, particularly outside the Orthodox 
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community, continued to support the Democratic Party out of a personal, sometimes 
familial, loyalty that is rooted in commitments to liberal economic and social policies of 
the New Deal and Great Society eras.  As American Jews have moved up the socio-
economic ladder and become more integrated into the broad American middle class, the 
Democratic Party has had to compete to hold on to their votes.  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
Republican Presidential candidates were receiving upwards of 30% of the Jewish vote – a 
dramatic increase over the previous years.  While the Jewish community and the Jewish 
vote has remained overwhelmingly Democratic, there was a growing sense that the 
Jewish vote was becoming a contested voting bloc.  
As a result, the Democratic Party had to try harder to demonstrate the depth of its 
commitment to Israel just as the Republicans began to emphasize their commitment to 
Israel both to please their Christian right base and to compete for economically 
conservative middle class Jews.   Thus political concerns replaced the strategic concerns 
(which had under girded the Kissingerian foreign policy and the President Carter’s Camp 
David negotiations in the 1970s) as the primary motivators in the development of 
American foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War, strategic concerns seemed to fall 
into the background and American policy became increasing a political construct.  The 
Clinton administration, as the first post-Cold War Democratic administration, naturally 
became the conduits of the Democratic political concerns over retaining the Jewish vote. 
The first term of the Clinton Administration, which roughly coincided with the 
Labor-led Israeli coalition under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres 
governments, proved to be remarkably cooperative period in U.S.-Israeli relations since 
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the Israel and U.S. governments were in essential agreement over the need to pursue the 
Oslo Peace Process. The Rabin government was much more inclined to advance the 
peace process than the various Likud governments that had been in power for the last 15 
years.  For once, the perceived interests of the two partners rather than U.S. pressure 
resulted in a major step forward in the peace process.   The convergence of national and 
political interests had revitalized a relationship that had undergone one of its most 
difficult periods during the previous administration of President George H.W. Bush. 
The Oslo Peace initiative was actually started as an informal backchannel outside 
of the official Washington-based peace process and eventually led to the ground-breaking 
1993 Declaration of Principles.  Surprisingly, this agreement was reached with little or no 
direct American involvement.  Nevertheless, Oslo negotiations created an opportunity for 
the famous signing ceremony on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993 and the 
iconic picture of Bill Clinton bringing Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat together to shake 
hands.  This was a promising start for what would become an extremely rocky process 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  The following year, with the “Jordanian option” off 
the table, the administration was able to broker a Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, 
which had only minor boundary disputes to resolve. 
However, the compartmentalized American policy which had begun to emerge in 
the Reagan period would re-emerge in the Clinton administration in a manner that would 
make it difficult for the Clinton administration to reconcile its contradictory roles of 
Israel’s best friend and a neutral peace mediator.  The Clinton administration was unable 
to leverage its strategic ties to Israel to use in the peace process, because its domestic 
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political commitments required it to separate its special relationship with Israel from its 
role as peace mediator.   This process could only work as long as American and Israeli 
goals and strategic interests in the peace process were essentially synonymous.  However, 
as the peace process evolved and the need for Israeli concessions grew, this became less 
and less the case.  Thus the Clinton administration’s inability to exercise an even-handed 
policy allowed the Israelis and Palestinians to engage in a cycle of violence that would 
undermine the credibility of the peace process. 
While Israel had placed a ban on creating new settlements in the Occupied 
Territories, it continued to expand existing settlements to account for so-called “natural 
growth” eventually doubling the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank to over 
200,000.  More settlements provoked Palestinian suicide bombings; suicide bombings led 
to a destructive polarization within Israeli society about whether the Oslo “Land for 
Peace” process offered a viable road to peace.  Each side managed to attack the other’s 
most vulnerable point of concern.  Suicide bombings undermined Israel’s sense of safety 
and security which remained vital in a society that lived in the shadow of the Holocaust 
(or Shoah/calamity in Hebrew).  Settlements undermined the fear of a Palestinian society 
traumatized by the 1948 dispossession of their land (or Nakba/catastrophe in Arabic) that 
even more of their land was disappearing.  Thus the cycle of violence began to eat away 
at the confidence of two traumatized peoples. 
With both the Democratic and Republican Parties (which controlled Congress 
after the 1994 midterm elections) tied to “pro-Israel” constituencies within each party’s 
base, the American government was unable to exert significant pressure on the Israeli 
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government to control settlement growth. As long as settlements were expanding, the 
relatively weak Palestinian government was unable to muster the will to challenge the 
violent factions within its society.   Instead, as described earlier, the leaders of the 
political parties competed with each other to offer the most over-the-top commitments to 
supporting the U.S.-Israel alliance regardless of the decisions that Israel made on the 
peace process. 
When Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s most credible advocate of “Land for 
Peace,” was tragically assassinated on November 4, 1995 by Yigal Amir, a fanatical 
right-wing Jewish Israeli opponent of the peace process, the peace process suffered a 
severe blow.  While the peace process initially moved forward under the leadership of 
Shimon Peres, the Israeli belief in the peace process was ultimately shattered by a series 
of devastating bus bombings in late February and early March, 1996.  This led to the 
electoral victory of Oslo opponent Benjamin Netanyahu in May, 1996.  The election of 
the government of hard-line Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu changed the 
strategic dynamic since the Netanyahu government was far less enthusiastic about the 
Oslo process than its predecessor.  The United States was able to pressure Israel into 
signing and implementing the Hebron Protocol in January, 1997, but then the progress 
came to an almost complete halt for nearly two years following Netanyahu’s decision to 
build a new settlement at Har Homa in the Occupied Territories southeast of Jerusalem 
(February, 1997).   Netanyahu also approved the opening of an archaeological tunnel near 
the Temple Mount which led to rioting (September, 1996).  These provocations were 
designed to undermine the peace process.  The Clinton administration was unwilling or 
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unable to seriously challenge these provocative actions by the Netanyahu government.  
With Israeli and American views of the peace process diverging dramatically, the Clinton 
administration had so compartmented the peace process and the “special relationship” 
and so publicly committed itself to unquestioned support for Israel’s policies, that it was 
unable to use its diplomatic muscle to advance its interest in towards achieving the 
agreed-upon goal of a two-state solution.   
In mid-1998, Secretary of State Madeline Albright tried and failed to convince the 
Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept a 13% Israeli redeployment from the West Bank.  
Pressure from Israel’s supporters in the United States forced her to back down.  In the 
end, Secretary Albright is reported to have relayed the following capitulation to the 
leaders of the pro-Israel lobby:  “If in the end Israel cannot accept our ideas, we will 
respect that decision.  And it will not affect our fundamental commitment to Israel by a 
single jot or tittle.276  The compartmentalization that had emerged during the Reagan 
administration had fully returned.   The peace process and the U.S.-Israel friendship 
were, once again, placed in entirely separate boxes.  As Vice-President Al Gore told the 
AIPAC conference that year, and has been quoted above:  “Our special relationship with 
Israel is unshakable, it is ironclad, eternal and absolute.  It does not depend on the peace 
process, it transcends the peace process.”  Events would show the political truth behind 
Gore’s over-the-top rhetoric.   
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Several months later, the relatively modest Israeli concessions achieved in the 
Wye River Memorandum (October 23, 1998) were only achieved at the price of an 
enormous expenditure of Presidential time and effort.  Even so, the final day of the 
conference witnessed the almost surreal experience of Prime Minister Netanyahu almost 
scuttling the entire deal in effort to convince President Clinton to release aforementioned 
American-Jewish spy, Jonathan Pollard -- who is still serving a life sentence and has been 
deemed a continuing threat to American national security by American Intelligence 
officials -- to Israel.  Although President Clinton rejected the option of immediately 
releasing Pollard -- after CIA Director George Tenet apparently threatened to resign -- 277 
some observers believed, incorrectly as it turned out, that President Clinton’s review of 
the matter would eventually result in Pollard’s early release.  Regardless, the fact that a 
bilateral issue between the U.S. and Israel became an issue during a negotiation between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority speaks volumes about the complexity and 
contradictions within America’s “special relationship” with Israel.  While the PLO did 
abrogate the controversial clauses in their Charter during President Clinton’s December, 
1998, visit to Gaza, most of the implementation bogged down in mutual recriminations.  
In the end, the Israelis only partially implemented their agreed-upon withdrawal from 
13% of the West Bank.  This increased the mutual animosity between the parties and the 
set the stage for the mutual acrimony and distrust that would play out in the final stage of 
the Clinton administration’s efforts.   
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President Clinton’s last chance to bring the parties together came after Netanyahu 
was defeated by Labor Party leader and former General Ehud Barak in mid-1999.  
Clinton, in effort to repeat the success of President Carter two decades earlier, put his 
personal prestige on the line and brought Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to Camp David 
for a summit meeting (July 11-25, 2000) in an attempt to break the deadlock on final 
status issues.  Many conflicting accounts have been written about the Camp David II 
summit by the various partisans making it particularly difficult to untangle the web of 
confusion surrounding this seminal event.  Clearly, under pressure from President 
Clinton, the Israelis made some sort of an indirect offer on final status issues that was 
significantly better than any previous Israeli proposal.  Arafat ultimately rejected the 
Israeli offer -- such as it was.  Much else remains contested, but the tensions described 
above within the American-Israel relationship seemed to play out to the detriment of the 
possibility of a peaceful resolution.   Some of the complex problems that emerged at the 
Camp David summit are described in this account by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha: 
The United States had several different roles in the negotiations, complex 
and often contradictory: as principal broker of the putative peace deal; as 
guardian of the peace process; as Israel’s strategic ally; and as its cultural 
and political partner. The ideas it put forward throughout the process bore 
the imprint of each. 
As the broker of the agreement, the President was expected to present a 
final deal that Arafat could not refuse. Indeed, that notion was the premise 
of Barak’s attraction to a summit. But the United States’ ability to play the 
part was hamstrung by two of its other roles. First, America’s political and 
cultural affinity with Israel translated into an acute sensitivity to Israeli 
domestic concerns and an exaggerated appreciation of Israel’s substantive 
moves. American officials initially were taken aback when Barak 
indicated he could accept a division of the Old City or Palestinian 
sovereignty over many of Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods—a reaction 
that reflected less an assessment of what a “fair solution” ought to be than 
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a sense of what the Israeli public could stomach. The US team often 
pondered whether Barak could sell a given proposal to his people, 
including some he himself had made. The question rarely, if ever, was 
asked about Arafat. 
A second constraint on the US derived from its strategic relationship with 
Israel. One consequence of this was the “no-surprise rule,” an American 
commitment, if not to clear, at least to share in advance, each of its ideas 
with Israel. Because Barak’s strategy precluded early exposure of his 
bottom lines to anyone (the President included), he would invoke the “no-
surprise rule” to argue against US substantive proposals he felt went too 
far. The US ended up (often unwittingly) presenting Israeli negotiating 
positions and couching them as rock-bottom red lines beyond which Israel 
could not go. Faced with Arafat’s rejection, Clinton would obtain Barak’s 
acquiescence in a somewhat improved proposal, and present it to the 
Palestinians as, once again, the best any Israeli could be expected to do. 
With the US playing an endgame strategy (“this is it!”) in what was in fact 
the middle of the game (“well, perhaps not”), the result was to depreciate 
the assets Barak most counted on for the real finale: the Palestinians’ 
confidence in Clinton, US credibility, and America’s ability to exercise 
effective pressure. Nor was the US tendency to justify its ideas by 
referring to Israeli domestic concerns the most effective way to persuade 
the Palestinians to make concessions. In short, the “no-surprise rule” held 
a few surprises of its own. In a curious, boomerang-like effect, it helped 
convince the Palestinians that any US idea, no matter how forthcoming, 
was an Israeli one, and therefore both immediately suspect and eminently 
negotiable. 
Seven years of fostering the peace process, often against difficult odds, 
further eroded the United States’ effectiveness at this critical stage. The 
deeper Washington’s investment in the process, the greater the stake in its 
success, and the quicker the tendency to indulge either side’s whims and 
destructive behavior for the sake of salvaging it. US threats and deadlines 
too often were ignored as Israelis and Palestinians appeared confident that 




Agha and Malley make it clear that the inherent contradictions in the various roles 
that the United States had taken made it impossible for it to act effectively to promote a 
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genuine peace deal.  In some sense, Barak was so intent on getting the best deal possible 
so that he could sell it to a fractured political coalition and a skeptical Israeli public that 
he was unable to strike a deal that was in Israel’s best interest.  President Clinton and his 
advisors were so close to Israel that they were unable to press Israel to make a deal which 
would have been in the best interest of both the U.S. and Israel.  Arafat, whose political 
situation at home was also precarious, was also unable to make significant compromises -
- something that the Clinton negotiators had a difficult time recognizing.  The political 
situation was made even more difficult for President Clinton, because of the political 
pressures of the last year of his administration in which his Vice-President was in a close 
race for President and his First Lady was coincidentally running for Senate in New York 
-- the state where this issue holds a particularly unique political status. 
Following the widespread outbreak violence of the Second Intifada (September, 
2000) and the extended U.S.  electoral recount (November, December, 2000), President 
Clinton made a last ditch effort to bridge the gaps with a set of bridging proposals which 
brought the parties as close to settlement as they had ever been.  Clinton offered these 
proposals only after the U.S. election was complete and the American political 
consequences of offering far reaching proposals and expecting major Israeli concessions 
had evaporated.  Of course, these proposals were too little too late with Clinton leaving 
office on January 20, 2001,and Ehud Barak headed for political defeat a few days later.  
Nevertheless, his final effort became the basis of the Taba Summit (January 21-27, 2001), 




which provides a starting point for future negotiations.279  At this point, the U.S.-Israel 
alliance, while still justified and rationalized in a strategic framework had evolved into a 
cultural and political alliance.  Without the Cold War strategic framework, the “special 
relationship” did not function in a way that was healthy enough to create opportunities to 
advance the Middle East peace process. 
George W. Bush and 9/11.  The near simultaneous inauguration of the George 
W. Bush on January 20, 2001in and the election victory of Likud leader Ariel Sharon a 
few days later in Israel sealed the fate of peace talks and seemed to close the door on 
serious discussion of a comprehensive peace settlement.  The current stage of the U.S.-
Israel Alliance is in large part the result of the alliance of George W. Bush and Ariel 
Sharon.  These two men came to power on the world stage at the same moment in very 
different countries for very different reasons, but never-the-less established a bond of 
friendship – both personal and national -- that is connected by a shared set of values.  It 
may be an accident of history, but an almost predictable one, that the neo-conservative 
ideology of Bush, Vice President  Dick Cheney, and the foreign policy hawks that 
surrounded them bore a remarkable similarity to neo-revisionism of Ariel Sharon’s Likud 
Party.  Ilan Peleg and Paul Schamm write that: 
Israeli Neo-Revisionism and American Neoconservativism….have 
developed remarkably similar ideologies and policies, based on similar 
and related Weltanshaungen.  In both cases, these movements combined 
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assertive nationalism, unrestrained unilateralism, and unabashed 
militarism in response to what they viewed as external challenges to their 
societies…280 
In short, the two ranchers were natural allies.  Both new leaders sought to distance 
themselves from what they perceived as the failed diplomatic policies of their immediate 
predecessors.  During the first nine months of the Bush/Cheney administration, President 
Bush adopted the position of ignoring the peace process and turning their attention to 
other areas including Iraq and missile defense.  According to Former Treasury Secretary 
Paul O’Neill, at the first National Security Council on January 30, 2001, Bush stated: 
We’re going to correct the imbalances of the previous administration on 
the Mideast conflict. We’re going to tilt it back toward Israel.  And we’re 
going to be consistent.  Clinton overreached, and it all fell apart.  That’s 
why we’re in trouble…. If the two sides don’t want peace, there’s no way 
we can force them….I don’t see much we can do over there at this point.  I 
think it’s time to pull out of that situation…..Sometimes a show a strength 
by one side can really clarify things.281 
Bush clearly believed that President Clinton had gotten too engaged in the negotiations 
and had been too “pro-Palestinian” in pressing for a negotiated solution.  Ariel Sharon 
who refused to re-open negotiations amidst suicide bombing attacks began instead to 
construct a West Bank security barrier (variously called a “fence” and a “wall” by 
proponents and opponents, respectively) to both protect and essentially begin a process of 
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de facto annexation of many of the settlements.  The Bush administration, by-and-large, 
has continued to support Israel’s policy in this regard. 
The alliance was further strengthened by the September 11th attacks which 
reestablished a common enemy -- Islamic extremism -- that had been missing since the 
end of the Cold War.  The September 11th attacks would ultimately serve to reinforce the 
cultural glue that tied together the strategic framework of the U.S.-Israel alliance.  The 
“War on Terror” suddenly emerged as America’s primary priority in the Middle East 
which clearly overshadowed any interest in advancing the peace process.  Israel, which 
had long struggled with terrorism, emerged as an even more natural ally.  The neo-
conservative ideology of the administration emphasized the importance of military means 
over the use of diplomacy.  Jason Vest argues that the neo-conservatives “effectively hold 
there is no difference between U.S. and Israeli national security interests, and that the 
only way to assure continued safety and prosperity for both countries is through 
hegemony in the Middle East.”282   Finally, President Bush’s born-again religious 
devotion and personal connection to the religious right and its way of conceptualizing 
Israel reinforced the tight bond with Israel as a natural extension of Western Judeo-
Christian civilization engaged in a titanic struggle with Islamic extremism. 
In the cultural context created within the United States after September 11th, Israel 
was defined as a valuable ally within the Manichean “Clash of Civilizations.”   Islam, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
282





which has long been viewed with hostility and suspicion by many Americans, morphed 
into a threat to Western civilization.  The “terrorist” enemies of both Israel and the United 
States have been publicly defined as a powerful amorphous group motivated by irrational 
hatred of the United States and Israel.   The underlying assumption is that the U.S. and 
Israel are entirely benevolent and that the terrorists have no rational reason for their 
hatred so they must be acting out of an irrational, religiously-inspired hatred that is 
completely detached from American and Israeli actions and the behavior.  Their hatred of 
the United States and of Israel is defined not as the result of any action or activity of 
either country, but as the result the extremist’s religious fanaticism.   Shortly after the 
September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush framed the issue in the following 
terms in his September 20th address to Congress: 
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.  (Applause.)  
Americans are asking, why do they hate us?  They hate what we see right here in this 
chamber -- a democratically elected government.  Their leaders are self-appointed.  They 
hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote 
and assemble and disagree with each other.  
They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.  They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East.  They want 
to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.  
These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life.  With 
every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and 
forsaking our friends.  They stand against us, because we stand in their way.  
We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety.  We have seen their kind before.  They 
are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century.  By sacrificing human 
life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power -- 
they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.  And they will follow 
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that path all the way, to where it ends:  in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. 
(Applause.) 283   
From the beginning,284 the defense of Israel is defined as an integral part of the “War on 
Terror.”  Islamic extremism is connected to the struggle against the Nazis, who pursed an 
irrational policy of exterminating European Jewry.  The entire discourse is defined in 
terms of a threat to our “way of life.” 
 As noted above, while the Democrats had long had a close political/cultural 
connection to the Jewish community, the Republicans had now, as discussed earlier, 
developed a deep connection to the religious right, which was if anything more 
unquestioningly “pro-Israel” in its willingness to support Israeli policies than the Jewish 
community.285  The Republican Party’s foreign policy goals in the Middle East, 
particularly under the sway of Henry Kissinger in the 1970s and President George H.W. 
Bush, had been fairly strategic since the Republicans did not rely on Jewish votes as part 
of their coalition.  With the rise of the “religious right” many Republicans committed to 
strongly “pro-Israel” positions on theological grounds.  The Republican Party adopted 
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rhetoric and policies which are much more sympathetic to the State of Israel than they 
had in the past.  These changes, which began under the Reagan Administration, solidified 
in the ideas and rhetoric of the party during the 1990s.  The statements of Republican 
leaders like Former Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Lott that were cited above 
show how the party had evolved.  As described in the next chapter, it is also clear in the 
Republican Party platforms; Every Republican platform since 1980 has spoken of a 
“moral” element to the U.S.-Israel relationship.  (See Appendix F)  In general, other 
foreign policy relationships are not spoken of as moral commitments, but purely as 
strategic alliances that are in America’s best interest. 
 The rise of the neo-conservatives in the 1990s stemmed in large part from the 
conceptualization of the Post-Cold War world put forward by Samuel Huntington as a 
“Clash of Civilizations.”  The Neo-Conservatives developed a foreign policy, that while 
based on an interpretation of America’s strategic interests, also worked closely in tandem 
with the views of the Christian right.  Both the neo-conservatives and the religious right 
maintained a deep ideological connection in support of Israel as a special ally.  They both 
see Israel as bastion of Western civilization in the Middle East which could help to 
protect the United States from the “threat of Islam.”  This once theoretical threat became 
far more real with the September 11th attacks.  For the Bush administration, the “War on 
Terror” replaced the “Cold War” as the defining conflict of the age. 
The Iraq War also strengthened the ties, since the U.S.  invasion of Iraq was 
clearly beneficial to Israel’s military position.  Also, both countries were now put in very 
similar positions as occupiers of a hostile Arab populations leading to increased tactical 
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cooperation. This phase has witnessed extreme version of the compartmentalization.  The 
Bush administration has completely separated the U.S.-Israel alliance from its efforts to 
achieve piece via its Road Map Peace Plan -- issued on June 24, 2002. So much so that 
many critics have come to question the seriousness of the administration’s commitment 
to its own peace plan. 
The policies of the Bush administration in terms of their unquestioned support of 
the Israeli Occupation policies, their intermittent and lackadaisical engagement in the 
Middle East process, their support for Israel’s 2005 unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip, their support for Israel’s disastrous 2006 War against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and, 
of course, the invasion and Occupation of Iraq follow naturally from their view of a 
“Clash of Civilizations.”  Their ideological approach often rejected diplomacy, because it 
reflected a form of weakness that required compromise with the “axis of evil” and other 
enemies.  This approach leaves little political space for negotiation, diplomacy, and 
political compromise.  Just as most of the regional conflicts of the Cold War were viewed 
through the prism of containing Communism, the George W. Bush administration has 
adopted “The War on Terror” as a Manichean paradigm for viewing modern conflicts 
including most particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
While it is hard to understand the origin of this sort of international alliance, one 
wonders if the relative international inexperience in world affairs of Presidents Clinton 
and George W. Bush led him to be excessively influenced by their own cultural and 
religious predispositions in Israel’s favor.  Their inexperience seemed lead them to rely 
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on advisors -- such as Dennis Ross and Elliot Abrams, respectively -- who reinforced 
their instinctual proclivities to favor policies supportive of Israel.  Their inexperience in 
foreign affairs may have also led them to look up to older grandfatherly Israeli leaders -- 
Rabin for Clinton, Sharon for Bush – who also reinforced their own existing 
predilections.  By contrast, the other President in the Post-Cold War period, George H.W. 
Bush, had a much deeper breadth of understanding of world affairs when he entered 
office and approached the conflict thru an entirely different framework. 
 Historical Comparisons.  While there is no way to draw exact comparisons of 
similar issue situations from different periods of the U.S.-Israel relationship, but some 
contrasts can be drawn between how earlier administrations dealt certain issue situations 
as compared with the two most recent administrations.  The comparisons are inherently 
inexact, since historical circumstances do not allow for exact comparisons.   
 Settlement Expansion and Refugees:  During the Reagan and, especially during 
the George H.W. Bush, administrations, there was a clear understanding that Israeli 
settlement expansion in the Occupied Territories undermined the peace process and 
undermined the viability of a future Palestinian state.  President Bush and Secretary 
Baker took dramatic steps in 1991-92 to condition Israeli Loan guarantees for assistance 
to Russian immigrants on a freeze of settlement expansion in the Occupied Territories.  
While their efforts were not successful, they used a clear economic incentive to back up 
their efforts to stop settlement expansion.  They were willing to accept the domestic 
political consequences of doing so.  There was a clear separation of Israeli and American 
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strategic interests in this calculation and an understanding that advancing the peace 
process was in the strategic interest of the United States.    
 By contrast, the Clinton administration did little to enforce the intent of the 
settlement freeze included in the Oslo Accord which prohibited unilateral actions to 
change the situation in the territories.  Israel stopped building more settlements, but it 
doubled the number of settlers during the Clinton/Oslo period.  The administration did 
little to challenge the Israeli decision to build a new settlement at Har Homa southeast of 
Jerusalem in 1997 despite widespread international objections.  The George W. Bush 
administration went even further on the issue of settlements.  While Bush’s 2002 Road 
Map extracted a promise to remove illegal outposts built after March, 2001 as part of its 
first phase, the administration has made little effort to hold Israel to this promise.  In an 
April 14, 2004 letter from President Bush to Ariel Sharon read: 
In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli 
populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status 
negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and 
all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same 
conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be 
achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.286 
This letter suggests the implicit acceptance of major Israeli settlement blocs on the West 
Bank before any negotiations had even started.  This was a startling break from previous 
U.S. policies that the future of these settlement blocs was to be negotiated as part of a 
                                                 






final status agreement.  In the same letter, the Bush administration also agreed that “a 
solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to 
be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian 
refugees there, rather than in Israel.”287  No previous administration had made this sort of 
commitment to Israel on the refugee issue.  In so doing, they placed themselves firmly on 
the Israeli side in one of the two of the key issues to be negotiated in future peace talks. 
While there is little doubt that Israel would have given little ground on either of these 
issues in final status talks, by siding with Israel ahead of any future negotiations the U.S. 
strengthened the Israeli position and weakened the Palestinian position.  They also further 
compromised the ability of the United States to act as a neutral mediator in future 
negotiations.  By supporting Israel in the context of the “War on Terror” this position 
continued the compartmentalization that assumed that the U.S. and Israel interests were 
synonymous and that U.S. interest in a strong Israel superseded U.S. strategic interest in 
advancing the peace process. 
 Withdrawals from Occupied Land:  Earlier administrations clearly insisted that 
Israel withdraw from lands that had been occupied.  Eisenhower insisted that Israel 
withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in 1957.  Kissinger insisted on an Israeli pullback 
from Quinatra as part of the 1974 Syrian disengagement agreement.  President Carter 
pressed Israel to fully withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula as part of the 1978 Camp 
David negotiations.  All of these administrations were able to use the diplomatic leverage 






of the United States to pressure Israel.  The Clinton administration appeared so 
committed to Israel politically and personally that they were unable to get the Netanyahu 
to implement a previously agreed-to 1998 pullback from 13% of the West Bank.  As 
noted, in quotes from Madeline Albright and Al Gore, they remained committed to 
maintaining an unbreakable U.S.-Israel alliance regardless of the consequences for the 
peace process.  Thus they were unable to use American leverage to press Israel for 
concessions or even acknowledge that such concessions might be in Israel as well as 
America’s strategic interest. 
 Unilateralism and Negotiations:  Similarly, all previous administrations had 
insisted that Israel’s conflicts with its neighbors could only be solved through bilateral 
and/or multi-lateral negotiations.  In the same letter from 2004 described above, the Bush 
administration committed to full support for Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip.  This policy was in-line with the Bush administrations own unilateral instincts that 
it had followed in its decision to invade Iraq without an authorizing resolution from the 
United Nations.  Again, this demonstrated a preference for deferring to Israel’s 
assessment of its strategic interests and accepting Israel’s approach rather than insisting 
on a more sustainable peace process that was likely to produce long-term stability in the 
region.  In essence, in deferring to Israel’s strategic judgment, the Bush administration 
gave up on over thirty years of American policy that asserted that a negotiated solution 
was in the U.S. interest and again accepted the framework of neo-conservatives that U.S. 
and Israeli strategic goals were synonymous and inseparable. 
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 Similarly, every U.S. administration from Nixon to Clinton had encouraged 
negotiations between Israel and the neighboring Arab states.  Under Nixon and Ford, 
Kissinger pressed Israel to negotiate Post-Yom Kippur War disengagement agreements 
with both Egypt and Syria and even pursued a policy of reassessing U.S.-Israeli relations 
in 1975 in order press Israel forward.  Carter personally hosted the Israelis and the 
Egyptians at the Camp David Summit in 1978 in order to seal those negotiations.  
Although somewhat less enthusiastic about the peace process during a period of renewed 
Cold War, the Reagan administration pursued several Israeli-Palestinian peace plans.  
The George H.W. Bush administration strongly encouraged all sides to convene the 
Madrid conference in 1991.  They were even willing to publicly challenge the Israeli 
commitment to the peace process.  Secretary of State Baker publicly criticized Israeli 
commitment to the peace process at a Congressional hearing when he argued that the 
Israelis weren’t serious about peace and sarcastically told the Shamir government:  
“Everybody over there should know that the telephone number ((of the White House)) is 
1-202-456-1414. When you’re serious about peace, call us.”288   The Clinton 
administration helped to promote an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, shepherded the 
Oslo peace process, hosted the Wye and Camp David II summits, and encouraged Israel 
to negotiate, albeit unsuccessfully with Syria.  By contrast, the George W. Bush 
administration adopted a policy of refusing to negotiate or promote negotiations with 
those that it deemed “terrorists.”  The administration refused to talk with PLO 
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Chairman/PA President Yasser Arafat and roundly condemned the Clinton administration 
for doing so.  Both before and after Arafat’s death, it did little to revive Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations.  Some news reports even suggest that the U.S. opposed Israeli-Syrian 
negotiations over the Golan Heights.  The calculation seems to be that Israel is in a 
stronger strategic position when it acts unilaterally rather than when it engages in 
diplomacy and, consequentially, has to make concessions.  The underlying neo-
conservative premise seems to be a preference for unilateralism and military solutions 
over diplomacy. 
 Summit Conferences:  Perhaps the most straight-forward comparison is to 
contrast the results achieved by President Carter at the first Camp David Summit (1978) 
and President George H.W. Bush to the Madrid Conference (1991) to those of President 
Clinton at the Wye Summit (1998) and the second Camp David Summit (2000).  
President Carter was willing and able to use American diplomatic muscle to make a 
reluctant Begin agree to return the entire Sinai Peninsula.  While there was significant 
political resistance raised by the Jewish community, it was unable to prevent Carter from 
pressuring the Israelis.  He was committed to making the peace process work and willing 
to use American diplomatic and financial levers to do so.  Similarly Bush and Baker were 
willing to press a reluctant Shamir to attend the Madrid Conference and begin a process 
of negotiations.  As a result, Carter was able to bring about Israel’s first full peace 
agreement with its largest Arab adversary and Bush and Baker successfully laid the 
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groundwork for the eventual Oslo agreement and the Jordan peace treaty a few years 
later.  These administrations understood that Israel’s interpretation of its own interests 
might differ from U.S. interpretation and were politically willing to pay the domestic 
price of pressuring the Israeli government.  They probably also viewed their actions as 
being in Israel’s own long-run best interest although this seems to have been more of a 
secondary concern.  Israel was understood as a client state that, while independent, was 
greatly desirous of American diplomatic, economic, and military support. 
 Conversely, President Clinton was much more limited in his ability to pressure 
Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Barak at the Wye and 2nd Camp David summits.  At 
Wye, he was only able to exact minimal concessions from Netanyahu and only after the 
Prime Minister attempted to force him to release convicted spy Jonathan Pollard.  Clinton 
also had to agree to go to Gaza to oversee changes to the PLO Charter.  In the end, many 
parts of the agreement weren’t actually implemented.  Prime Minister Barak later opted 
to refuse to implement the partial withdrawal agreement and other steps such as prisoner 
releases included in the 1998 Wye Accord ahead of the Camp David summit.  While 
Barak’s actions were intended to get the best deal that he could for Israel, they ended up 
doing just the opposite.   By disregarding previously signed agreements, Barak 
undermined the Palestinian faith in the value of negotiating with Israel since such 
agreements could simply be ignored by the next prime minister. The Clinton 
administration was either unwilling or unable to press for Israel for compliance with 
Wye.  Their alliance with Israel was too important to the Clinton administration to try to 
force acquiescence -- especially as they approached a Presidential election and as the 
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President struggled to recover politically from a failed effort to remove him from office.  
At Camp David, as Malley and Agha have noted above, the Clinton team was so close to 
the Israeli team that they were unable to really separate out their different roles or 
maintain real credibility with the Palestinian side as a balanced mediator.  Their closeness 
and empathy with the Israelis resulted in a dysfunctional negotiating process. 
 The George W. Bush administration went several steps further in undermining the 
negotiating process.  From 2001-2004, it refused to speak to the Palestinian leader, 
Yasser Arafat, who it defined as a “terrorist.”  After Arafat’s death, it did little to support 
the new Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and instead continued to support Ariel 
Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.  After Hamas won majority control 
in the Palestinian parliamentary election in January, 2006, it boycotted all contact with 
Hamas.  Whereas the Clinton administration was willing to promote negotiations with the 
Palestinians, the Bush administration adopted an ideological approach that accepted 
Sharon’s assertion that there was no Palestinian negotiating partner.  Thus, not 
surprisingly, there have been no American-hosted summit meetings up to this time during 
the Bush administration.  Their approach has been to provide unquestioned support of 
Israel’s policies and thus refuse to assert that Israel’s frame of reference is in any way 
distinct from America’s own. 
Unlike the 1970s and before, in the last two administrations the U.S. has been 
either unwilling or unable to use its position as Israel’s superpower patron to pressure 
Israel to make concessions in the peace process.  This is the primary distinction between 
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the first five phases and the last two phases of the alliance.  Since the early 1980s, a 
pattern has developed in which American administrations grow angry and warn Israel and 
then end up backing off without any serious sanctions or forcing Israel to alter its peace 
policies in any significant way.  While the U.S. clearly still has the military and economic 
ability to force Israel to make concessions as it had done in the previous decades, it now 
seems to lack the political will to do so.  Despite the overwhelming potential leverage of 
its position as a superpower protector, the United States often seems unwilling or unable 
to force Israel to alter its policies regarding significant American strategic priorities.  
Despite its position of relative weakness compared to the United States, Israel 
consistently follows its own perceived national interests even when they directly 
contradict with those of its superpower patron.  Despite Israeli intransigence on these 
crucial issues, American administrations rarely exercise their vast power and influence at 
their disposal to force Israel to comply.  Unlike 1957 or the late 1970s, or the even early 
1990s, when the United States flexed some of its muscles, the U.S. is either unwilling or 
unable to compel Israel to conform.  A partnership that had begun as a fairly ordinary 
patron-client relationship has now evolved into a much more complex, convoluted, and 
nuanced alliance in which the client is now, more often than not, able to refuse its patron. 
If the relationship is viewed as that of a parent and a child, one could look at the 
United States as the devoted parent that can not provide “tough love” to discipline an 
unruly child to act in its own self-interest.  Israel, instead of growing into a more 
responsible world citizen, acts like an obstinate child and pursues policies that are self-
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destructive and destructive to others.  This is the tragedy of the increasingly dysfunctional 
U.S.-Israel “special relationship.”  
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Chapter 6 – The Reframing of Israel in Democratic and Republican Platforms 
The aforementioned rise of the religious right around 1980 was part of a 
realignment of the contours of the American party system.  A newly assertive religiously 
conservative right-wing of Republican Party emerged as the base of the Party as the 
Democratic “New Deal” coalition frayed at the seams.  One of the unanticipated and 
mostly unexpected results of this transformation was the strengthening of the U.S.-Israel 
“special relationship,” as the realignment resulted in the creation of strong “pro-Israel” 
political base within each party.  Thus the two major political parties are one of the most 
important intermediary political institutions that serve to help establish and a broad 
bipartisan “pro-Israel” political consensus within the American political elite.   
In this context it is extremely useful to examine the quadrennial platforms of both 
parties over time to understand how the political consensus within each party has 
evolved.  Since platforms are only written every four years, they provide a useful periodic 
window into the nature of the political discourse.  They tend to reflect the consensus 
views within the party (and the campaign of each party’s Presidential nominee).  They 
are obviously greatly affected by whatever the most current issues are, but they also 
reflect the consensus within the party.   (See Appendix F for extensive excerpts of all the 
platforms.) 
The party platforms allow us to examine the gradual pattern of cultural change at 
clearly specified intervals as they occurred within both major American political parties.  
By examining the change that is occurring in the political parties we can see how the 
 
 -233-
political frame of reference for understanding the conflict is changing within the political 
establishment.  Over time, we see how the nature of America’s political commitment to 
Israel changes and the nature of the American evolving understanding of Israel’s role in 
the Middle East changes.  The rhetorical evolution of America’s commitment to Israel 
serves to demonstrate the role that political parties play as one of the key political 
institutions that collects and transmits the views of both interest groups and the general 
public to the policymaking elites.  At the same time, we are able to see the differences 
between the two parties.  While both parties have developed often similar policies that 
are supportive of Israel, they have fundamentally different cultural assumptions that 
shape their views of the nature of that commitment.   This is apparent in the rhetoric that 
they adopt when trying to define that commitment. 
In the 1920s, the Jewish vote was already shifting towards the Democratic Party.  
Al Smith won 72% of the Jewish vote in 1928.  With the advent of the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition of African-Americans, Jews, Unions, etc. the Jewish vote 
became a solidly Democratic vote with Roosevelt winning consistently between 82% and 
90% of the Jewish vote.  At the time of the development of the New Deal coalition, 
Israel/ Zionism were a non-issue in American politics.   A Jewish state in the Middle East 
was a naïve dream supported by a minority of American Jews.  While it had been 
supported publicly by American Jewish leaders like Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis, it was not a major political issue.  As the Second World War progressed and 
reports of the Holocaust began to filter out of Europe, Zionism began to emerge as more 
of an issue.  Both Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie included referenced to a “free and 
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democratic commonwealth” and called for “unrestricted” Jewish immigration in their 
party’s respective 1944 platforms.  This was language reflective of the 1942 Biltmore 
Conference and it marked the emergence of the Zionism as a serious political issue on the 
American political scene.  The Democratic platform contained a single sentence on the 
subject, while the Republican platform was a little more extensive referencing both the 
1917 Balfour Declaration and a 1922 Republican Congressional resolution, but they were 
practically the same in content. 
By 1948, as the Israeli War of independence continued, both parties praised 
President Truman’s recognition of Israel and supported economic assistance to the 
fledgling Jewish State.  While the Democratic platform was more extensive, there was 
little difference in content.  The Democratic platform notes that the Jews “have long 
sought and justly deserve freedom and independence.”  President Truman’s platform did 
make a promise to seek “revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the 
right of self-defense.”  However, this promise was never implemented by the Truman 
administration.  The 1948 Democratic platform is also the first one by either party to 
affirm the “internationalization of Jerusalem” in accord with the UN’s 1947 partition 
plan. 
By 1952 both parties had introduced passing references to seeking a peace 
settlement in the region.  This has remained an on-going theme appearing in every 
platform since – sometimes in passing reference, sometimes in copious detail.  During the 
1950s, the platform planks remained focused on issues of postwar humanitarian relief for 
both Jewish and Arab refugees.  It is worth noting that the party platforms would not 
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begin to refer to the Arab population as “Palestinians” until 1980.  Both 1952 platforms 
referred to Israel’s “humanitarian” mission to help persecuted Jewish refugees.  The 
Democratic platform referred to the “relief and reintegration of the Palestine refugees” 
while the Republican platform seems to suggest the same thing implicitly in a reference 
to bringing about “economic and social stability” to the region.  The Republican language 
takes on a laudatory tone not previously present referring to Israel as a “constructive and 
inspiring undertaking.” 
By the time of the 1956 platforms, the political context seems to have shifted 
from the postwar humanitarian relief to the Cold War.  While references to refugee relief 
remain in both platforms, new language alluding to the Soviet threat and the regional 
arms race is now part of the picture and would continue to reoccur throughout the 
remaining decades of the Cold War.  In 1956, both parties for the first time referred to 
guaranteeing Israel’s security.  These platforms were written in the context of Soviet 
arms supplies going to Egypt during the lead up to the Suez crisis.  The Democratic 
platform promised to address the communist arms sales to Egypt “by selling or supplying 
defensive weapons to Israel” and taking “such steps, including security guarantees, as 
may be required to deter aggression and war in the area.”  The Eisenhower platform was 
even more explicit, stating:  “We regard the preservation of Israel as an important tenet of 
American foreign policy.  We are determined that the integrity of an independent Jewish 
state shall be maintained.  We shall support the independence of Israel against armed 
aggression.”  In both cases, the language suggests that an independent Israel is an 
instrumental strategic asset in the Cold War.   It does not suggest that Israel is 
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intrinsically or inherently valuable to the United States.  There is little real difference 
between either the policy positions or the language used by the two parties.  There is no 
evidence to suggest a significant role for the organized Jewish community in shaping the 
platform language on Israel. 
While the context is less urgent in 1960, both platforms focus on themes of 
promoting peace negotiations, resettling refugees, ending boycotts and blockages, and 
ending the regional arms race resulting from Soviet arms sales to the region.  
Interestingly, there are no promises of arms sales to Israel -- even though the first U.S. 
sales of defensive Hawk missiles to Israel take place under in Kennedy in 1962.  The 
Eisenhower administration was already considering such sales as well.  The explicit 
commitments to Israel in the context of the emerging crisis of 1956 are not present in the 
1960 platforms -- presumably they no longer seemed necessary.  Again, the parties 
remain quite similar in their platforms. 
In 1964, the pledges and themes are almost identical to those of 1960.  While the 
Democratic platform is much more verbose, the pledges on negotiations, refugees, 
economic and military assistance remain quite similar to four years earlier with little 
party differentiation. The Democratic platforms throughout the 1960s and 1970s referred 
to an explicit Soviet threat to the region, while the Republicans referred slightly more 
subtly to the regional arms race with much the same intent.  However, both parties 
introduced new language about the oppression of Soviet Jews into their 1964 platforms.  
The references are brief in these platforms and contextualized among other persecuted 
minorities in the Soviet Union.  These references would remain in the platforms of both 
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parties until the end of the Cold War and would gradually become much more extensive 
and detailed as the issue of Soviet Jewry became a more politically salient one in the 
Jewish community.   
The decade between the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War was a relatively quiet 
period in the Arab-Israeli conflict with relatively little American involvement.  The 
international context had shifted dramatically by the time of the 1968 platforms.  The 
U.S. was stuck in the quagmire of the Vietnam War and the 1967 War had reshaped the 
region dramatically.  The Middle East had taken on a sense of explosive danger with the 
democratic platform calling it a “powder keg” while the Republicans considered it to be 
more of “a tinderbox.”  Both parties adopt language similar to UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 concerning secure borders, territorial integrity, freedom of navigation and 
negotiations.  However, Sen. Humphrey, the Democratic nominee, adopts a much 
stronger commitment to Israel, pledging that “As long as Israel is threatened by hostile 
and well-armed neighbors, we will assist her with essential military equipment needed for 
her defense, including the most advanced types of combat aircraft.”  The Republican 
platform maintained much more balanced language that didn’t take sides.  Even though 
Nixon defeated Humphrey that year, the language of the Democratic platform 
foreshadowed the language and policy that was to follow in the coming decades.   
During the early 1970s, the U.S.-Israel relationship was greatly strengthened as a 
result of the Nixon/Kissinger reevaluation of Israel’s strategic value following the Black 
September (1970).  The level of U.S. Foreign aid was increased significantly in the early 
1970s.  The nature of the new strategic alliance was clearly reflected in the reframing of 
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the relationship in the 1972 party platforms.  The language in both platforms had 
strengthened the commitments greatly over the 1968 platforms.  The 1972 Democratic 
platform stated, “The United States must be unequivocally committed to support of 
Israel’s right to exist within secure and recognized borders.”  President Nixon’s platform 
differed significantly from that of 1968, stating that Republicans “support the right of 
Israel and its courageous people to survive and prosper in peace.”  This represented a 
dramatic increase in the nature of the political commitment of each party to Israel.  Both 
parties also committed to support peace negotiations, to provide aid for Jewish refugees 
in Israel, and to provide new arms sales to Israel.  The Democratic platform also included 
language about Jerusalem that would become standard for both parties in the next few 
years that committed a Democratic administration to “recognize and support the 
established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel with free access to tall its holy 
places provided to all faiths.  As a symbol of this stand, the U.S. Embassy should be 
moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.”   The Democratic Party continued to refer to moving 
the U.S.  Embassy up to its 1984 platform at which point it was dropped.   The 
Republicans picked up the Embassy issue in their platforms from 1996 on. 
 Following the 1973 War, the Republican commitments to Israel remained 
relatively similar. The wording of the Democratic platform, however, evolved greatly in 
the 1976 platform.  Still, President Ford’s platform described the U.S. commitment to 
Israel as “fundamental and enduring.”  President Carter’s platform declared that “the 
cornerstone of our policy is a firm commitment to the independence and security of the 
State of Israel.”  Carter’s platform also was the first to use the phrase “special 
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relationship” to describe the U.S.-Israel alliance.  The phrase a “special relationship” 
would become standard Democratic language which would be repeated in all of the 
Democratic platforms from 1988 to 2004.  Also, the 1976 Carter platform used one of the 
more peculiar, and perhaps telling, expressions when objecting to the 1975 UN General 
Assembly resolution equating Zionism with Racism, which the platform called 
“blasphemous.”  In other words, the presumably secular platform on an American 
political platform described UNGA resolution as an affront to God.  This seems to hint at 
the religious/cultural significance that Israel was beginning to take on.  Interestingly, this 
is the only time that the Democratic platform criticized the UN around the issue of Israel.  
However, as is often the case, themes initially used in Democratic platforms were picked 
up by the Republicans.  Criticism of the UN’s treatment of Israel has been used in 
practically every Republican platform from 1984 to 2004 (except for 1996).  It has 
become a common theme of Republican rhetoric about Israel.  The 1976 Democratic 
platform was also the first platform to denounce the role of the PLO as a terrorist group 
that didn’t represent the Palestinian people.  The nature of the political debate that had 
begun to change in the mid-1970s would become apparent in the early 1980s. 
 The 1980 platforms of both parties reflected the transformed nature of the 
American commitment to Israel.  The Camp David Summit represented by far the deepest 
involvement of an American President in the nitty-gritty details of the conflict.  The 1980 
platforms were more than twice as long -- in terms of the number of words devoted to the 
subject -- as the previous party platforms and spelt out the nature of those commitments 
in far greater detail than ever before.  Carter’s platform reflected the depth of the 
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Presidential involvement in the conflict; however, it is also clear that fear about the 
strong-willed role that the President played in pressuring Israel had created real concern 
in the Jewish community.  In 1980, the organized Jewish community became much more 
engaged in the process of writing the Democratic platform plank on Israel than it had 
ever been before.  Meanwhile, President Reagan’s platform reflected the ideological 
transformation that had occurred within the Republican Party with Reagan’s nomination 
and emergence of the religious right in the Republican Party.  These platforms are the 
first ones in which explicit and outspoken “pro-Israel” voices within both political parties 
are now strong enough to influence and reshape each party’s platform commitments to 
Israel.  At this stage, the parties have moved away from speaking about how they will 
protect America’s broad strategic interests in the Middle East and are much more focused 
on how they will engage the political priorities of their specific interest groups.  
 While both parties continued to refer to Soviet Jewry in every platform, the nature 
of their rhetoric around the Cold War seemed to shift at this point.  Before 1980, the 
Democrats always mentioned the Soviet threat when talking about Israel and the 
Republicans never did.  After all in the preceding years, the Democrats had been the 
more belligerent cold warriors and the Republicans had been more inclined towards to 
détente.  But by 1980, the parties seemed to switch rhetoric on this issue.  The Democrats 
become far less bellicose as they reevaluated their approach to foreign affairs following 
the American withdrawal from Vietnam.  While both parties referred to the Soviet threat 
in 1980 -- following the invasion of Afghanistan and the renewal of Cold War tensions -- 
the Democrats stopped referring to Soviet encroachment in the region as a reason to 
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support Israel.  Conversely, the more aggressive Reagan Republicans used the Soviet 
threat to frame their support for Israel until the end of the Cold War. 
 In 1980, the Republicans joined the Democrats and for the first time endorsed an 
undivided Israeli controlled Jerusalem (which the Democrats had been calling for with 
more ambiguous language since 1972).  The Republican platform joined the Democratic 
platform in adopting strident anti-PLO language.   Also, for the first time, both parties 
adopted specific statements opposing Palestinian statehood (although Democratic 
platform did refer, in line with the Camp David Accords, to Palestinian autonomy).  This 
language would reappear several more times in Republican platforms of 1988 and 1992 
and at other times would be implicit in anti-PLO language. 
  For the first time, the Democratic platform adopted language contending that 
Israel should be supported because it was the only democracy in the Middle East.  This 
language would soon become standard in both party platforms.  The Democrats also 
introduced language that would become standard describing Israel as a “friend” and/or 
“ally.”  Furthermore, both parties for the first time introduced language referring to 
America’s “moral” obligation to Israel.  This language was used by the Democrats only 
in 1980, but would become standard in future Republican platforms -- presumably 
reflecting the influence of the religious right and its mindset within the party.  Also, very 
importantly, for the first time both parties adopted language in which they spoke of Israel 
as a “strategic asset” or “strategic interest” of the United States.   This has become 
standard in the language and rhetoric of both parties ever since.  
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 The major changes seen in the 1980 platforms seem to be more solidly 
institutionalized by 1984.  The Republicans included previously Democratic language 
about supporting Israel, because it was a democracy and an ally.  The Republicans would 
also adopt language for the first time condemning the U.N. for being anti-Israel.  This 
would become standard Republican language.   The Republicans, also for the first time, 
adopted language speaking of America’s “shared values” with Israel.  The Republicans 
dropped the  
“shared values” language after 1984, but the Democrats started using it in1988 and have 
continued to use it ever since. 
There was one important change to both platforms in 1984 presumably as a result 
of the Reagan administration’s controversial sale of AWACS panes to Saudi Arabia.   
Both parties decided for the first time to include language guaranteeing that Israel’s 
“qualitative edge” over all its adversaries would be preserved.  This phrase has become a 
staple of almost all future platforms and an important rhetorical commitment within both 
parties to the nature of the “special relationship.”  It clearly represents a new level of 
commitment to Israel that had not previously been made. 
 In 1988, the political language of both parties remained quite similar.  
Stylistically, the Democratic Party downsized its platform across the board and 
eliminated a lot of the specific detail -- which for the most part would return in later 
years. They essentially trimmed their platform to one run-on sentence in which they 
restored the phrase “special relationship” (which they had first used in 1976 platform) 
and adopted the phrase “shared values.”  These phrases have appeared in every 
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Democratic platform since, while never being used by the Republicans.  Other language 
previously used by the Democrats seems to have been dropped out of a desire for brevity 
rather than real changes in party positions.  The Republican language and commitments 
remained virtually identical to that used by Reagan in their preceding two platforms.  
They renewed a specific commitment to oppose the creation of a Palestinian state, which 
they had first mentioned in their 1980 platform. 
 Surprisingly, the end of the Cold War did very little to change the 1992 party 
platforms planks on Israel.  Longstanding calls for the release of Soviet Jews -- who were 
now free to immigrate to Israel -- and references to the Cold War context were dropped.  
Both parties dropped their opposition to negotiating with the PLO following the 
precedent set by the 1991 Madrid conference.  Also, in the context of the victory of 
democracy over communism, both parties restored references to supporting Israel, 
because of its commitment to democracy. 
 Despite many changes in the Middle East including the advent of the Oslo peace 
process, little changed in the 1996 platforms.  The only significant change seemed to be 
that the Republicans officially dropped their opposition to a Palestinian state.   
 The 2000 platforms were written around the time of the Camp David Peace 
conference and before the outbreak of the renewed violence of the Second Intifada.  Both 
parties maintained the established patterns of previous platforms.  The Republicans 
included language (dropped in 1996) criticizing the UN for being anti-Israel and added 
language criticizing the Red Cross for being anti-Israel – both themes would reappear in 
2004.  In the context of the upcoming Camp David II negotiations, both parties 
 
 -244-
unsurprisingly included nearly identical language opposing a “unilateral declaration of 
Palestinian statehood.” 
 By 2004, the situation in the Middle East had been transformed by the 2nd 
Intifada, September 11th and the U.S.  invasion of Iraq.  In the wake of the President 
Bush’s shift of U.S. policy in 2002, both parties committed themselves to the eventual, 
conditional creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.  The themes of the 2004 
platform and the understanding of the U.S.-Israel relationship remain remarkably similar 
to what they have been rhetorical since the early 1980s despite the immense changes in 
the region and the world since that time.  Both parties have remained committed to some 
sort of peace settlement although the nature of that settlement has evolved somewhat over 
time.  Both parties have remained fundamentally committed to defending Israel’s right to 
exist, safeguarding its security, and protecting its “qualitative edge” over its adversaries.  
They continue to remain committed to Israel because of its shared democratic values, its 
continuing friendship, and its strategic value. 
There was, however, one remarkable change in the platforms.  Since 1980, both 
parties had consistently described the U.S.-Israel alliance as a “strategic” asset or 
“strategic” interest of the United States.  This key language disappeared from the 
Democratic platform in 2000 and was absent from both party platforms in 2004. Both 
parties stopped claiming that Israel provided a strategic advantage to them and instead 
asserted that the “special relationship” was based on a commitment to democracy, and 
other shared values.  As the Bush platform asserted in 2000, “we must ensure that Israel 
remains safe and secure.”  The political language of these documents, particularly in the 
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wake of September 11th, suggests that defending and securing Israel has at least 
rhetorically become a value in and of itself that the United States undertakes, because it 
conforms to American values, independent of any strategic advantage that the United 
States might gain by doing so.  Subconsciously, it seems that the security of Israel is no 
longer viewed as a means to a strategic end, but as an end in and of itself. 
In this context, with little or no organized Arab-American community to offer a 
competing bastion of votes to the parties, the differences between the parties over policy 
towards Israel mostly evaporated into a contest that is more about culturally-nuanced 
politics than strategic interests.  While the platforms continued to speak of Israel’s 
strategic importance to the United States -- even after the Cold War -- they also 
increasingly emphasized the moral commitment to the Jewish state and the sense of 
shared values.  In some sense, criticism of Israel or Israeli policies was pushed fringes of 
the American political spectrum.  The mainstreams of both parties -- albeit for differing 
political reasons -- have grown increasingly unequivocal in their commitment to Israel’s 
security as a value in and of itself. They have also grown increasingly unwilling to 
express even the slightest substantive of criticism of Israeli government actions -- even 
when these actions, such as Israeli settlement expansion, undermine the peace process to 
which the United States has been nominally committed to for decades. 
While the framework of events, threats, and situations has changed radically since 
1980 -- including the end of the Cold War and the rise of the “War on Terror,” the 
political framework of the U.S.-Israel relationship simply adjusts to the new events, takes 
them into consideration, and maintains continuity and inertia with the past. It is now quite 
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clear that the rhetoric of the U.S.-Israel alliance is a product of American culture rather 





Chapter 7 - The Role of the Jewish Community 
“They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. 
Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war 
anymore.” -- Isaiah 2:4 & Micah 4:3  
  
 As we have seen, the most important cultural institution for shaping and 
interpreting Israel for the public and the policymaking elites is the Jewish community.  
The Jewish community has acted as a filtering device that has defined Israel’s role as a 
benign friendly ally that is compatible with American culture, values, and beliefs.  In so 
doing, the Jewish community has also emerged as a body that can provide policymakers 
with legitimacy and credibility in a complex, contested, and emotional policy arena.  
The pro-Israel Lobby, which mostly as an extension of the mainstream of the Jewish 
community, provides policymakers with financial and electoral support.  The Lobby also 
provides policymakers with information so that they can easily interpret complex events 
thousands of miles away.  Of course, not surprisingly, the pro-Israel lobby provides 
policymakers with an extremely mythologized interpretation of Israel that reinforces 
their cultural pre-dispositions and thus promotes its own policy agenda.   
 While the most important diplomatic decisions regarding U.S. engagement in 
the peace process are made by Constitutional design in the Executive Branch, most of 
the hue and cry of public debate around the Israeli-Palestinian occurs at the other end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue in the hallowed halls of the U.S. Congress.  Thus in order to 
examine the role of the Jewish community it is most useful to look at its role influencing 
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the public debate within Congress which shapes the contours of the policy debate for the 
Executive Branch.  
 Congress and the Jewish Community.  In this model, Congress, like the 
political parties discussed above, is viewed as primarily an intervening and filtering 
institution.   While most of the policy decisions about the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process are made in the executive branch a great deal of the debate that shapes the 
context of those decisions occurs in Congress and most particularly in the nexus between 
the Congress and the American Jewish community.  This raises the question of how the 
Jewish community, operating in a Post-Cold War context without an overwhelming 
strategic imperative for the U.S. to support Israel, is able to be so effective at influencing 
the policies of the U.S. government in support of Israel’s priorities. 
The Congress’s direct role is U.S. foreign policy is relatively limited and focused 
around budget authority -- in this case, particularly the annual foreign aid budget.  
However, given the opaqueness of the Executive Branch decision-making processes, 
much of the public debate and discussion of the peace process occurs within the 
Legislative Branch.  This has a significant affect in shaping the milieu of American 
foreign policy decision-making.  The cultural and political context in which each 
administration operates is shaped -- to one degree or another -- by views discussed and 
debated in Congress.  Since the Executive Branch has limited contact with the broader 
public, the Congress acts as a filtering device which listens to, sorts out, and brings the 
voices of constituents to the Executive Branch via legislation -- both substantive and often 
symbolic, public and private letters from members of Congress, public hearings, floor 
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debates, direct discussions, and public appearances. Inevitably, the views within Congress 
are shaped by both its perception of America’s strategic interests and its interaction with 
variety of interest groups representing many points of view. So while the Congress’s 
direct role is often limited, it does serve to transmit the values, ideas, and concerns of its 
constituents to the President and his administration. Almost invariably, the views that it 
transmits to the Executive Branch on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reflective of the 
consensus views of the leadership of the Jewish community.  As will be discussed below, 
the views of the leadership of the American Jewish community are often more reflective 
of the views of the leaders of the existing Israeli coalition government than that of the 
majority of American Jews. 
The politics that inform the manner in which America’s strategic interests in the 
Middle East, and in particular around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are interpreted by 
Congress and transmitted to the Executive Branch are largely shaped by American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its allies in the American Jewish community.  As 
noted in chapter 1, the role of AIPAC’s “stealth PACs” certainly play a role in providing 
AIPAC activists and supporters with easier access and sympathetic ears from members of 
Congress and their staff, but this role is limited by campaign finance laws to a few million 
dollars during each 2-year election cycle spread out among many members of Congress.  
The money gets their lobbyists and supporters in the door of Congressional offices and 
this often helps them get their specific messages across to members of Congress -- 
particularly those members of Congress who are already receiving campaign donations, 
because they are already sympathetic to AIPAC’s views.  
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While campaign donations are relatively limited, AIPAC and its allies are able to 
spend essentially unlimited  -- other than the limits of their fundraising apparatus -- are the 
amounts of time, money, and effort on educating and informing members of Congress 
through lobbying and advocacy.  Much of AIPAC’s success is rooted in skilled use of the 
tools available to it.  According to one recent analysis, AIPAC’s annual budget was 
recently estimated at roughly $33.4 million.  It has 85,000 to 100,000 members, a staff of 
165 and offices in 10 regional offices and in Israel.289  This amount dwarfs the amount that 
the “Stealth PACs” are able to spend on campaign contributions.  In fact, the amount of 
money going into the so-called Stealth PACs has been dropping steadily from a peak of 
around $5 million in the 1988 electoral cycle to about $3 million in 2006 electoral cycle in 
spite of inflation.  AIPAC uses its resources to provide members of Congress with 
information and to shape their perceptions of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
They bring thousands of supporters to their Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC 
to lobby members of Congress.  They also specialize in using the access that they have 
obtained to network and build on-going relationship with members and their staffs.  This 
allows their supporters to provide members with information and guidance on how to 
understand and interpret Israel and its role in the Middle East.  Not surprisingly, they 
provide the members of Congress and their staffs with the most benign interpretations of 
Israel’s actions -- based on their own deeply sympathetic viewpoints.  At the AIPAC 
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policy conference, participants are trained to stick to very carefully prepared talking 
points.  Furthermore, AIPAC and their allies regularly provide Capitol Hill briefings on 
the Middle East to members and their staffs.  Through a supporting organization called the 
American Israel Education Foundation, AIPAC provide members and their staffs with 
educational trips to Israel where they are a shown AIPAC’s selective interpretation of 
political, military, and historical reality.290  Their work is actually made very easy, because 
most of the members and their staffs are already sympathetic to their viewpoints.  As one 
AIPAC staffer explained to a researcher in 1992: 
The product itself -- the latest public opinion poll -- shows that 80 percent 
of the American people support aid to Israel.  We have a product that the 
average American is willing to support.   We get involved with all 
(members) regardless of party, but the issue is that the product is a sellable 
product.  We don’t convince them of things if they didn’t think it made 
sense. 291 
 
Since most of the members of Congress and their staffs have already been culturally 
conditioned to see Israel as a vital strategic asset, it is relatively easy to sell them on 
legislative priorities that are framed as being “pro-Israel.”   In a larger sense, they rely on 
the reality that most members are not experts on the Middle East and, having to deal with 
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dozens of issues each session, often vote on the basis of limited information and 
knowledge filtered through their staff members and informed by their existing pre-
conceptions.  The simple conclusion is that while campaign contributions are a factor in 
candidate thinking they do not dictate how members vote on these issues. 
Politically speaking, there is no foreign policy lobby widely considered more 
influential than AIPAC as the primary voice of the mainstream of the American Jewish 
Community.292  AIPAC, however, does not act as the singular voice of the mainstream 
Jewish community in Congress.  Although it has been in some sense the lead 
organization in shaping the Jewish message to Congress over last 30 years, there are 
literally dozens of American Jewish organizations --  mostly headquartered in DC --  that 
regularly lobby Congress including, but not limited to:  Jewish Council for Public Affairs 
(which represents the Jewish Community Relations Councils across the country), 
numerous local Jewish Federations, the American Jewish Committee, the Zionist 
Organization of America (representing the far right), the Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL), the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting (CAMERA), Americans 
for a Safe Israel, the Israel Project, Palestine Media Watch, the Middle East Media 
Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the various 
Rabbinical and lay bodies of the Reform, Conservative movements, a variety of Orthodox 
movements, and a large number of local rabbis and congregations around the country.  
Recently, the formation of Christians United for Israel (CUFI) has brought an organized 
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fundamentalist Christian voice that acts as a Christian ally in support of AIPAC’s 
positions on Israel.293  While there are certainly nuances among these groups, by and large, 
they have consistently spoken to Congress with a singular voice in asking the United 
States to provide Israel with practically unquestioned economic, political, diplomatic, and 
military support. 
One of the key components of the coalition described above are the local religious 
institutions -- both Jewish and Christian -- that transmit much of the broad contours of 
AIPAC’s message back to local communities in practically every corner of the country.  
Local religious institutions offer an important filtering device for their parishioners, and 
sometimes the broader community, in attempting to contextualize the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict both theologically and politically.  The above-mentioned CUFI actually defines 
its primary mission as educating “Christians on the biblical and moral imperatives of 
supporting Israel.”294 While the Fundamentalist Christian right is not the only Christian 
voice speaking about Israel, it is by far the most outspoken. 
 A similar situation exists with Jewish religious and secular institutions.  
Synagogues and Jewish Federations are highly engaged in the process of educating both 
the Jewish community, and the broader gentile community, about Israel and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  However, most of their educational programming around Israel for 
                                                 
 
293 http://www.cufi.org/.  See also David Brog.  Standing with Israel.  (New York: 
Frontline, 2006).  Brog is Christians United for Israel’s Executive Director.  The Founder 






both children and adults is filtered through the above-mentioned mainstream Jewish 
organizations (including AIPAC) and the extensive Israel’s consular network in the 
United States.  Their message is one that is designed to promote conformity with 
community norms.  While there are occasional exceptions, most of their educational work 
tends to reinforce the mythologies of the existing cultural framework rather than 
encourage any sort of healthy skepticism.  
 As suggested by the Adler memo (cited above in Chapter 4), the Jewish 
community has long attempted to speak to the U.S. government with a singular voice 
about Israel.  The American Jewish community has also long defined support for Israel as 
support for the policies of each democratically-elected government of Israel almost 
regardless of content of those policies.  Even when many of the members of the Jewish 
community personally disagree with specific Israeli policies, the American Jewish 
communal organizations have almost always spoken publicly and to the U.S. Congress in 
a singularly unified voice that asks for American support of Israeli policies.  For example, 
this was particularly evident in 2005 when many American Jews were deeply distrustful 
of Ariel Sharon decision to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip.  With the 
exception of a few far right organizations, the mainstream Jewish organization offered 
wide-ranging support for Ariel Sharon’s policies that many were personally skeptical of.  
In many cases, the reasoning for this approach is imbedded in the assumption that most 
American Jews are not Israeli citizens and that Israelis and their leaders know what’s best 
for Israel.  




A peculiar irony of this situation is that public opinion research consistently 
shows that the views of American Jews are often quite different from those of the Israeli 
government whose views they often public articulate.  As J.J. Goldberg, editor of the 
Forward has noted:  “a majority of American Jews favor Palestinian statehood, and that a 
significant majority favor ceding a significant amount of territory on the West Bank and 
withdrawing from the settlements.”295  The 2006 Annual Survey of American Jewish 
Opinion confirmed a viewpoint that by-and-large has been consistent among American 
Jews.  That poll found that when American Jews were asked “In the current situation, do 
you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?”  54% favored a Palestinian 
state while only 38% opposed one.296   
The leading Jewish organizations that speak for the Jewish community have 
defined being “pro-Israel” as reflecting the view of the Israeli government rather 
reflecting an independent analysis of what is in the best interests of the Israeli people or 
world Jewry.  This definition has also been broadly accepted by the vast majority of 
members of the U.S. Congress, which consistently votes by overwhelming margins in 
support of policies priorities shaped by AIPAC and its allies that strongly favor the 
policies implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the Israeli government.  In recent years, this 
has included support for moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 
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supporting the construction of the security barrier, placing sanctions on Syria and Iran 
and providing billions of unrestricted dollars of foreign aid to Israel while placing severe 
restrictions on the limited supply of aid money provided to the Palestinian Authority.  All 
of these efforts act in affect to place the United States government squarely in support of 
Israeli government positions and reinforce Israeli resistance to advancing the Middle East 
peace process.  
At this stage, it is useful to consider voting patterns among the members of 
Congress to see whether there are any particular demographics, party affiliations, or 
geographic affiliations that lead members of Congress more-or-less likely to support 
AIPAC’s priorities in Congress.  A statistical analysis of voting patterns in the U.S. 
House of Representatives during the 108th and 109th Congresses is highly suggestive of 
the relationship between Congressional voting and interest groups. (See a summary in 
Appendix G)  In this study, members were ranked depending on whether they supported 
political positions that favored progressive political positions that supported the Middle 
East peace process as compared to whether they supported the priorities of AIPAC and 
other right-wing groups that advocated positions that undermined the ability to advance 
the peace process.  While such analysis is somewhat subjective, the patterns produced 
were remarkably clear. 
 Republican members of Congress, with a few significant exceptions, were much 
more likely to vote for AIPAC’s preferred positions than Democrats.  This is initially 
surprising since the Jewish community overwhelming votes for Democrats.  The most 




likely explanation is that the strong and growing influence of both the religious right and 
the neo-conservative foreign policy of the Bush administration have shaped the thinking 
of Republicans members.  While AIPAC used to be closer to the Democratic Party, there 
has been a clear trend towards the Republicans, and particularly the neo-Conservatives, 
since the Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress in 1994.297  Male 
members vote for AIPAC’s positions more than female.  This is most probably simply 
because the female members of Congress are more likely to be Democrats.  For similar 
reasons, African-American, Hispanic, and Asian members of Congress are less likely to 
support AIPAC’s positions. In terms of religion, Jews and members of more 
Conservative protestant Churches are more likely to agree with AIPAC’s positions. 
The most intriguing pattern is of regional and state voting patterns.  The U.S. 
House members for those states typically referred to as “red states” -- states that voted for 
Republican George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 -- overwhelmingly voted in favor of 
AIPAC positions.  These are mostly states, which typically, also have Republican-
dominated Congressional delegations.  Broadly speaking these are states in the South and 
the West.  This is suggestive of the degree to which the vast majority of Republican 
members of Congress support AIPAC’s positions, which coincides with the positions 
aggressively advocated by the religious right and neo-conservatives on this issue. 
By contrast almost all of the states whose Congressional delegations voted for 
pro-peace positions were states that voted for the Democratic Party in the Presidential 
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election (or so-called “Blue” states) and have mostly Democratic representatives in 
Congress.  There were, however, several intriguing exceptions to this rule.  There are 
several Democratic-dominated states where members of Congress voted in a manner that 
was much more in favor of AIPAC’s positions.   This pattern was most pronounced in 
New York, New Jersey, and Florida (a state that is typical closely divided between 
Democrats and Republicans in Presidential voting).  This pattern is visible to a lesser 
degree in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Connecticut. 
The initial hypothesis that these were all states with relatively large Jewish 
populations turned out to be only partially explanatory.  While all of these Democratic-
leaning states had Jewish populations of at least 2%, so did California, Massachusetts and 
Illinois whose members of the House of Representatives had much more anti-AIPAC 
oriented voting records.  However, the pattern of voting for AIPAC’s positions in 
Congress correlated highly with having a high percentage of Orthodox synagogues in the 
state.  The pattern was particularly strong in the northeastern states of New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland.  States with more Orthodox synagogues than Reform 
synagogues are much more likely to have representatives that vote in favor AIPAC’s 
positions in Congress.  Intuitively this thesis makes senses, because the Orthodox Jewish 
communities, while generally smaller, are more tightly knit, well-organized, closely 
connected to Israel, highly politically homogenous, and generally highly supportive of 
right-wing Israeli policies such as West Bank settlement expansion on religious grounds.  
In some Hasidic communities, particularly in New York, the communities are known for 




bloc voting for particular candidates designated by their rabbinic leadership.  The likely 
explanation is that well-organized Orthodox communities are able to skew the debate 
within the larger Jewish community so that the voices that members of Congress in those 
states hear from a variety of sources are more likely to be in favor of unfettered support 
for Israeli policies.  In states like Massachusetts, California, Washington, and Oregon, 
where the Orthodox communities are smaller and the progressive Jewish voices are 
stronger and better organized, members of Congress are more likely to be far less 
responsive to AIPAC political priorities around Israel.  They are more likely to 
responsive to the progressive Jewish voices that they are more likely to hear.  As is often 
the case, members of Congress are more likely to be responsive not to lightly-held, 
softly-spoken majority in their communities, but rather to voices of well-organized, 
intensely interested, highly outspoken subgroups within their constituencies and 
surrounding constituencies. 
In this context, the role of New York City plays particularly interesting element in 
the existing cultural framework that shapes the U.S.-Israel alliance.  New York’s Jewish 
community -- largest Jewish community in the country -- seems to act as a culture filter. 
New York City’s politics and history are particularly closely linked to the Jewish 
community and through the Jewish community to Israel.  For example, New York 
politicians often campaign for Jewish votes by visiting Israel and promising American 
Jews that they will work to keep Israel safe and secure.  In one particularly peculiar 
incident in 1995, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani expelled Palestinian leader Yasser 
Arafat from a concert at Lincoln Center that New York City was hosting to celebrate the 
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50th anniversary of the United Nations.  The issue of Israel’s security is deeply connected 
to political life in New York where the Jewish community has an omnipresent cultural 
role. 
By coincidence, New York also happens to be location of most America’s media. 
America’s paper of record, the New York Times, is owned by a Jewish family and often 
gives what many critics would suggest is disproportionate attention to issues involving 
Israel.  Logically, this would seem to be because it has many Jewish editors, writers, and 
readers.  Stories from the New York Times are often reprinted in local papers and cited 
on network and cable news broadcasts.  The major network news broadcasts also 
originate from studios in Manhattan.  Many network and cable news program originate in 
New York.  Many late night comedians, who are often political barometers, such as 
Saturday Night Live and the Daily Show, record their shows in New York City.  Much of 
theatrical world is centered there.  The vast majority of major book and many music 
publishers are also based in New York.  While the largest concentration of the film 
industry is in Hollywood -- where Jews are also overrepresented -- New York remains the 
2nd largest center for movie production and financing.  Although they not usually thought 
of as cultural barometers, New York is also central to the financial markets and banking 
industry -- which are surely important in transmitting some form of capitalistic values to 
the rest of the country.  Thus ideas and trends that are important to New York including 
much about the cultural role of American Jews and Israel is transmitted through New 
York’s filter to the rest of the country.  Although its an almost impossible to prove 
definitively, most commentators would agree that the September 11th attacks were 
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targeted at the World Trade Center, because it had become such an overwhelmingly 
powerful cultural icon of American capitalism.  Of course, the September 11th attacks 
reverberated across the country in ways great and small.  September 11th has undoubtedly 
further elevated emotional connection of most Americans to their largest city and likely 
increased the sense of empathy and connection that many Americans felt for its dominant 
ethnic group. 
In some sense, New York has become the filter for much America’s secular 
culture, while the Bible -- as discussed above -- remains the filter for much of American 
religious culture.  Coincidentally, Israel and Jews are positioned to play privileged roles 
in both these generally contrasting narratives of American society.  While it perhaps too 
simplistic, one could argue that New York is the primary filter through which much of 
the basically positive secular images of Jews, particularly well-known Jewish celebrities, 
are transmitted to secular liberal “blue state” voters.  At the same time, the Bible acts as a 
filtering device for presenting the Jews as God’s “Chosen people” in many of the 
messages transmitted to conservative Christian “red state” voters.  In this context, it is not 
surprising that the public opinion data cited above indicates that for many decades 
Americans have had overwhelming positive opinions of both of Israel and Israelis and 
negative views of their adversaries.  The two of the largest and usually contrasting 
streams of thought within American culture unexpectedly converge with positive and 
sympathetic views of Jews and Israel.  As has been described above, there are significant 
differences in the nuanced pictures that each side of the culture war has of Israel, but both 
filter create overwhelmingly positive images. 
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The Holocaust and Jewish Identity.  Let us now briefly consider how the 
American Jewish identity shapes the behavior of American Jews and how they behave 
politically in regard to Israel.  The description in Chapters 2 and 3 and provides a context 
for the looking at the unique role that the American Jewish community has played in 
shaping the cultural framework that surrounds American foreign policy towards Israel.  
The framework of the Holocaust experience has in many ways become the defining 
narrative of the modern Jewish history that most clearly shapes the Jewish connection to 
both Israel and America.  Most Jews, even those not directly affected by the Nazi 
genocide, share certain elements of the mentality of Holocaust survivors.298  Zygmunt 
Bauman wrote that: 
Half-a-century has passed since the victory of the Allied troops put an 
abrupt end to Hitler’s “final solution of the Jewish question” -- but the 
memory of the Holocaust goes on polluting the world of the living, and the 
inventory of its insidious poisons seems anything but complete.  We are 
all to some degree possessed by that memory, though the Jews among us, 
the prime targets of the Holocaust, are perhaps more than most.  For Jews 
especially, living in a world contaminated with the possibility of a 
Holocaust rebounds time and again in fear and horror.  To many, the 
world appears suspect at the core; no worldly event is truly neutral -- each 
event is burdened with sinister undertones, each contains an ominous 
message for the Jews, a message that can be overlooked or played down 
only to the Jews’ own peril.... The percept of staying alive as the sole thing 
that counts, as the supreme value that dwarfs all other values, is among the 
most tempting, and the most common, interpretations of the lesson..... 
humankind is divided into the victims and the victimizers, and so if you 
are (or expect to be) a victim, your task is to reverse the tables (“the 
stronger lives”).  It is this lesson that the specter of the Holocaust whispers 
into many ears....  The pernicious legacy of the Holocaust is that today’s 
persecutors may inflict new pains and create new generations of victims 
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eagerly awaiting their chance to do the same. While acting under the 
conviction that they avenge yesterday’s pain and ward off the pains of 
tomorrow -- while being convinced, in other words, that ethics is on their 
side.  This is perhaps the most awesome among the Holocaust’s curses and 
the greatest of Hitler’s posthumous victories.299 
For many Jews, both in the United States and in Israel, each threat to the security 
of the state of Israel -- including terrorism -- is widely viewed as an existential threat to 
the survival of the Jewish people.  Given the enormity of the Holocaust, it is hardly 
surprising that the Jews, even those living safely and securely in the United States, should 
suffer from an exaggerated traumatic fear of persecution.  Nor is sympathy among 
Americans -- who failed to help the Jews -- particularly surprising.  In the United States, 
the Holocaust almost completely de-legitimized anti-Semitism and broadly legitimated 
the right of the Jews to a state of their own.  The result from an American perspective is a 
bit ironic.  Israel was created to protect Jews from anti-Semitism experienced in the West, 
but the very anti-Semitism that American Jews feared began to disappear as a result of 
the very same horrific events that also legitimized the creation of that state.  As a result, 
only a small trickle of American Jews has actually immigrated to Israel during the past 
half-century. 
Ironically, the impact of the Holocaust, and the centuries of religious persecution 
that preceded it, is that Jews in both America and Israel are as safe and secure as they 
have ever been, but are almost completely unable to perceive of themselves as being 
secure.  The Holocaust wiped out one-third of World Jewry and destroyed its most 
                                                 
299
  Bauman, Zygmunt.  “The Holocaust’s Life as a Ghost.”  Tikkun.  (Vol. 33, 
No. 4, July/August 1998):  33, 36. 
 
 -264-
vibrant political and cultural center -- the Yiddish culture of Eastern Europe.   The trauma 
of these events has left a mark on Jewish identity that has redefined Jewish conceptions 
of self.  Even those who were not direct survivors of the Holocaust share some sense of 
the feeling of fear and powerlessness with the survivors.   The community itself might be 
said to be a survivor.  Historian David Biale notes in his analysis of the history of Jewish 
power and powerlessness that: 
The Jewish tradition...is strangely unhistorical.  The traditional Jew sees 
his history as through the lens of memory, for which all events are cyclical 
recurrences of ancient archetypes.  One might say that this very notion of a 
recurring Jewish destiny remained deeply rooted even in [the first Israeli 
Prime Minister David] Ben Gurion, the most secular of Zionists: in 
attempting to revolt against this destiny, Ben Gurion accepted the 
traditional view of recurrent cycles.... If Jews typically see themselves as 
less powerful than they really are, anti-Semites....portray them [Jews] as 
much more powerful.... Afraid of feeding these bizarre delusions, many 
Jews shrink from acknowledging the actual power they possess.  The 
reality...lies somewhere between Jewish fear and anti-Semitic fantasy.  
Traumatic historical memories play as great a role in the Jews’ 
misperception of their contemporary power.  Every nation labors under the 
burden of its own history, caught in the tensions between its understanding 
of history and current political realities; these tensions are often the cause 
of misguided political decisions.... For Jews, contemporary political 
problems return inevitably and fatefully to the Holocaust, the final 
denouement of European Jewish history.  The Jews have classically 
defined their history as unique, and in many ways it is.  Their 
vicitimization by the Nazis revived anew the sense of uniqueness, at a 
time when ideologies of “normalization” had begun to undermine the 
concept of a Chosen People.  For many, the return of Jews to sovereignty 
could be understood only against the backdrop of the Holocaust, the 
epitome of the powerlessness of a powerless people:  the Holocaust 
became a metaphor for the special character of all Jewish history, and only 
Jewish sovereignty could be a response to this condition of impotence.300 
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In the past half-century, American Jews have achieved remarkable success and 
prominence in American life -- particularly in academia, publishing, the law, the media, 
politics, and entertainment -- both TV and film.  All of these fields play major roles in 
shaping public opinion.  In so doing, American Jews have through a process of almost 
subconscious osmosis grafted their perception of their own powerlessness and 
vulnerability and of Israel’s on to the American national psyche -- a form of “false 
consciousness,” if you will. 
This unique sense of consciousness was not created out of a desire to control 
others or to increase the power and influence of the group.  Rather the Jewish 
consciousness is a product of a genuine, albeit at times irrational, traumatic fears of 
persecution rooted in a long history Jewish powerlessness and persecution.  While it is 
not entirely rational to believe that history is forever cyclical, it is indeed very human.  
Again, Former Vice-President Gore seems to encapsulate the images of Jewish history 
that have been transmitted into the American psyche.  In 1998, he told AIPAC’s National 
Policy Conference in somewhat hyperbolic language of the relationship between the 
Jewish history of victimization and his support for Israel: 
I reaffirm my own faith in God, and I am inspired by the fact that the 
Jewish faith is unfailing even though the Jewish people have endured 
more suffering and more injustice than any other people in the history of 
this earth.... I believe, and the people of the United States of America 
believe, that when a people endure over 40 centuries of suffering -- 
enslavement by the pharaohs, wanderings in Canaan, destruction in Judah, 
captivity in Babylon, oppression by the Romans, expulsion again, 
persecutions and sufferings and pogroms, culminating in the unspeakably 
horrific frenzy of evil at the hands of the Nazis -- justice demands a home, 
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demands a state, demands for them security -- peace with security, 
enduring.301 
Within this larger cultural context of Manichean struggle between good and evil, 
the Holocaust is held up as the greatest example of the struggle between good and evil 
and the Jews as history’s greatest victim.  This mental construct is then applied to the 
modern-day Middle East of which most Americans have a very limited understanding.  
Few ordinary Americans are able to make the mental jump that the historical condition of 
the Jewish people has been transformed greatly by the creation of an independent Jewish 
state.  Jewish victimhood serves as a basis for justifying, defending and rationalizing 
most actions taken by Israel as “self-defense.”   Within this sort of cultural paradigm, is a 
self-reinforcing component.  Often times, criticism of Israeli policies and actions are 
labeled as not only “anti-Israel,” but often as “anti-Semitic.”  This creates greater barriers 
of hyper-sensitivity making it that much more difficult to challenge a cultural 
construction of political reality.  In recent years, the rise in anti-Semitic attacks in Europe 
and the extremist rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been widely 
used to reinforce Jewish fears and strengthen the existing cultural paradigm. 
Thus, America’s “special relationship” with the State of Israel has become a part 
of America’s civil religion.  Gradually America’s sense of political and moral obligation 
to Israeli survival and security has become the paramount concern of American foreign 
policy in the Middle East.  Many Americans feel a moral obligation not just to the Israeli 
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state, but to the protecting the Israeli people from further pain and suffering.  American 
strategic interests in the region have thus been defined in culturally-contingent terms.  
Areas of strategic convergence and divergence are compartmentalized so as not to 
negatively impact the on-going vitality of the political alliance.  The convergence of all 
of these cultural factors -- the rise of the religious right, the decline of anti-Semitism, the 
increasingly negative stereotypes of Arabs and Islam, and the pernicious aftereffects of 
the Holocaust -- have enhanced a climate of cultural intimacy and moral obligation to the 
Jewish State.  This leads to an inherent sympathy for Israel within the American political 
establishment and the American public as a whole.  Peter Grose’s Israel in the Mind of 
America, which focuses on the fascinating historical relationship between America and 
the pre-state Zionist movement, summarizes the peculiar relationship between America 
and the Israel: 
Liking it or not, Americans who are willing to look see something of 
themselves in Israel.  Even as they go their own way, in pursuit of their 
own national interests, Americans and Israelis are bonded together like no 
two other sovereign peoples.  As the Judaic heritage flowed through the 
minds of America’s early settlers and helped to shape the new American 
republic, so Israel restored adopted the vision and the values of the 
American dream.  Each, the United States and Israel, grafted the heritage 
of the other onto itself.302 
It is as if Americans and Israelis looking at each other through a mirror, or 
perhaps a prism, and see a reflection of themselves in the other.  It is these perceived 
bonds that actually anchor the often misunderstood “special relationship.”  Americans 
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Christians see the Jews as sharing their Judeo-Christian values and feel some guilty over 
the awful suffering that Christian have inflicted upon the Jewish people over centuries. 
Thus American political culture humanizes Jews and dehumanizes Arabs.  While Jewish 
suffering resonates with the American public, the suffering of dehumanized Arabs and 
Muslims is so often overlooked.  To Americans, Jews are real people -- their favorite 
actors and comedians, their doctor, their lawyer and their friends and neighbors; while 
conversely Arabs and Muslims are often seen as distant negative violent stereotyped 
abstractions.  These images have allowed Americans to focus on Israel’s virtues and 
ignore and/or rationalize Israel’s vices. 
As a result, American policy towards Israel is compartmentalized on the basis of 
cultural predispositions stemming from the contours of American domestic political 
culture.  Those areas of strategic agreement and shared interest between the U.S. and 
Israel are emphasized -- particularly in Congress.  Those areas are defined as central to 
the relationship and through a process of selective collective memory continually 
reinforced resulting is in an ever-increasing sense intimacy and cooperation.  Conversely, 
areas of strategic disagreement -- particularly issues involving the Middle East peace 
process -- are often downplayed and defined as peripheral to the maintenance of the 
overall relationship.  It is only within such a political culture that Jewish suffering can be 
privileged and the suffering other peoples minimized.  It is only within this sort of 
political culture that the lobbying efforts of AIPAC could succeed in maintaining a 
consistently high support for Israel with the American public and within the U.S. 
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government.  And it is these unique cultural bonds that make possible the special, and 
truly unique, political alliance between the United States and the State of Israel. 
Searching for Alternative Voices.303   Another part of the answer as to why 
AIPAC’s voice is so dominant in American political debate is that the nature of 
America’s political and mass culture has simply foreclosed the presence of significant 
alternative political voices.  Unfortunately for those trying to bring about a two-state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, significant structural,  institutional, and 
cultural barriers exist which have made it extremely difficult for the organizations 
seeking to market alterative interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the mass 
public and the political elite.  While such voices do exist, they are often extremely 
marginal and essentially remain politically isolated and ineffective.  Their messages 
generally run counter to mainstream cultural views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
undermining their ability to gain attention in the media and widespread public support.  
They are even further marginalized within the Jewish community, which is most often 
accepted in the public debate as the authoritative voice on the conflict. 
A large part of the explanation is embedded in demographics and immigration 
patterns within American society.  The Arab-American Institute reports that there is a 
population of roughly 3.5 million Arab-Americans.  The older more established part of 
this population is mostly Christians who often doesn’t identify strongly with its Arab 
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 Some of the observations and analysis in this section are based on the author’s 
personal observation and participation in campaigns and efforts of a number of 




heritage or with the struggles of Palestinians -- which is overwhelmingly Muslim.  The 
Muslim-Arab community (including Palestinian-Americans) is mostly 1st and 2nd 
generation immigrants and not yet well positioned economically and socially to offer a 
strong political voice.  The larger community of Muslim-Americans -- estimated at 5 to 6 
million -- is mostly new immigrants as well and mostly from non-Arab countries.  For 
example, the large numbers of Muslims from the Indian subcontinent are more likely to 
identify with issues around Kashmir than the Israeli-Palestinian issues.  Another segment 
of this population is also made up of relatively recent African-American converts to 
Islam. This group is often more interested in issues that directly affect the African-
American underclass in the United States.  The Orientalist and anti-Arab, anti-Islamic 
patterns described above often further undermine the degree to which such groups are 
able to have their voices heard in public debates on American policy towards the Middle 
East. 
Within Congress itself, their voices have also long been marginalized as a result 
of public attitudes and voting patterns.  While the Muslim community is roughly the 
same size as the Jewish community, remarkably, it was not until 2006 that a Muslim-
American, Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN), an African-American convert to Islam, became 
the first Muslim ever elected to the Congress of the United States.
304
  In a telling political 
                                                 
304 There are a few Arab-American Christian members of Congress such as 
Senator John Sununu (R-NH) and Rep. Darrel Issa (R-CA), but their families have all 
been the United States for several generations.  By contrast, there are 30 Jewish members 
of the House of Representatives and 13 Jewish Senators serving in the 110th Congress 




incident, right-wing critics publicly argued that it was inappropriate for Rep. Ellison to 
take his ceremonial oath of office on a Koran rather than a Jewish or Christian Bible.  
One critic wrote that Ellison should not be allowed to do so because “the act undermines 
American civilization.”
305  In a powerful symbolic move that sent the message that Islam 
was as American as Judaism and Christianity, Ellison arranged to take his ceremonial 
oath of office on Thomas Jefferson’s copy of the Koran -- which he borrowed from the 
Library of Congress.   
There are a few small Arab and Islamic organizations that lobby Congress on the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue.  These include Arab-American Institute (AAI), the American 
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), the Palestinian American Congress, and the American Task Force on Palestine.  
All of these organizations lack the resources to pose any sort of coherent alternative voice 
to AIPAC and its allies.  Over time, it seems likely that these newer populations may be 
able to adapt to American society, and as the Jewish population did, find stronger 
political voice, but this is a slow generational process that will likely take decades. 
Nor are the alternative voices coming from secular and interfaith progressive 
organizations particularly promising as means of addressing these issues.  There are a 
plethora of small “anti-Occupation” groups spread across the country.  Most are small 
groups with limited resources that are often as perceived by the larger community as 
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marginal groups with radical agendas.  Most of these groups are loosely associated with 
the U.S. Campaign to End the Occupation which is a small organization with a very 
limited budget, staff, and few resources.  There are a few larger national peace groups 
that address the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the context of broader multi-issue agendas 
including the Network of Spiritual Progressives/Tikkun Community, the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, United for Peace and Justice (mostly an anti-War organization), and some 
progressive Church groups such as the Quaker-based American Friends Service 
Committee and Churches for Middle East Peace.    Thus far, these groups have not been 
able to provide a coherent political alternative that has been able to have significant 
political influence in Congress.  They have lacked the financial resources, supporters, and 
political skills to have a significant effect.  
Many of the local groups associated with the U.S. Campaign focus on ending the 
Occupation without advocating specifically for a two-state solution.  In order to reach out 
to the far leftist activists they often support either a 1-state or a two-state solution.  This 
allows them to bring in the far left, but completely marginalizes them within the Jewish 
community which understands any advocacy of a 1-state solution as a “pro-Palestinian”, 
“anti-Zionist”, “anti-Israel” position.  Without the ability to be heard in any fashion by 
the organized Jewish community, these groups are basically marginalized within the 
mainstream political discourse. 
 Another part of their difficulty is that these groups often use rhetoric that directly 
conflicts with the norms and values of the broader American society in which they 
operate.  For example, they often run campaigns using themes such as “pro-Palestinian” 
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or “anti-Occupation” in which they seek to define Israel as an “apartheid state” or a 
“state-sponsor of terrorism” or “a violator of human rights.” By and large these 
campaigns have been ineffective within both the Jewish community or with the larger 
American public.  They have sought to achieve goals such as having the United States 
force Israel to change its policies by cutting off foreign aid, diplomatic support, weapons 
sales or military cooperation.  They have often operated from the premise that if the U.S.-
Israel alliance was essentially ended and the U.S. stopped supporting the Israeli 
Occupation policies that Israel would be forced to reach a peace agreement with the 
Palestinians.  The underlying assumption is that this is the only way to bring about an end 
to the Israeli Occupation policies.  Arguably, their lack of success is a direct result of 
their failure to understand how deeply imbedded the U.S.-Israel alliance is in American 
culture.  Such campaigns and tactics have by and large reflected the viewpoints of 
marginal, essentially counter-cultural, groups which being estranged from the broader 
American society are unable to create messages with the mass appeal necessary to prove 
politically persuasive.  Regardless of how much truth or fairness such campaigns, 
slogans, organizations may contain, they have proved politically ineffective, because they 
simply run counter to the broad “pro-Israel” consensus within the American body politic.  
Since their views contradict the established cultural framework through which most 
Americans and most members of Congress view the Middle East conflict, their views 
have tended to remain marginalized in the media, public discourse, and within Congress.  
There is little indication that Arab, Muslim, or radical leftist groups are going to be able 
to marshal the extensive economic resources necessary to transform U.S. policy. 
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This research has shown that the Jewish community remains the key group in 
shaping the cultural contours of the political elite’s understanding of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  Thus the last possibility for an alternative voice comes from within 
the Jewish community itself.  As noted above, the American Jewish community usually 
doesn’t assert its own view of the conflict independent of that expressed by the 
government of Israel.  The leading organizations of the American Jewish Community, 
which are supposed to speak for the larger community to Congress and the 
administration, have consistently promoted extremely cautious policies that have tended 
to slow down or oppose the goal of achieving a comprehensive two-state solution.  In so 
doing, they are speaking not as the representatives of the views of American Jewish 
community, which as noted above, consistently supports a two-state solution in public 
opinion polls, but instead presenting the views of the Israeli government through the 
voices of the American Jews.  Thus the American Jewish community consistently turns 
its voice over to the views of the democratically-elected Israeli government and 
consistently forfeits its ability to act as a truly independent actor and articulate its own 
independent view of what policies are in Israel’s best interest.  The broadly accepted 
assumption in the Jewish community is that since American Jews do not choose to live in 
Israel, they have essentially chosen to forfeit their right to speak independently on what 
the “Jewish state” should do and, therefore, should defer to the Israeli government that 
has been elected by the majority of Israeli citizens living in Israel.306 
                                                 
306  Except for members of the diplomatic corps and the military, Israel does not 
have a system of overseas absentee voting.  Israeli citizens who are living or traveling 
abroad at the time of the election are thus not given the option of voting.  Thus voting is 
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These groups that claim to represent the voice of the American Jews are in 
practice basically self-selected leadership.  Consider the most important of these 
organizations, AIPAC.  According to Michael Massing: 
Power rests with the fifty-odd member board of directors, which is selected 
not according to how well they represents AIPAC’s members but according 
to how much money they give and raise.  Reflecting this, the board is thick 
with corporate lawyers, Wall Street investors, business executives, and 
heirs to family fortunes.  With the board itself, power is concentrated in an 
extremely rich subgroup, known as the “minyan club.”  And, within that 
group, four members are dominant:  Robert Asher….Edward 
Levy….Mayer “Bubba” Mitchell; and….Larry Weinberg….Asher, Levy, 
and Mitchell are loyal Republicans; Weinberg is a Scoop Jackson 
Democrat who has moved rightward over the years.  The “Gang of Four,” 
as these men are known, do not share the general interest of a large part of 
Jewish community in promoting peace in the Middle East.  Rather, they 
seek to keep Israel strong, the Palestinians weak, and the United States 
from exerting pressure on Israel.307 
 
Although, Massing doesn’t frame it this way, these wealthy individuals are really 
products of their cultural environment. These men and the organization they lead reflect a 
set of cultural norms that see Israeli actions as consistently benign and 
Palestinian/Arab/Muslim actions as an existential threat to Israeli survival.  Their views 
are deeply reflective of a set of cultural norms that include an Orientalist view of Middle 
East and have been shaped by the trauma of the Holocaust.  They have established 
themselves and AIPAC in the position to speak as the corporate voice of the Jewish 
                                                                                                                                                 
tied to actual residence within the physical boundaries of Israel.  This tends to reinforce 
the idea that Jews living abroad -- whether or not they are Israeli citizens -- do not have 
the right to make decisions for the “Jewish state.” 
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community even thought their views are, in fact, the opposite of what most American 
Jews believe.  This is another reflection of how the most intensely interested groups  -- 
especially if they are well-funded -- are able to dominate political debate.  While the 
majority of the community may disagree with them, they do not have the 
interest/intensity and the money to make their views heard.  So, in essence, a relatively 
small group of wealthy individuals is able to project their own cultural norms as speaking 
as the collective view of the Jewish community.  This is enhanced by the norm within the 
community that it must speak with one voice in support of the policies of the Israeli 
government. 
Since there is a significant gap between what the Jewish community believes 
about the importance of a two-state solution to the Middle East conflict and the message 
that the much of the leadership of the Jewish community transmits in its name to the 
political elites, this seems to be the most promising avenue for development of an 
alternative voice that can challenge the views that are articulated by AIPAC and most of 
the leadership of the Jewish establishment. A division within the community where a 
variety of opinions were expressed rather than a position that almost always express 
views in support of the Israeli government policies could, potently transform the nature of 
the political debate in Congress and, through Congress, in the Executive Branch. 
Over the last several decades there have been several efforts to build Jewish 
political alternatives to AIPAC which have failed.  These include Breira (which means 
the “Alternative” in Hebrew) (1973-1978) and the multi-issue New Jewish Agenda 
(1980-1992).  Both failed due to lack of widespread popular support and funding.  One of 
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the interesting results of the Oslo Peace Process, even though it eventually collapsed as a 
result of its own internal contradictions, is that it changed the way in which American 
Jews viewed the conflict.  In recent years, particularly after the second Intifada, a number 
of American Jewish groups expressing alternative understandings of the conflict have 
begun to emerge on the Jewish political scene.  These include the Washington-based 
Israel Policy Forum, Americans for Peace Now (the American wing of the Israeli peace 
group, Shalom Achshav / Peace Now), Ameinu (the American wing of the Labor Party, 
formerly known as the Labor Zionist Alliance), the New York-based MeretzUSA (the 
American wing of the Meretz party), the more radical San Francisco-based Jewish Voice 
for Peace, the Philadelphia-based Shalom Center, the New York-based student group 
Union of Progressive Zionists, and the Chicago-based grassroots group Brit Tzedek v’ 
Shalom (the Jewish Alliance for Justice Peace).308  Except for the Jewish Voice for Peace, 
all of these groups are committed to resolving the conflict through a two-state solution.  
Combined, all of these groups remain small and limited in their scope and resources.  
They have not yet able been to exercise significant impact on the Jewish community.  
However, for the most part, they are working to challenge and redefine the Jewish 
community’s norms from within rather than from without.  They are gradually gaining 
limited traction within the Jewish community by offering an alternative voice for 
sympathetic members of Congress to listen to.  For example, in 2006, a coalition-led of 
the Israel Policy Forum, Americans for Peace Now, and Brit Tzedek v’ Shalom was able 
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to play a small part in moderating the AIPAC-sponsored Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act 
of 2006, which was initially proposed as a response to Hamas’s victory in the 2006 
Palestinian Parliamentary elections.309  In 2007, these groups are on the verge of passing a 
resolution in the Senate by unanimous consent that would support the appointment of a 
U.S. Middle East peace envoy.310  
The key issue in building an alternative voice to AIPAC within the Jewish 
community remains lack of resources to pose a credible political alternative.  The lack of 
resources of these organizations is due in large part to their inability so far to completely 
reframe the context of the conflict in a manner that is widely acceptable and highly 
engaging to the majority of American Jews and the majority of the American population 
who support the idea of a two-state solution that will preserve the safety and security of 
Israel.  The frame of reference offered by these groups often makes it difficult for them to 
                                                 
309  The Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act was essentially prepared by AIPAC.  
Initially, it was passed overwhelming in the House.  This bill was moderated in the 
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Senate version which was then signed by President Bush.  He attached a signing 
statement which further limited the bill’s effect.  Although these groups played a public 
role in moderating the bill, the opposition of State Department also played a significant 
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310 S.Res.224. A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  This resolution is sponsored by Sen. Dianne Feinstein 
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integrate their ideas within the cultural norms of the Jewish community since most of the 
leadership of these groups comes from radical secular activist culture outside the 
organized Jewish community and often has difficultly fully articulating and expressing 
their views about the conflict in language that is consistent with the norms and values of 
the broader Jewish community and the broader American cultural understanding of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Even when the policy solutions that they offer, such as a two-
state solution, are not particularly radical, they have a difficult time trying to sell their 
ideas to the Jewish community and the wealthy liberal Jewish donors, because the 
language and context that they adopt tends to be radical and disconnected from the 
mainstream culture. Instead of trying to challenge the mainstream cultural norms, which 
change slowly over generations, these groups need to find ways to reinterpret mainstream 
cultural norms in support of the policies that they advocate.  This requires reclaiming 
terms such as “Zionism,” “pro-Israel,” “security,” “strategic interest,” “strengthening 
Israel”  and contextualizing them to support the policies that they are advocating.  If these 
groups are able to frame their policy objectives less in terms of justice for the Palestinians 
and abstract notions of peace and anti-militarism and more in terms of what will allow 
Israel to emerge as a safe, secure, democratic Jewish state that will be better positioned to 
advance American interests in the region, they may be able to begin to untie the Gordian 
knot that has thus far limited their ability to effectively establish a mainstream alternative 
to AIPAC. 
Cultures are large amorphous constructions of historical ideas, images, and values 
and evolve gradually over decades.  Given the construction of values and mythologies 
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about the state of Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Arab/Islamic world there 
is little likelihood that any activist groups will succeed by challenging the cultural norms 
that support the U.S.-Israel relationship.  The security of Israel and safety of Jews are 
simply too deeply ingrained as goals that American public supports.  However, that 
doesn’t mean that there isn’t the political space for the nature of the relationship to 
gradually evolve in different direction.  The U.S.-Israel relationship has, in fact, survived 
and grown in large part because it has proved to be a remarkably flexible political 
construction.  As currently constructed, the immense political influence of the Jewish 
community, the Christian right and the neo-Conservatives within the American political 
system, constricts the ability of the U.S. to use its influence as Israel’s superpower patron 
to make Israel act in a manner that conforms to America’s and Israel’s strategic interest 
in a two-state solution.  As Daniel Levy, a policy advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak, has recently written, “The [pro-Israel] lobby denies Israel something many 
other countries benefit from -- the excuse of external encouragement to do things that are 
politically tricky, but nationally necessary.”311  
From this research, it is clear that the structure of the U.S.-Israel alliance as 
currently defined has prevented progress towards Middle East peace.  However, given the 
                                                 
311 Levy, Daniel.  “So pro-Israel that it hurts.”  International Herald Tribune.  
(April 4, 2006).  Implicit in Levy’s comment is a critique of the political paralysis within 
Israel’s fractious coalition-based political system that suggests that takes responsibility 
off of Israel by suggesting that it would be almost impossible for Israel to move forward 
to make peace on its own without significant U.S. pressure.  This may not be an entirely 
true.  The Oslo Accords, for example, emerged from a backchannel between Israel and 
the Palestinians with little U.S. involvement after the stalemating of the official U.S.-
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flexibility of the construct, it can be extrapolated that the U.S.-Israel alliance does not 
inherently preclude that the alliance from being reconstructed in a manner in which it will 
encourage progress towards a diplomatic solution.  Thus those political actors seeking a 
more diplomatically engaged American policy in support of a two-state solution need to 
find a way to operate within the cultural paradigm of the U.S.-Israel alliance rather than 
attempting to undermine an alliance that is deeply culturally imbedded, has survived 
many serious challenges, and is unlikely to disappear anytime soon.  Thus those who are 
seeking to bring about a two-state solution must find a ways to reinterpret the framework 
of the U.S.-Israel “special relationship” in order to convince the key interest groups, most 
particularly, American Jews, that the Israeli people -- not to mention the American people 
-- will be more secure if Israel pursues a two-state solution rather than a policy of 
continued military occupation.  This requires encouraging American Jews to recognize 
that the long-term best interests of the Israeli people may not always be the policies 
advocated by AIPAC or even those advocated by particular Israeli governments.  
 The best way for the United States to be freed to use its leverage as Israel’s 
patron to achieve a two-state solution is for American Jews, and then thru them the 
American public at large, to reconsider the definition of what it means to take a “pro-
Israel” position.  Under the current definition of being “pro-Israel” the American Jewish 
community acts as the primary force that inhibits U.S. diplomatic engagement in favor of 
a two-state solution.  However, if the meaning of being “pro-Israel” can be redefined 
                                                                                                                                                 
sponsored Washington-based negotiations. Nevertheless, while this issue hasn’t been 
explored in detail in this analysis, the author agrees with much of what Levy is implying. 
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within the American Jewish community and within the broader American culture context 
as a position that promotes an independently-defined best long-term security interests of 
the Israeli people rather than simply the goals of each specific politically-constrained 
Israeli coalition government than the American Jewish community can be empowered to 
act as a force within the American political system to promote, rather than constrain, 
active American engagement in favor of a two-state solution.   
This research suggests that the cultural values and beliefs shared by both the 
American public and policymaking elites are established in a manner that is likely to lead 
to the continuation of the U.S.-Israel alliance for many decades to come.  However, the 
nature of alliance and the relationship of the two states is likely to continue to evolve in 
response to events in ways that are extremely difficult to anticipate.  In recent decades, 
the alliance has acted to constrain the ability of the United States to promote its oft-stated 
long-stated goal of a two-state solution that would, hopefully, lead to a more peaceful, 
more stable region.  Thus those seeking to achieve a two-state solution should look for 
ways to redefine the nature of the commitment and the relationship between the parties in 
ways that can lead to more constructive and positive alliance that will ultimately be more 
mutually beneficial in the long-run for both parties.  The 2008 election will bring a new 
Presidential administration to power which will be faced with immense challenges – 
including many self-inflicted wounds -- in the Middle East.  The great difficulties that the 
U.S. now faces in the Middle East may well create new openings that seem to hold the 
potential for redefining the nature of the U.S.-Israel “special relationship” and, therefore, 




An Agenda for Further Research 
This study has covered a lot of ground and opens up many promising areas for 
further research and study.  Most directly, this has been a study of the importance of 
political culture as a crucial variable in shaping political outcomes.  Unlike many earlier 
studies, it is designed to show the linkages between broad cultural changes and a narrow 
public policy issue.  This study has attempted to address Laitin’s previously cited critique 
by specifying in a more precise Gertzian fashion the relationship between the particular 
forms of cultural change and specific political outcomes.  
 Part of the process of culture change is that ideas and images are filtered through 
a variety of intervening cultural and political institutions which act as filtering devices.  
These intervening variables, in effect, become venues for interpreting and reproducing 
culture.  One of the limitations of this study is that it was unable to explore in greater 
depth the role played by intervening institutions such as elementary and secondary 
schools, universities, think tanks, Hollywood films, museums, and the media.  These are 
crucial links in the process of trying to understand how cultural images are continually 
transmitted and reinterpreted over time.  This study has attempted to suggest that while 
cultural models produce considerable continuity that they also allow room for 
considerable, albeit, gradual change as cultural images are redefined over time.  How and 
under what conditions the process of reinterpreting culture occurs, both in this policy area 
and any number of other policy areas, offers a rich research agenda.  The amount of 
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material available, particularly in the realm of English language media coverage of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is vast, but well-worth exploring.  An interesting side project 
would be to consider the role of particular key events in shaping media coverage.  For 
example, a systematic examination of the repercussions of Ariel Sharon’s partially 
successful libel suit against Time Magazine -- over its coverage of his role in Sabra and 
Shatila massacres -- had in shaping media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
could yield some fascinating results in terms of understanding how the media covers the 
conflict and the conditions that affect its interpretative role. 
There is also a lot of work to be done in better understanding how the mass public 
and public opinion affect decision-making elites.  In examining the actions of 
policymakers and the influences on them, it has been possible to begin to gain a better 
understanding of how decision-makers interpret and process political images and ideas.  
This allows us to begin to gain a better understanding of the role which intermediary 
political institutions (lobbies, political parties, financial contributors, PACs) play in 
interpreting the images and ideas and transmitting them to policymakers.   
This is also a study of political development of the United States which is often 
categorized as distinctive and exceptional as compared to other industrialized countries.  
It explores some of the nuances of the debate on American exceptionalism.  American 
democracy has long been regarded as exceptional when compared to European models.  
Some of the interrelated exceptional aspects of the American experience that are often 
cited are the lack of feudal past, the lack of a socialist movement, and the higher level of 
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religiosity in American society.  Unlike in many other developed countries, American 
policymakers often appear to have placed more emphasis on cultural factors that go 
beyond the realist paradigm.  This study examined the cultural elements that American 
policymakers have incorporated into their definition of the “national interest.”312  So the 
question becomes: Do American policymaking elites approach the process of defining the 
national interest differently than policymaking elites in other advanced industrial 
democracies.  While this sort analysis would require far more extensive comparative 
work than has been attempted here, the preliminary conclusion from examining the 
American case is strongly suggestive of a pattern in which cultural and moral concerns 
influence U.S. policy towards Israel in ways that don’t seem to have obvious parallels in 
other Western democracies.  This study could easily be used as the basis for further study 
of why such a unique “special relationship” between Israel and the U.S. has developed, 
but other industrialized democracies such as Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, 
and Italy have not developed the same kind close alliances with Israel.  A preliminary 
hypothesis of such a comparative study might propose that the major difference is that in 
the U.S. religion and religious values have a much stronger cultural resonance in politics 
whereas most other industrialized states have developed more strictly secular polities.  
Anthony Rusonik, for example, argues that there is “no doubt [that] American 
exceptionalism makes...sympathy an operative value... [since] no other country allows 
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  Another striking example of this phenomenon is America’s continued 
economic boycott of Cuba against its own apparent economic interests.  Here 
again, a powerful lobby, the Cuban-American Foundation, appears to play a 
significant role in shaping American policy.  This study may well shed some light 
on the cultural elements of the U.S.-Cuba relationship. 
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purely moral concerns to take precedence over security interests in conduct of its foreign 
relations.”313 
This study, in line with the arguments of Huntington and Shain above, suggests 
that the making of foreign policy is being domesticated and that the processes for making 
foreign and domestic policy are more similar than has often been presumed.  Thus this 
study reopens many complex questions about to degree to which foreign policy is shaped 
by domestic concerns as opposed to strategic interests.  Perhaps, more importantly, it 
opens a discussion about the degree to which strategic interests are defined by the real 
threats and opportunities abroad and to what extent they are defined by cultural 
constraints at home.   In other words, to what degree are strategic interests defined by 
objective conditions and to what degree are they shaped by more subjective cultural 
forces?    
Along the same lines, it also examines the increasingly important role that 
Diaspora communities play in shaping the foreign policy of their host countries towards 
their original home countries.   Perhaps in a world of instantaneous communications, 
where sovereignty is becoming more nebulous, distinctions between domestic and 
foreign policy are becoming more ambiguous.  Indeed, perhaps, the differences between 
decision-making elites and the mass public (or at least the politically active public) have 
also become smaller and less significant. 
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  Rusonik, Anthony.  “On the West Bank of the Potomac: Debating the 
Sources of US Support for Israel.”  The Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations. (Vol. 12, No, 4, 1990): 52. 
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This study also opens the door to a future research agenda on the “special 
relationship” between Israel and the United States.  Many of the political polemics on this 
subject have argued that the relationship is either deteriorating or strengthening -- 
depending on the political perspective of the author.  This study has raised the question as 
to the permanence of a relationship built on cultural foundations.  One of the criticisms 
that have often been launched at cultural arguments is that they can not explain political 
change.  And yet, the cultural case study above suggests that the images and elements 
within a culture constantly evolving -- albeit often slowly and over extended periods of 
time.  While cultures change relatively slowly, they are constantly being reinterpreted and 
redefined in new circumstances.  The “special relationship” that has been discussed 
above has already gone through a series of transformations.  Does that mean that it is 
likely to continue to transform in a way that continues to support a strong U.S.-Israel 
alliance or is it likely to dissolve over time?  If history is any guide, the U.S.-Israel 
alliance is likely to continue for some time, but the nature and content of that relationship 
seems likely to evolve. 
And finally, on a more abstract level, this study is an examination of the manner 
in which humans manipulate their own reality.  In politics, as in other areas of human 
interaction, the perception of reality often matters more than the actual facts.  Political 
reality is not the sum total of all the known facts, but rather a construction of the human 
imagination.  Reality is almost inevitably a construction in which facts are selectively 
filtered through lenses of the human mind.  This is a study of how those lenses have been 
applied to the U.S.-Israel “special relationship.”  If American foreign policy is ever to 
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serve the cause of regional peace, the lenses on America’s glasses may have to be 
adjusted.  Therefore, this study is an attempt to determine how the lens of political culture 
filters perceptions of political reality in the making of foreign policy in the Middle East.  
Only by bettering our understanding of how humans perceive reality is it possible to 
reduce the gap between perception and reality.  The American view of the Middle East is 
an arena where this gap is particularly wide and the consequences of such a gap have 
often been particularly dire.  If this project can in some small way, contribute to the 
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Appendix A:  U.S. Assistance to Israel, FY1949-FY2005 
(In Millions of Dollars) 














1949 $863.0 $8.63 $100.0    $100.0
1950 $0.0 $8.53 $0.0     
1951 $277.3 $7.90 $35.1   $0.1 $35.0
1952 $669.6 $7.75 $86.4   $63.7 $22.7
1953 $566.7 $7.70 $73.6   $73.6  
1954 $570.7 $7.64 $74.7   $54.0 $20.7
1955 $404.2 $7.67 $52.7   $21.5 $31.2
1956 $384.0 $7.56 $50.8   $14.0 $36.8
1957 $299.0 $7.31 $40.9   $16.8 $24.1
1958 $607.2 $7.11 $85.4   $9.0 $76.4
1959 $376.3 $7.06 $53.3  $0.4 $9.2 $43.7
1960 $390.0 $6.94 $56.2  $0.5 $8.9 $46.8
1961 $535.2 $6.87 $77.9   $8.5 $69.4
1962 $635.1 $6.80 $93.4  $13.2 $0.4 $79.8
1963 $590.7 $6.72 $87.9  $13.3  $74.6
1964 $245.3 $6.63 $37.0    $37.0
1965 $424.5 $6.52 $65.1  $12.9  $52.2
1966 $803.9 $6.34 $126.8  $90.0  $36.8
1967 $145.8 $6.15 $23.7  $7.0  $16.7
1968 $629.4 $5.91 $106.5  $25.0  $81.5
1969 $897.7 $5.60 $160.3  $85.0  $75.3
1970 $497.1 $5.30 $93.8  $30.0  $63.8
1971 $3,215.9 $5.07 $634.3  $545.0  $89.3
1972 $2,120.0 $4.92 $430.9  $300.0 $50.0 $80.9
1973 $2,281.7 $4.63 $492.8  $307.5 $50.0 $135.3
1974 $10,930.8 $4.17 $2,621.3 $1,500.0 $982.7 $50.0 $88.6
1975 $2,972.0 $3.82 $778.0 $100.0 $200.0 $344.5 $133.5
1976 $8,439.1 $3.61 $2,337.7 $750.0 $750.0 $475.0 $362.7
TQ $1,055.9 $3.61 $292.5 $100.0 $100.0 $50.0 $42.5
1977 $5,974.9 $3.39 $1,762.5 $500.0 $500.0 $490.0 $272.5
1978 $5,741.2 $3.15 $1,822.6 $500.0 $500.0 $525.0 $297.6
1979 $13,833.0 $2.83 $4,888.0 $1,300.0 $2,700.0 $525.0 $363.0
1980 $5,281.3 $2.49 $2,121.0 $500.0 $500.0 $525.0 $596.0
1981 $5,454.3 $2.26 $2,413.4 $500.0 $900.0 $764.0 $249.4
1982 $4,793.6 $2.13 $2,250.5 $550.0 $850.0 $806.0 $44.5
1983 $5,161.5 $2.06 $2,505.6 $750.0 $950.0 $785.0 $20.6
1984 $5,210.6 $1.98 $2,631.6 $850.0 $850.0 $910.0 $21.6
1985 $6,449.5 $1.91 $3,376.7 $1,400.0  $1,950.0 $26.7
















1987 $5,502.8 $1.81 $3,040.2 $1,800.0  $1,200.0 $40.2
1988 $5,295.5 $1.74 $3,043.4 $1,800.0  $1,200.0 $43.4
1989 $5,055.7 $1.66 $3,045.6 $1,800.0  $1,200.0 $45.6
1990 $4,764.8 $1.57 $3,034.9 $1,792.3  $1,194.8 $47.8
1991 $5,605.6 $1.51 $3,712.3 $1,800.0  $1,850.0 $62.3
1997 $4,009.1 $1.28 $3,132.1 $1,800.0  $1,200.0 $132.1
1998 $3,880.8 $1.26 $3,080.0 $1,800.0  $1,200.0 $80.0
1999 $3,702.3 $1.23 $3,010.0 $1,860.0  $1,080.0 $70.0
2000 $4,916.9 $1.19 $4,129.1 $3,120.0  $949.1 $60.0
2001 $3,336.3 $1.16 $2,876.1 $1,975.6  $838.2 $62.3
2002 $3,249.7 $1.14 $2,848.0 $2,040.0  $720.0 $88.0
2003 $4,194.6 $1.12 $3,741.1 $3,086.4  $596.1 $58.6
2004 $2,929.1 $1.09 $2,687.3 $2,147.3   $477.2 $62.8
2005 $2,742.8 $1.05 $2,612.2 $2,202.2   $357.0 $53.0
2006  $1.02  
Total $187,346.0  $96,153.1 $49,046.4 $11,212.5 $30,540.0 $5,354.2 
Source:  Jeremy Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service, 
Updated January 5, 2006  
 http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8124:1 
 Inflation Adjustment based on Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis to 2007 dollars 
 http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/Research/data/us/calc/index.cfm 
 














































Appendix B:  U.S. Public Opinion Data on Israel 
 
General Feelings towards Israel 
 
Date Favorable, pro-Israel Unfavorable, anti-Israel Neutral 
 
1957  94   5  
1972  91   9 
1981  96   4 
1981  93   1       6 
1982  88   1      11 
1983  91   3       6 
 
 
Feeling a Personal Sense of Loss If Israel were Destroyed 
 
Date  Yes No Not Sure 
 
1957  90 10 
1975  94  6 
1981  83 13       5 
1982  83   9       8 
1983  77 10     13 
 
Source:  Gilboa, Eytan.  American Public Opinion toward Israel and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict.  (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books / D.C. Heath 






Sympathy for Israel and the Palestinians 
 
  Israel Palestinians Both Neither     Don’t Know 
2001  47 19  8 18     17 
2003  41 13  8 18     20 
2004  40 13  7 18     22 
2005  37 12  5 19     27 
2006  44   9  5 20     22 
 





American Sympathy Toward Israel and the Arabs/Palestinians 
The following are results of the most consistently asked question regarding American 
public attitudes toward the Middle East: “In the Middle East situation, are your 
sympathies more with Israel or with the Arab nations?”  
  
Month  Year  Pollster Israel Arabs
June 1948 NORC 34 12
October 1948 NORC 33 11
March 1949 NORC 32 13
June 2-7 1967 Gallup 38 3
June  1967  Gallup 56 4 
June  1967  Harris 41 1 
Jan.  1969  Gallup 50 5 
Jan. 23-28 1969 Gallup 44 5
Feb.  1969 Gallup 41 4
Feb.  1970  Gallup 44 3 
March 1970  Gallup 38 3
Oct.  1970  Harris 47 6 
June  1971  Harris 46 7 
July  1971  Harris 44 7 
Oct. 2-7  1973 Gallup 38 3
Oct. 5-8  1973  Gallup 47 6 
Oct. 16 1973 Gallup 44 5
Oct. 19-22  1973  Gallup 48 6 
Oct.  1973  Harris 39 4 
Nov.  1973  Roper 48 7 
Dec. 4 1973  Gallup 48 7
Dec.7-10  1973  Gallup 54 8 
Dec.  1973  Gallup 50 7 
Jan. 1974 Gallup 38 6
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Oct.  1974  Yankelovich 55 9 
Jan.  1975  Gallup 44 8 
Jan.  1975  Harris 33 14* 
Apr.  1975  Gallup 37 8 
Apr.  1975  Roper 43 7 
Jan.  1976  Harris 52 6 
Jan.  1976  Harris 40 10* 
Jan.  1976  Yankelovich 56 9 
Mar.  1977  Roper 43 5 
June  1977  Gallup 44 8 
Nov.  1977  Gallup 46 11 
Dec.  1977  Gallup 37 8 
Jan.  1977  Roper 47 6 
Jan.  1978  Roper 37 10 
Mar.  1978  Gallup 44 11 
Apr.  1978  Gallup 38 11 
May  1978  Roper 35 9 
Aug.  1978  Gallup 42 11 
Nov.  1978  Gallup 41 13* 
Mar.  1979  Roper 36 9 
Apr.  1979  Yankelovich 47 11 
Oct.  1979  Los Angeles Times 49 11 
Dec.  1979  Yankelovich 49 6 
Dec.  1979  Yankelovich 49 15* 
Jan.  1979  Gallup 40 14 
Mar.  1979  Gallup 34 11 
Nov.  1979  Gallup 40 14 
Mar.  1980  Roper 37 10 
July  1980  Harris 52 12 
July  1980  Harris 47 14* 
Oct.  1980  Gallup 45 13 
July-Aug.  1981  Gallup 44 11 
July  1981  Roper 35 10 
Aug.  1981  Harris 47 15* 
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Nov.  1981  Gallup 49 12 
Jan.  1982  Gallup 49 14 
Mar.  1982  Washington Post/ABC 55 18 
May  1982  Gallup 51 12 
June  1982  Gallup 52 10 
June  1982  Roper 39 9 
Jul.  1982  Los Angeles Times 48 17 
Jul.  1982  Gallup 52 10 
Aug.  1982  Gallup 41 12 
Aug.  1982  Washington Post/ABC 52 18 
Sep.  1982  Roper 40 12 
Sep.  1982  Gallup 32 28 
Oct.  1982  Roper 38 14 
Oct.  1982  Gallup 40 17* 
Jan.  1983  Gallup 49 12 
Jan.  1983  Washington Post/ABC 47 17 
Feb.-Mar.  1983  Washington Post/ABC 52 16 
Mar.  1983  Gallup 49 12 
July  1983  Roper 37 9 
Jan.  1983  Gallup 49 12 
Jan.  1984  Roper 44 8 
Mar.  1984  Roper 39 8 
July  1985  Washington Post/ABC 49 11 
Oct.  1985  Harris 64 14 
Apr.  1985  Roper 42 10 
May  1986  Gallup 43 20* 
June  1986  Roper 53 8 
Feb.  1987  Harris 58 8 
March  1987  Roper 48 8 
Apr.  1987  AJC 50 14* 
Jan.  1988  Penn & Schoen 47 14 
Apr.  1988  AJC 61 13 
Apr.  1988  AJC 55 23* 
Apr.  1988  Los Angeles Times 51 12 
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Apr.  1988  Los Angeles Times 37 25* 
Apr.  1988  Chicago Tribune 42 27* 
Apr.  1988  Roper 37 11 
May  1988  ADL 44 13 
May  1988  Gallup 37 15* 
Dec.  1988  Gallup 46 24* 
Apr.  1989  Washington Post/ABC 69 16 
Apr.  1989  Roper 34 14* 
June  1989  Roper 36 13 
Aug.  1989  Gallup 50 14* 
Sept.  1989  Marttila & Kiley 53 14 
Sept.  1989  Marttila & Kiley 42 30* 
Mar.  1990  Harris 52 18 
May  1990  AJC (Roper) 39 9 
May  1990  Roper 34 15* 
June  1990  New York Times/CBS 40 19 
Oct.  1990  Gallup 48 23* 
Dec.  1990  Marttila & Kiley 48 20 
Jan.  1991  Gallup 64 8 
March  1991  New York Times/CBS 49 20 
March  1991  Gallup 60 17* 
Sept.  1993  Gallup 42 15* 
Nov.  1996  Gallup 38 15* 
Aug.  1997  Gallup  38 8* 
   1997  New York Times/CBS 48 13*
April  1998  New York Times/CBS 58 13* 
Dec.  1998  Gallup  46 13* 
July  1999  Gallup  43 14* 
Jan.  2000  Gallup  43 13* 
July  2000  Gallup  41 12* 
Oct.  2000  Gallup  41 11* 
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Feb.  2001  Gallup  51 16* 
Aug 2001 Gallup 41 13* 
Sept. 2001 Gallup 55 7* 
Dec. 2001 Gallup 51 14* 
Feb. 2002 Gallup 55 14* 
March 2002  Gallup  43 14* 
April 2002  Gallup  50 15* 
April 22-24 2002 Gallup 47 13*
May 2002 Gallup 49 15*
June 2002 Gallup 49 14*
Sept. 2002 Gallup 47 14*
Feb. 2003 Gallup 58 13*
May 2003 Gallup 46 16*
May 8 2003 Israel Project+ 46 7*
May 29 2003 Israel Project+ 42 8*
July 2003 Israel Project+ 48 10*
Aug 2003 Israel Project+ 42 6*
Nov 2003 Israel Project+ 47 11*
Dec 2003 ADL 40 15*
Jan. 2004 Israel Project+ 52 10*
Feb. 2004 Gallup 55 18*
March 17 2004 Israel Project+ 52 8*
March 23 2004 Israel Project+ 48 8*
May 2004 Pew 46 12*
July 2004 Israel Project+ 47 9*
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Sept. 2004 Israel Project+ 48 6*
Nov. 2004 Israel Project+ 49 10*
Jan. 2005 Israel Project+ 39 6*
Feb. 2005 Israel Project+ 40 10*
Feb. 2005 Gallup 52 18*
March 18-25 2005 ADL 42 13*
March 18-25 2005 ADL 44 9
Aug. 2005 Israel Project+ 38 8*
Oct. 2005 Israel Project+ 46 10*
Jan. 2006 Israel Project+ 45 7*
Feb. 2006 Gallup 59 15*
Mar-May 2006 Pew 48 13*
May 2006 Israel Project+ 52 6*
July 2  2006 Israel Project+ 45 6*
July 16-18  2006 Israel Project+ 60 7*
July 20  2006 Israel Project+ 57 8*
July 27  2006 Israel Project+ 58 6*
Aug. 2006 Israel Project+ 56 7*
Sept. 2006 Israel Project+ 53 5*
Nov. 2006 Israel Project+ 54 6*
Jan. 2007 Israel Project+ 50 7*
Feb. 2007 Gallup 58 20*
Average for 172  polls 46 11 
*Palestinian Arabs 
+Question wording slightly different: Thinking about the ongoing conflict between Israel 
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and the Palestinians in the Middle East, please tell me whether, in general, you consider 
yourself to be a strong supporter of Israel, a supporter of Israel, a supporter of the 
Palestinians or a strong supporter of the Palestinians. 
BY ADMINISTRATION 
 
  Number of 
Polls 
Israel Arabs/Palestinians
Truman 3 33.00 12.00
Johnson 3 45.00 2.67
Nixon/Ford 28 44.75 6.39
Carter 23 42.57 10.57
Reagan 43 46.37 13.56
Bush 15 47.87 16.67
Clinton 10 43.80 12.70
George W. Bush 47 48.94 10.70
  
Source:  Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-
Israel/polls.html 




Gallup Polls on American Sympathy 
Toward Israel and the Arabs/Palestinians 
 
Gallup Poll results of the most consistently asked question regarding American public 
attitudes toward the Middle East: “In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies 
more with Israel or with the Arab nations?”  
 
  
Month  Year  Israel Arabs
June 2-7 1967 38 3
June  1967 56 4 
Jan.  1969 50 5 
Jan. 23-28 1969 44 5
Feb.  1969 41 4
Feb.  1970 44 3 
March 1970 38 3
Oct. 2-7  1973 38 3
Oct. 5-8 1973 47 6 
Oct. 16 1973 44 5
Oct. 19-22 1973 48 6 
Dec. 4 1973 48 7
Dec. 7-10 1973 54 8 
Dec.  1973 48 7 
Jan. 1974 38 6
Jan.  1975 44 8 
Apr.  1975 37 8 
June  1977 44 8 
Nov.  1977 46 11 
Dec.  1977 37 8 
Feb.  1978 33 14 
Mar.  1978 38 11 
Apr.  1978 38 22 
 
 -301-
May  1978 44 10 
Aug.  1978 42 11 
Sep.  1978 41 12 
Sep.  1978 42 12 
Nov.  1978 41 13 
Jan.  1979 40 14 
Mar.  1979 34 11 
Nov.  1979 40 14 
Oct.  1980 45 13 
Aug.  1981 44 11 
Nov.  1981 49 12 
Jan.  1982 49 14 
May  1982 51 12 
June  1982 52 10 
Jul.  1982 52 10 
Aug.  1982 41 12 
Sep.  1982 32 28 
Oct.  1982 40 17 
Jan.  1983 49 12 
Mar.  1983 49 12 
Jan.  1983 49 12 
May  1986 43 20 
May  1988 37 15* 
Dec.  1988 46 24 
Aug.  1989 50 14 
Oct.  1990 48 23 
Jan.  1991 64 8 
Feb.  1991 64 7 
March  1991 60 17 
Aug.  1991 59 21 
Sept.  1993 42 15* 
Nov.  1996 38 15* 
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Aug.  1997 38 8* 
Dec.  1998  46 13* 
July  1999  43 14* 
Jan.  2000  43 13* 
July  2000  41 12*
Oct.  2000  41 11*
Feb.  2001  51 16*
Aug. 2001  41 13*
Sept. 2001  55 7*
Dec. 2001 51 14*
Feb. 2002 55 14*
March 2002 43 14*
April 2002 50 15*
April 22-24 2002 47 13*
May 2002 49 15*
June 2002 49 14*
Sept. 2002 47 14*
Feb. 2003 58 13*
May 2003 46 16*
Feb. 2004 55 18*
Feb. 2005 52 18*
Feb. 2006 59 15*
Feb. 2007 58 20*
 
Avg. All Polls  46.00 12.00
All Polls After 67 War 46.10 12.12
Avg. 2000-  49.55 14.25
Avg. 90s  50.20 14.10 
Avg. 80s  45.76 14.59 
Avg. 70s  41.85 9.27





  Number of 
Polls 
Israel Arabs/Palestinians
Johnson 2 47.00 3.50
Nixon/Ford 15 44.20 5.60
Carter 15 40.33 12.27
Reagan 15 45.53 14.73 
Bush 6 57.50 15.00 
Clinton 8 41.50 12.63 
George W. Bush 17 50.94 14.65
 *Question asked about Palestinian Arabs  
Source:  Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-





















1975-1976 $2,450  $8,844.50 $3.61 1 
1977-1978 $43,475  $136,946.25 $3.15 3 
1979-1980 $414,400  $1,031,856.00 $2.49 10 
1980-1982 $2,027,200  $4,317,936.00 $2.13 40 
1983-1984 $3,772,994  $7,470,528.12 $1.98 81 
1985-1986 $4,609,984  $8,666,769.92 $1.88 94 
1987-1988 $5,432,055  $9,451,775.70 $1.74 78 
1988-1990 $4,948,934  $7,769,826.38 $1.57 95 
1991-1992 $3,963,007  $5,785,990.22 $1.46 76 
1993-1994 $2,529,573  $3,516,106.47 $1.39 61 
1995-1996 $2,738,647  $3,587,627.57 $1.31 61 
1997-1998 $2,102,906  $2,649,661.56 $1.26 36 
1999-2000 $1,889,904  $2,248,985.76 $1.19 35 
2001-2002 $2,727,689  $3,109,565.46 $1.14 37 
2002-2004 $3,142,994  $3,425,863.46 $1.09 36 
2004-2006 $3,031,793  $3,092,428.86 $1.02 35 




Sources:  Based on figures from the Federal Election Commission and the 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.asp?txt=Q05&cycle=2006) and 
Curtiss, Richard H. Stealth PACs: Lobbying Congress for Control of U.S. 
Middle East Policy. (Washington, DC:  American Education Trust, 1996): 
254, Washington Report for Middle East Affairs (April/May, 1997): 50 and 












Lieberman, Joe II-CT) $156,593.00
Stabenow, Debbie (D-MI) $95,796.00
Nelson, Bill (D-FL) $94,861.00
Kyl, Jon (R-AZ) $88,000.00
Menendez, Bob (D-NJ) $87,335.00
Talent, Jim (R-MO) $75,510.00
Whitehouse, Sheldon (D-RI) $75,500.00
Santorum, Rick (R-PA) $75,000.00
Nelson, Ben (D-NE) $71,500.00
DeWine, Mike (R-OH) $70,000.00
Conrad, Kent (D-ND) $68,600.00
Cardin, Ben (D-MD) $64,565.00
Burns, Conrad (R-MT) $46,000.00
Klobuchar, Amy (D-MN) $37,835.00
Allen, George (R-VA) $36,500.00
Clinton, Hilary (D-NY) $35,618.00
Feinstein, Dianne (D-CA) $33,500.00
Ford, Harold Jr. (D-TN) $30,576.00
Ensign, John (R-NV) $30,000.00
Akaka, Daniel (D-HI) $29,500.00
Kennedy, Edward (D-MA) $28,000.00
Lugar, Dick (R-IN) $27,250.00
Brown, Sherrod (D-OH) $26,000.00
Carper, Tom (D-DE) $25,100.00
Laffey, Steve (R-RI) $24,750.00
Snowe, Olympia (R-ME) $18,500.00
Lott, Trent (R-MS) $15,500.00
Casey, Bob (D-PA) $15,000.00
McCaskill, Claire (D-MO) $14,335.00
Kennedy, Mark (R-MN) $13,500.00
Bingaman, Jeff (D-NM) $11,000.00
Thomas, Craig (R-WY) $11,000.00
Baucus, Max (D-MT) $10,300.00
Tester, Jon (D-MT) $10,224.00
Allard, Wayne (R-CO) $10,000.00









Kirk, Mark (R-IL) $75,064.00 
Ellsworth, Brad (D-IN) $48,250.00 
Hoyer, Steny (D-MN) $48,000.00 
Berkley, Shelley (D-NV) $44,250.00 
Hastert, Dennis (R-IL) $40,700.00 
Engel, Elliot (D-NY) $40,500.00 
Cantor, Eric (R-VA) $40,500.00 
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (R-FL) $36,500.00 
Ember, Reichgott Junge (D-MN) $29,500.00 
Shaw, E. Clay Jr. (R-FL) $28,505.00 
McHenry, Patrick (R-NC) $27,500.00 
Johnson, Hank (D-GA) $27,200.00 
Pryce, Deborah (R-OH) $26,000.00 
Bean, Melissa (D-IL) $24,279.00 
Crowley, Joseph (D-NY) $24,000.00 
DeLay, Tom (R-TX) $23,500.00 
Pelosi, Nancy (D-CA) $23,350.00 
Shays, Christopher (R-CT) $21,500.00 
Edwards, Chet (D-TX) $20,600.00 
Schiff, Adam (D-CA) $20,000.00 
Rothman, Steven (D-NJ) $18,000.00 
Spratt, John Jr. (D-SC) $17,500.00 
Barrow, John (D-GA) $16,824.00 
Burton, Dan (R-IN) $15,000.00 
Wilson, Heather (R-NM) $14,500.00 
Pence, Mike (R-IN) $14,000.00 
Kline, John (R-MN) $12,500.00 
Garrett, Scott (R-NJ) $12,500.00 
McCaul, Mike (R-TX) $12,000.00 
Melancon, Charles (D-LA) $11,600.00 
Salazar, John (D-CO) $11,100.00 
Lantos, Tom (D-CA) $11,000.00 
Sherman, Brad (D-CA) $10,600.00 
Simmons, Rob (R-CT) $10,500.00 
Sherwood, Don (R-PA) $10,500.00 
Weldon, Curt (R-PA) $10,000.00 




Jewish members are highlighted in Yellow. 








Appendix E:  Jewish Vote in Presidential Elections, 1916-2004 
 
 Democratic Republican Independent    
Year Candidate Candidate Candidate Democrats Republicans Independents
1916 Woodrow Wilson Charles E. Hughes 55 45  
1920 James Cox Warren Harding Eugene V. Debs 19 43 27 
1924 John Davis Calvin Coolidge R. La Follette 51 27 22 
1928 Al Smith Herbert Hoover 72 28  
1932 Franklin Roosevelt Herbert Hoover 82 18  
1936 Franklin Roosevelt Alf Landon 85 15  
1940 Franklin Roosevelt Wendell Willkie 90 10  
1944 Franklin Roosevelt Thomas Dewey 90 10  
1948 Harry Truman Thomas Dewey H. Wallace 75 10 15 
1952 Adlai Stevenson Dwight Eisenhower 64 36  
1956 Adlai Stevenson Dwight Eisenhower 60 40  
1960 John Kennedy Richard Nixon 82 18  
1964 Lyndon Johnson Barry Goldwater 90 10  
1968 Hubert Humphrey Richard Nixon George Wallace 81 17 2 
1972 George McGovern Richard Nixon 64 34  
1976 Jimmy Carter Gerald Ford 64 34  
1980 Jimmy Carter Ronald Reagan 45 39 15 
1984 Walter Mondale Ronald Reagan 67 31  
1988 Michael Dukakis George H.W. Bush 64 35  
1992 Bill Clinton George H.W. Bush Ross Perot 80 11 9 
1996 Bill Clinton Bob Dole    Ross Perot 78 16 3 
2000 Al Gore George W. Bush  Ralph Nader 79 19 1 
2004 John Kerry George W. Bush 74 25  
Average   70.0 24.8 
Average, New Deal (1932-44)  86.8 13.3  
Average since New Deal (1932-2000)  74.4 22.5  
Average, Post-War (1948-2000)  70.9 25.0  
Average since Nixon (1968-2000)  69.1 26.2  
Average since Reagan (1980-2004)  69.6 25.1  
 




Appendix F - Excerpts from the Republican and Democratic 
Platforms on Israel and Jews 
(Most Important phrases are boldfaced below) 
 
1944  
D (Franklin Roosevelt) –  
“We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and 
colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and 
democratic Jewish commonwealth.” 
 
R - (Wendell Willkie)  
  “In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, 
women, and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of 
Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with 
the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of a 
Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic 
Commonwealth.  We condemn the failure of the President [Franklin Roosevelt] to insist 
that the mandatory of Palestine [Great Britain] carry out the provision of the Balfour 
Declaration and of the mandate while he pretends to support them.” 
 
1948  
D (Harry Truman) –  
“President Truman, by granting immediate recognition to Israel, led the 
world in extending friendship and welcome to a people who have long sought and 
justly deserve freedom and independence.   
We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel.  We affirm our pride that the 
US under the leadership of President Truman played a leading role in the adoption of the 
resolution of November 29, 1947, by the UNGA for the creation of a Jewish State.   
We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the UN 
resolution of November 29th and consider that modification thereof should be made only 
if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.   
We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the UN and its full 
participation in the international community of nations.  We pledge appropriate aid to 
the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources. 
We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the 
right of self-defense.  We pledge ourselves to work for modification of any resolution of 
the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision. 
We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the 







R (Thomas Dewey) – 
“We welcome Israel into the family of nations and take pride in the fact that the 
Republican Party was the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent 
Jewish Commonwealth.  The vacillation of the Democratic [Truman] Administration on 
this question has undermined the prestige of the United Nations.  Subject to the letter and 
the spirit of the United Nations Charter, we pledge to Israel full recognition, with its 
boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations and aid in developing its economy.” 
 
1952 -  D (Adalai Stevenson) –  
 “We pledge continued assistance to Israel so that she may fulfill her 
humanitarian mission of providing shelter and sanctuary for her homeless Jewish 
refugees while strengthening her economic development.  We will continue to support 
the tripartite declaration of May 1950, to encourage Israel and the Arab States to settle 
their differences by direct negotiation, to maintain and protect the sanctity of the Holy 
Places and to permit free access to them. 
We pledge aid the Arab States to enable them to develop their economic resources 
and raise the living standards of their people.  We support measures for the relief and 
reintegration of the Palestine refugees, and we pledge continued assistance to the 
reintegration program voted by the UNGA in January 1952.” 
 
R (Dwight Eisenhower) – 
“The Republican Party has consistently advocated a national home for the Jewish 
since a Republican Congress declared its support of that objective thirty years ago.   
In providing a sanctuary for Jewish people rendered homeless by 
persecution, the State of Israel appeals to our deepest humanitarian instincts.  We 
shall continue our friendly interest in this constructive and inspiring undertaking.  
We shall put our influence at the service of peace between Israel and the 
Arab States and we shall cooperate to bring economic and social stability to that area.” 
 
1956 D (Adalai Stevenson)-  
 “The Democratic Party stands for the maintenance of peace in the Middle 
East, which is essential to the well-being and progress of all its peoples.   
We urge Israel and the Arab States to settle their differences by peaceful 
means, and to maintain the sanctity of the Holy Places in the Holy Land and permit 
free access to them.   
We will assist Israel to build a sound and viable economy for her people, so 
that she may fulfill her humanitarian mission of providing shelter and sanctuary for 
her homeless Jewish refugees while strengthening her national development.   
The plight of the Arab refugees commands our continuing sympathy and 
concern.  We will assist in carrying out large-scale projects for their resettlement in 
countries where there is room and opportunity for them.  




The Democratic Party will act to redress the dangerous imbalance of arms in 
the area resulting from the shipment of Communist arms to Egypt, by selling or 
supplying defensive weapons to Israel, and will take such steps, including security 
guarantees, as may be required to deter aggression and war in the area.” 
 
R (Dwight Eisenhower) –  
“We recognize the existence of a major threat to international peace in the 
Near East.  We support a policy of impartial friendship for the peoples of the Arab 
states and Israel to promote a peaceful settlement of the causes of tension in that 
area, including the human problem of the Palestine-Arab refugees.  
Progress towards a just settlement of the tragic conflict between the Jewish 
State and the Arab nations in Palestine was upset by the Soviet Bloc sale of Arms to 
Arab countries.  But prospects of peace have now been reinforced by the mission to 
Palestine of the UN Secretary General upon the initiative of the US.   
We regard the preservation of Israel as an important tenet of American 
foreign policy.  We are determined that the integrity of an independent Jewish State 
shall be maintained.  We shall support the independence of Israel against armed 
aggression.” 
 
1960 -  D (John Kennedy) –  
 “In the Middle East we will work for guarantees to insure 
independence for all states.  We will encourage direct Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations, the resettlement of Arab refugees in lands where there is room and 
opportunity for them, and end to boycotts and blockages, and unrestricted use of 
the Suez Canal by all nations.... 
We urge continued economic assistance to Israel and the Arab peoples to help 
them raise their living standards.  We pledge our best efforts for peace in the Middle East 
by seeking to prevent an arms race while guarding against the dangers of a military 
imbalance resulting from Soviet arms shipments.” 
 
R (Richard Nixon)  
“In the Middle East, we shall continue to support the integrity and 
independence of all states of that area including Israel and the Arab States.   
With specific reference to Israel and the Arab Nations we urge them to 
undertake negotiations for a mutually acceptable settlement of the causes of tension 
between them. We pledge continued efforts:  
To eliminate the obstacles to a lasting peace in the area, including the human 
problem of the Arab refugees.  To seek an end to the transit and trade restrictions, 
blockades, and boycotts.   
To secure freedom of navigation in international waterways, the cessation of 
discrimination against Americans on the basis of religious beliefs, and an end to the 





1964 D (Lyndon Johnson) –  
“Work for the attainment of peace in the Near East as an urgent goal, using 
our best efforts to prevent a military unbalance, to encourage arms reductions and 
the use of national resources for internal development and to encourage the re-
settlement of Arab refugees in lands where there is room and opportunity. The 
problems of political adjustment between Israel and the Arab countries can and must be 
peacefully resolved and the territorial integrity of every nation respected…. 
Encourage by all peaceful means the growing independence of the captive 
peoples living under Communism and hasten the day that Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania 
and the other captive nations will achieve full freedom and self-determination. We 
deplore Communist oppression of Jews and other minorities. 
In 1960, we urged B  
…Continued economic assistance to Israel and the Arab peoples to help them 
raise their living standards. We pledge our best efforts for peace in the Middle East 
by seeking to prevent an arms race while guarding against the dangers of a military 
imbalance resulting from Soviet arms shipments. 
In the period since that pledge was made the Middle East has come closer to 
peace and stability than at any time since World War II.   
Economic and technical assistance to Israel and Arab nations continues at a 
high level, although with more and more emphasis on loans as against grants.  The 
United States is determined to help bring the revolution in technology of desalinization to 
the aid of the desert regions of this area.” 
 
R (Barry Goldwater) –  
“We condemn the persecution of minorities, such as Jews, within Communist 
borders.... 
Respecting the Middle East, and in addition to our reaffirmed pledges of 
1960 concerning this area, we will so direct our economic and military assistance as 
to help maintain stability in this region and prevent an imbalance of arms.” 
 
1968 D (Hubert Humphrey) –  
“The Middle East remains a powder keg.  We must do all in our power to prevent 
a recurrence of war in this area.  A large Soviet fleet has been deployed to the 
Mediterranean.  Preferring short-term political advantage to long-range stability and 
peace, the Soviet Union has rushed arms to certain Arab states [Egypt and Syria] to 
replace those lost in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.  As long as Israel is threatened by 
hostile and well-armed neighbors, we will assist her with essential military equipment 
needed for her defense, including the most advanced types of combat aircraft. 
Lasting peace in the Middle East depends upon agreed and secured frontiers, 
respect for the territorial integrity of all states. The guaranteed right of innocent 
passage through all international waterways, a humane resettlement of the Arab 
refugees, and the establishment of a non-provocative military balance.  To achieve 
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these objectives, we support negotiations among the concerned parties.  We strongly 
support efforts to achieve an agreement among states in the area and those states 
supplying arms to limit the flow of military equipment to the Middle East.  
We support efforts to raise the living standards throughout the area, including 
desalinization and regional irrigation projects which cut across state frontiers…. 
We are profoundly concerned about the continued repression of Jews and other 
minorities in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and look forward to the day when the full 
light of liberty and freedom shall be extended to all countries and all peoples.” 
 
R (Richard Nixon) –  
“In the tinderbox of the Middle East, we will pursue a stable peace through 
recognition by all nations of a stable peace through recognition of all nations of each 
other=s right to assured boundaries, freedom of navigation through international 
waters, and independent existence free from the threat of aggression.  We will seek 
an end to the arms race through international agreement and the stationing of peace-
keeping forces of the United Nations in areas of severe tension, as we encourage peace-
table talks among adversaries.... 
Nor can we fail to condemn the Soviet Union for its continuing anti-Semitic 




1972 D (George McGovern) –  
“In particular, the United States should, by diplomatic contacts, seek to mobilize 
world opinion to express concern at the denial of oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, 
and the minorities of the Soviet Union, including the Soviet Jews, of the right to practice 
their religion and culture and to leave their respective countries.... 
The United States must be unequivocally committed to support of Israel’s 
right to exist within secure and defensible boundaries.  Progress toward a negotiated 
political settlement in the Middle East will permit Israel and her Arab neighbors to 
live at peace with each other, and to turn their energies to internal development.  It 
will also free the world from the threat of the explosion of Mid-East tensions into world 
war.  In working toward a settlement, our continuing pledge to the security to security 
and freedom of Israel must be both clear and consistent.  The next Democratic 
Administration should:  
Make and carry out a firm, long-term public commitment to provide Israel 
with aircraft and other military equipment in the quantity and sophistication she 
needs to preserve her deterrent strength in the face of Soviet arsenaling of Arab 
threats of renewed war;  
Seek to bring the parties into direct negotiations toward a permanent 
political solution based on the necessity of agreement on secure and defensible 
boundaries;  
Maintain a political commitment and a military force in Europe and at sea in the 
Mediterranean ample to deter the Soviet Union from putting unbearable pressure on 
Israel;  
Recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of 
Israel with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths.  As a symbol of this 
stand, the U.S. Embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; and  
Recognize the responsibility of the world community for a just solution to the 
problems of Arab and Jewish refugees.” 
 
R (Richard Nixon) –  
 “In the Middle East, we initiated arrangements leading to a cease-fire [in 
the War of Attrition] which has prevailed for two years.  We pledge every effort to 
transform the cease-fire into lasting peace.... 
We are fully aware of and share the concern of many citizens for the plight of 
Soviet Jews with regard to their freedoms and emigration.... 
We support the right of Israel and its courageous people to survive and 
prosper in peace.  We have sought a stable peace for the Middle East and helped to 
obtain a cease-fire which contained the tragic conflict.  We will help in any way 
possible to bring Israel and the Arab states to the conference table, where they may 
negotiate a lasting peace.  We will continue to act to prevent the development of a 
military imbalance which would imperil peace in the region and elsewhere by 
providing Israel with support essential for her security, including aircraft, training 
and modern and sophisticated military equipment, and also by helping friendly Arab 
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governments and peoples, including support for their efforts to diminish their dependence 
on outside powers.  We support programs of economic assistance to Israel pursued by 
President Nixon that helped her achieve a nine per cent annual economic growth rate.  
This and the special refugee assistance ordered by the President have also helped to 
provide resettlement for the thousands of immigrants seeking refuge in Israel.... 
The irresponsible proposals of our political opposition to slash defense forces of 
the United States...would increase the threat of war in the Middle East and gravely 
menace Israel.  We flatly reject these dangerous proposals. 
With a settlement fair to all nations of the Middle East, there would be an 
opportunity for their peoples to look ahead to shared opportunities rather than backward 
to rancorous animosities.  In a new environment of cooperation, Israel will be able to 




1976 D (Jimmy Carter) –  
“We should continually remind the Soviet Union...of its commitments in Helsinki 
to the free flow of people and ideas and of how offensive we and other free people find 
its violations of UNDHR.... 
But we must let the world know that anti-American polemics are no substitute for 
sound policy and that the United Nations is weakened by harsh rhetoric from other 
countries or by blasphemous resolutions such as the one equating Zionism and 
racism.... 
We shall continue to seek a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.  The 
cornerstone of our policy is a firm commitment to the independence and security of 
the State of Israel.  This special relationship does not prejudice improved relations 
with other nations in the region.  Real peace in the Middle East will permit Israel and 
her Arab neighbors to turn their energies to internal development, and will eliminate the 
threat of world conflict spreading from tensions there.   
The Middle East conflict is complex, and a realistic, pragmatic approach is 
essential.  Our policy must be based on firm adherence to these fundamental principles of 
Middle East policy: 
 We will continue our consistent support of Israel, including sufficient military 
and economic assistance to maintain Israel’s deterrent strength in the region, and the 
maintenance of U.S. military forces in the Mediterranean adequate to deter military 
intervention by the Soviet Union.   
We steadfastly oppose any move to isolate Israel in the international arena or 
suspend it from the United Nations or its constituent organizations.   
We will avoid efforts to impose on the region an externally devised formula for 
settlement, and will provide support initiatives toward settlement, based on direct face-to-
face negotiation between the parties and normalization of relations and a full peace 
within secure and defensible boundaries.   
We vigorously support the free passage of shipping in the Middle East B 
especially in the Suez Canal.   
We recognize that the solution to the problems of Arab and Jewish refugees 
must be among the factors taken into account in the course of continued progress 
toward peace. Such problems cannot be solved, however, by recognition of terrorist 
groups which refuse to acknowledge their adversary’s right to exist, or groups 
which have no legitimate claim to represent the people for whom they purport to be 
speaking.   
We support initiation of government enforcement action to insure that stated U.S. 
policy in opposition to boycotts against friendly countries is fully and vigorously 
implemented.   
We recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital 
of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths.  As a symbol of 






R (Gerald Ford) –  
“The preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East is a paramount 
concern.  The efforts of the two Republican Administrations, summoning diplomatic and 
political skills, have been directed toward reduction of tension and toward avoiding 
flashpoints which could serve as an excuse for yet another round of conflict between 
Israel and the Arab countries.   
Our commitment to Israel is fundamental and enduring.  We have honored 
and will continue to honor that commitment in every way B politically, economically 
and providing the military aid that Israel requires to remain strong enough to deter 
any potential aggression.  Forty percent of all United States aid that Israel has received 
since its creation in 1948 has come in the last two fiscal years, as a result of Republican 
initiatives.  Our policy must remain one of decisive support for the security and integrity 
of Israel.   
An equally important component of our commitment to Israel lies in continuing 
our commitment to Israel lies in continuing our efforts to secure a just and durable peace 
for all nations in that complex region.  Our efforts have succeeded, for the first time since 
the creation of the state of Israel, in moving toward a negotiated peace settlement which 
would serve the interests and the security of all nations in the Middle East.  Peace in the 
Middle East now requires face-to-face direct negotiations between the states involved 
with the recognition of safe, secure and defensible borders for Israel.   
At the same time, Republican Administrations have succeeded in reestablishing 
communication with the Arab countries, and have made extensive progress in our 
diplomatic and commercial relations with the more moderate Arab nations.... 
Because we have such fundamental interest in the Middle East, it will be our 
policy to continue out efforts to maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean 
region.  Our adversaries must recognize that we will not permit a weakening of our 
defenses or any attempt to disturb valued Alliance relationships in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.... 
We shall expect the Soviet Union to implement the UNDHR and the Helsinki 
agreements, which guarantees conditions for the free interchange of information and the 
right to emigrate, including emigration of Soviet Jews, Christians, and Muslims and 
others who wish to join relatives abroad.  In this spirit we shall expect the immediate end 
of all forms of imprisonment and military service, aimed at preventing such emigration.” 
 
1980 D (Jimmy Carter) –  
“Our...objective must be peace in Middle East.  The Carter Administration has 
pursued this objective with determination and together with the leaders of Israel and 
Egypt, has overcome great obstacles in the last three years.  America made this 
commitment for two fundamental reasons B morality and national security.   
Our nation feels a profound moral obligation to sustain and assure the 
security of Israel.  That is why our relationship with Israel, in most respects, a unique 
one.  Israel is the single democracy, the most stable government, the most strategic 
asset and our closest ally in the region.   
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To fulfill this imperative, we must move towards peace in the Middle East.  
Without peace, there is a growing prospect, indeed inevitability, that this region will be 
radicalized, susceptible to foreign intrusion, and possibility involved in another war.  
Thus, peace in the Middle East also is vital for our national security interests.   
The strength of these two impulses B our moral commitment and national security 
B has sustained the Democratic Administration in many difficult trials.  The result has 
been the first peace ever between Israel and an Arab country, as well as the eventual 
prospect of a wider comprehensive agreement which will assure peace and security to all 
parties concerned.  Our goal is to make the Middle East an area of stability and progress 
in which the United States can play a full and constructive role.... 
The Democratic Administration will also seek to reverse the sharp downturn in 
Soviet Jewish emigration and to obtain the release of dissidents now detained in the 
Soviet Union, including 41 members of the Helsinki Watch Groups who are in Soviet 
prisons, labor camps and banishment for their human rights activity. We will pursue our 
human rights concerns as a necessary part of overall progress on the range of political, 
military and economic issues between the United States and the Soviet Union—including 
the possibility of improved, mutually beneficial economic relations between our two 
countries. 
Almost immediately after his inauguration, President Carter undertook to move 
the peace process forward. Following the historic visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem, 
the Administration’s efforts led to Camp David, where the two presidents and Prime 
Minister Begin in thirteen days created the Camp David Accords—the most promising 
effort in three decades for creating a genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East. 
Following President Carter’s trip to the Middle East in March 1979, Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat signed the Israel-Egypt peace treaty at the White 
House. A year later, that treaty has led to the transfer of two-thirds of the Sinai to 
Egypt—along with the Sinai oil fields; ambassadors have been exchanged; borders have 
been opened; and normalization of relations is well underway. Israel has finally gained 
peace with its largest Arab neighbor. In sum, this Democratic Administration has done 
more to achieve Israel's dream of peace than any other Administration in thirty years. 
Negotiations are continuing under the Camp David framework on full 
autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, in order to preserve fully 
Israel=s security while permitting the Palestinians living in the territories to 
participate in determining their own future.  The United States is a full partner in 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt to provide a five-year transitional regime in the 
West Bank and Gaza.   
It is recognized that the Democratic Administration has to proceed with special 
care and sensitivity resulting from its deep engagement in the delicate process of 
promoting a wider peace for Israel.   
At the same time, the United States’ commitment to the independence, security, 
and future of Israel has been strengthened.  Nearly half of all U.S. aid to Israel since its 
creation as a sovereign state B more than $10 billion B has been requested in the last three 
and a half years.  We provide Israel with modern military equipment and we fully support 
Israel=s efforts to create a just and lasting peace with all of its Arab neighbors.   
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U.S. policy is B and should continue to be B guided also by the following 
principles:  
UN Security Council Resolution 242, unchanged, and the Camp David Accords 
are the basis for peace in the Middle East.   
We support Israel=s security, and will continue to provide generous military 
and economic aid to that end.  
We pledge not to provide Israel’s potential enemies with sophisticated offensive 
equipment that could endanger the security of Israel.   
Jerusalem should remain forever undivided, with free access to the holy 
places for people of all faiths.  We oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian 
state.   
We will not negotiate with or recognize the Palestinian liberation organization, 
unless it accepts Israel’s right to exist and UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.  It is also long 
past time for an end to all terrorism and other acts of violence against Israel.   
We have not and will not use our aid to Israel as a bargaining tool; and we 
will never permit oil policies to influence our policy towards peace or our support 
for Israel.   
As stated in our 1976 platform, the Democratic Party recognizes and supports 
“the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its 
holy places provided to all faiths.  As a symbol of this stand, the U.S. Embassy 
should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem…” 
We call upon all states in the region to support the historic efforts of Israel and 
Egypt to build a comprehensive peace.   
We believe a cooperative effort among the nations of the Middle East and the 
United States can help provide the needed assistance to Israel and her Middle East 
neighbors engaging in the peace process with Israel in the vital areas of refugee 
resettlement, agricultural development, water development, health and medical facilities, 
and productivity and trade.  A planning group should be created to pursue an effort to 
provide this type of assistance.   
The Democratic Administration will also take needed measures to protect 
American interests in the Persian Gulf, including energy security, regional stability, and 
national independence.  This will require sophisticated diplomacy as well as military 
capability.  We will seek both to counter external threats and to encourage necessary 
political and economic development.  In the end, our allies have an equal or greater 
interest than we in security of oil supply and regional stability, and the Democratic 
Administration will continue to cooperate with them in a common strategy and to share 
common burdens.   
We condemn the government of Iran for its outrageous conduct in the taking of 
our diplomatic personnel as hostages.... 
In the regional as a whole, we must end our dangerous dependence of foreign oil.  
Only in this way can our foreign policy counter effectively the pressures of OPEC and of 
Soviet power poised above the Persian Gulf in Afghanistan…..As we reduce oil 
consumption and dependence on OPEC, we will be able to bargain on equal terms with 




R (Ronald Reagan) –  
“We affirm our commitment to press the Soviet Union to implement the UNDHR 
and the Helsinki Agreements which guarantee rights such as the free interchange of 
information and the right to emigrate.  A Republican Administration will press the Soviet 
Union to end its harassment and imprisonment of those who speak in opposition to 
official policy, who seek to worship according to their religious beliefs, or who represent 
diverse ethnic minorities and nationalities.   
Republicans deplore growing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and the 
mistreatment of “refuseniks” by Soviet authorities.  The decline in exit visas to Soviet 
Jews and others seeking religious freedom and the promulgation of ever more rigorous 
conditions inhibiting their emigration is a fundamental affront to human rights and the 
U.N. Charter.  Republicans will make the subject of emigration from the Soviet Union a 
central issue in Soviet-American relations.  Human rights in the Soviet Union will not be 
ignored as it has been during the Carter Administration.  As a party to the Helsinki 
Conference Final Act, a Republican Administration will insist on full Soviet compliance 
with the humanitarian provisions of the agreement.... 
In the past three years, the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf have 
suffered an unprecedented level of political, economic, and military turmoil.  The Soviet 
Union has been prompt in turning these sources of instability of its advantage and is now 
in an excellent position to exploit the chaos in Iran and to foment similar upheavals in 
other countries in the region.  Today, the countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
are encircled as never before by Soviet advisors and troops based in the Horn of Africa, 
South Yemen, and Afghanistan.  Moreover, the Soviets have close political and military 
ties with other states in the region.   
The Soviet goal is clear B to use subversion and the threat of military intervention 
to establish a controlling influence over regions’ resource-rich states, and thereby to gain 
decisive political and economic leverage over Western and Third World nations 
vulnerable to economic coercion.  The first signs of Soviet success in this undertaking are 
already evidenced in the recent proposal by European countries to associate the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization in the West Bank autonomy talks. 
Republicans believe that the restoration of order and stability to the region must 
be premised upon an understanding of the interrelationship between Soviet and radical 
Palestinian goals, the fundamental requirements of stable economic development and 
marketing of the area’s resources, and the growing ferment among Islamic radical groups.  
Republicans believe that a wise and credible U.S. Policy must make clear that our 
foremost concern is for the long-term peaceful development of all states in the region, not 
purely a self-serving exploitation of its resources.  Our goal is to bring a just and 
lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
With respect to an ultimate peace settlement, Republicans reject any call for 
involvement of the PLO as not in keeping with the long-term interests of either 
Israel or the Palestinian Arabs.  The imputation of legitimacy to organizations not yet 
willing to acknowledge the fundamental right to existence of the State of Israel is wrong.  
Repeated indications, even when subsequently denied, of the Carter Administration’s 
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involvement with the PLO have done serious harm to the credibility of U.S. policy in the 
Middle East and have encouraged the PLO=s position of intransigence.  We believe the 
establishment of a Palestinian State on the West Bank would be destabilizing and 
harmful to the peace process.  
Our long- and short-term policies for the area must be developed in consultation 
with our NATO allies, Israel, Egypt, and other friends in the area, and we will spare no 
effort in seeking their consultation throughout the policy process, not merely demanding 
their acquiescence to our plans.   
  
The sovereignty, security, and integrity of the State of Israel is a moral imperative 
and serves the strategic interests of the United States.  Republicans reaffirm our 
fundamental and enduring commitment to this principle. We will continue to honor 
our nation’s commitment through political, economic, diplomatic, and military aid.  
We fully recognize the strategic importance of Israel and the deterrent role of its 
armed forces in the Middle East and East-West military equations.   
Republicans recognize that a just and durable peace for all nations of the region is 
the best guarantee of continued stability and is vital to deterring further Soviet inroads.  
Peace between Israel and its neighbors require direct negotiations among the states 
involved.  Accordingly, a Republicans Administration will encourage the peace process 
now in progress between Egypt and Israel, will seek to broaden it, and will welcome 
those Arab nations willing to live in peace with Israel.  We are encouraged by the support 
given to the Middle East peace process by Sudan and Oman and the progress brought 
about by the strong and effective leadership of their governments.   
We applaud the vision and the courage of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and 
we pledge to build our relationship with Egypt in cultural affairs, economic development, 
and military cooperation.   
Republicans recognize that the Carter Administration’s vacillations have left 
friend and foe alike unsure as to the United States policies.  While reemphasizing our 
commitment of Israel, a Republican Administration will pursue close ties and friendship 
with moderate Arab states.  We will initiate the economic and military framework for 
assuring long-term stability both in the internal development of regional states and 
orderly marketplace for the area=s resources.  We will make clear that any reimposition 
of an oil embargo would be viewed as a hostile act.  We will oppose discriminatory 
practices, including boycotts, and will discourage arms sales which contribute to regional 
instability. 
Republicans believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city with 




1984 D (Walter Mondale) –  
“He [President Ronald Reagan] has had as many Middle East policies as he has 
had staff turnovers.  First, he offered strategic cooperation to Israel as if it were a gift.  
Then he took it away to punish Israel as if it were not our ally.  Then he pressured Israel 
to make one-sided concessions to Jordan.  Then he demanded that Israel withdraw from 
Lebanon.  Then he pleaded with them to stay.  Then he did not accept their offer of 
medical help for our wounded Marines.  He undercut American credibility throughout the 
Middle East by declaring Lebanon a vital interest of the United States and then 
withdrawing.... 
The Democratic Party condemns continued Soviet persecution of dissidents and 
refuseniks, which may well have brought Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov and his wife to 
the verge of death in internal exile in Gorki.  We will not be silent when Soviet actions, 
such as imprisonment of Anatoly Shcharansky and Ida Nudel and thousands of others, 
demonstrate the fundamentally repressive and anti-Semitic nature of the Soviet regime.  
A Democratic Administration will give priority to securing the freedom to emigrate for 
these brave men and women of conscience, including Jews and other minorities, and to 
assuring their fair treatment while awaiting permission to leave.  These freedoms are 
guaranteed UNDHR and by the Helsinki Final Act which the Soviets have signed and 
with whose provisions they must be required to comply.  Jewish emigration, which 
reached the level of fifty thousand per year during the last Democratic Administration 
and which has virtually ended under its Republican successor, must be renewed through 
firm, effective diplomacy.  We also recognize that Jewish emigration reached its height at 
the same time there was an American Administration dedicated to pursuing arms control, 
expanding mutually beneficial trade, and reducing tensions with the Soviet Union B fully 
consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies.  It is no contradiction to 
say that while pursuing an end to the arms race and reducing East-West tensions, we can 
also advance the cause of Soviet Jewish emigration.... 
The Democratic Party believes that the security of Israel and the pursuit of 
peace in the Middle East are fundamental priorities for American foreign policy.  
Israel remains more than a trusted friend, a steady ally, and a sister democracy.  
Israel is strategically important to the United States, and we must enter into 
meaningful strategic cooperation.   
The Democratic Party opposes this Administration’s sales of highly advanced 
weaponry to avowed enemies of Israel, such as AWACS aircraft to and Stinger missiles 
to Saudi Arabia.  While helping to meet the legitimate defensive needs of states aligned 
with our nation, we must ensure Israel’s military edge over any combination of 
Middle East confrontation states.  The Democratic Party opposes any consideration 
of negotiations with the PLO, unless to PLO abandons terrorism, recognizes the 
state of Israel, and adheres to U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.   
Jerusalem should remain forever undivided with free access to the holy 
places for people of all faiths.  As stated in the 1976 and 1980 platforms, the 
Democratic Party recognizes and supports the established status of Jerusalem as the 
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capital of Israel.  As a symbol of this stand, the U.S. Embassy should be moved from 
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.   
The Democratic Party condemns this Administration’s failure to maintain a high-
level Special Negotiator for the Middle East, and believes that the Camp David peace 
process must be taken up again with urgency.  No nation in the Middle East can afford to 
wait until a new war brings even worse destruction.  Once again we applaud and support 
the example of both Israel and Egypt in taking bold steps for peace.  We believe that the 
United States should press for negotiations among Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other 
Arab states.  We reemphasize the fundamental principle that the prerequisite for a 
lasting peace in the Middle East remains an Israel with secure and defensible 
borders, strong beyond a shadow of a doubt; that the basis for peace is the 
unequivocal recognition of Israel=s right to exist by all other states, and that there 




R (Ronald Reagan) –  
“We will press Soviet compliance with all international agreements, including the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act and the UNDHR.  We will continue to protest Soviet anti-
Semitism and human rights violations.  We admire the courage of such people as Andrei 
Sakharov, his wife Yelena Boner, Anatole Shcharansky, Ida Nudel and Josef Begun, 
whose defiance of Soviet repression stands as a testament to the greatness of the human 
spirit.  We will press the Soviet Union to permit free emigration of Jews, Christians, and 
oppressed national minorities.  Finally, because the peoples of the Soviet empire share 
our hope for the future, we will strengthen our information channels to encourage them in 
their struggle for individual freedom, national self-determination, and peace.... 
President Reagan’s Middle East policy has been flexible enough to adapt to 
rapidly changing circumstances, yet consistent and credible so that all nations recognize 
our determination to protect our vital interests.... 
Lebanon is still in turmoil, despite our best efforts to foster stability in that 
unhappy country.  With the Syrian leadership increasingly subject to Soviet 
influence, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its homicidal 
subsidiaries taking up residence in Syria, U.S. policy towards the region must 
remain vigilant and strong. Republicans reaffirm that the United States should not 
recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as that organization continues to 
promote terrorism, rejects Israel=s right to exist, and refuses to accept U.N. 
Resolutions 242 and 338.   
The bedrock of that protection remains, as it has for over three decades, our 
moral and strategic relationship with Israel.  We are allies in the defense of freedom.  
Israel’s strength, coupled with United States assistance, is the main obstacle to 
Soviet domination of the region.  The Sovereignty, security, and integrity of the 
State of Israel are moral imperatives.  We pledge to help maintain Israel’s 
qualitative military edge over its adversaries.    
Today, relations between the United States and Israel are closer than ever 
before.  Under President Reagan, we have moved beyond mere words to extensive 
political, military, and diplomatic cooperation.  U.S. -Israel strategic planning groups are 
coordinating our joint defense efforts, and we are directly supporting projects to augment 
Israel’s defense industrial base.  We support the legislation pending for an Israel-U.S. 
free trade area.   
We recognize that attacks in the U.N. against Israel are thinly disguised 
attacks against the United States, for it is our shared ideals and democratic way of 
life that are their true target.  Thus, when a U.N. agency denied Israel’s right to 
participate, we withheld our financial support until that action was corrected.  And we 
have worked behind the scenes and in public in other international organization to defeat 
discriminatory attacks against our ally.   
Our determination to participate actively in the peace process begun at Camp 
David has won us support over the past four years from moderate Arab states.  Israel’s 
partner in Camp David Accords, Egypt, with American support, has been a constructive 
force for stability.  We pledge continued support to Egypt and other moderate regimes 
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against Soviet and Libyan subversion, and we look to them to contribute to our efforts 
for a long-term settlement of the region=s destructive disputes.   
We believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city with free and 
unimpeded access to all holy places by people of all faiths.... 
The Republican Party commends President Reagan for accepting the Honorary 
Chairmanship of the campaign to erect a U.S. Holocaust Memorial in Washington, D.C. 
and supports the efforts of the U.S. Holocaust Council in erecting such a museum and 





1988 D (Michael Dukakis) –  
“Deeply disturbed that the current Administration has too long abandoned 
the peace process in the Middle East and consistently undermined it in Central 
America, we believe that this country, maintaining the special relationship with 
Israel founded upon mutually shared values and strategic interests, should provide 
new leadership to deliver the promise of peace and security through negotiations 
that has been held out to Israel and its neighbors by the Camp David Accords.” 
 
R (George Bush) –  
“We call on the Soviet government to release political prisoners, allow free 
emigration for “refuseniks” and others, and introduce full religious tolerance.  Soviet 
Jews, Christians, Armenians, and other ethnic and religious groups are systematically 
persecuted, denied the right to emigrate, and prevented from freely practicing their 
religious beliefs.  The situation is intolerable, and Republicans demand an end to all of 
these discriminatory practices.... 
The foundation of our policy in the Middle East has been and must remain 
the promotion of a stable and lasting peace, recognizing our moral and strategic 
relationship with Israel.  More than any of its predecessors, the Reagan-Bush 
Administration solidified this partnership.  As a result, the relations between the United 
States and Israel are closer than ever before.   
We will continue to maintain Israel’s qualitative advantage over any 
adversary or coalition of adversaries.  
We will continue to solidify our strategic relationship with Israel by taking 
additional concrete steps to further institutionalize the partnership.  This will 
include adequate levels of security and economic assistance; continuing our meetings 
on military, political and economic cooperation and coordination; prepositioning military 
equipment; developing joint contingency plans; and increasing joint naval and air 
exercises.  The growth of the Soviet military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and along NATO’s southern flank has demonstrated the importance of developing 
and expanding the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship.   
We oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state; its establishment 
is inimical to the security interests of Israel, Jordan and the U.S.  We will not 
support the creation of any Palestinian entity that could place Israel=s security in 
jeopardy.   
Republicans will build upon the efforts of the Reagan-Bush Administration and 
work for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors based upon the following 
principles:  
A just and lasting peace is essential, urgent, and can be reaching only 
through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab nations.   
Peace treaties must be reached through direct negotiations and must never be 
imposed upon willing partners.  
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The PLO should have no role in the peace process unless it recognizes 
Israel’s right to exist, accepts UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, renounces terrorism, 
and removes language from its charter demanding Israel’s destruction. 
Under Republican leadership, the United States will explore every opportunity to 
move forward the peace process toward direct negotiations as long as the security of 
Israel is not compromised.  Much work remains to establish a climate in the Middle 
East where the legitimate rights of all parties, including the Palestinians, can be 
equitably addressed.   
We recognize that Israel votes with the United States at the United Nations more 
frequently than any other nation.  The Reagan-Bush Administration supported 
legislation mandating that if the U.N. and its agencies were to deny Israel’s right to 
participate, the United States would withhold financial support and withdraw from 
those bodies until their actions are rectified.  The Republican Party reaffirms its 
support for the recision of U.N. Resolution 3379, which equate Zionism with racism.  
Failure to repeal that resolution will justify attenuation of our support for the U.N.  
We believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city, with free and 
unimpeded access to all holy places by peoples of all faiths. 
Republicans see Egypt as a catalyst in the Arab world for advancing the cause of 
regional peace and security.  For this reason, we believe that the United States has a 
significant stake in Egypt’s continuing economic development and growth.  As the only 
Arab nation to have formally made peace with Israel, it is reaping the benefits.  Egypt’s 
support of the Camp David Accords demonstrates that an Arab nation can make peace 
with Israel, be an ally of the United States, and remain in good standing in the Arab 
world.  Republicans support the Reagan-Bush Administration’s formal designation of 




1992 Bill Clinton) –  
“Support the peace process now under way in the Middle East, rooted in the 
tradition of the Camp David Accords.  Direct negotiations between Israel, her Arab 
neighbors and Palestinians, with no imposed solutions, are the only way to achieve 
enduring security for Israel and full peace for all parties in the region.  The end of 
the Cold War does not alter America’s deep interest in our longstanding special 
relationship with Israel, based on shared values, a mutual commitment to 
democracy, and a strategic alliance that benefits both nations.  The United States 
must act effectively as an honest broker in the peace process.  It must not, as has 
been the case with this Administration, encourage one side to believe that it will 
deliver unilateral concessions from the other.  Jerusalem is the capital of the state of 
Israel and should remain an undivided city accessible to peoples of all faiths.” 
 
R (George Bush) –  
“In the Middle East, prospects for peace have been transformed by the determined 
statesmanship of George Bush.  Without the leadership of President Bush, Iraq would 
today threaten world peace, the peace and security of the Middle East, and the very 
survival of Israel with a huge conventional army and nuclear weapons.  Direct peace 
talks, on terms Israel rightly had sought for more than four decades, would not be a 
reality.  Soviet Jewish emigration likely would have been interrupted.  The rescue of 
Ethiopian Jewry might not have happened.  And the equation of Zionism to racism still 
would be a grotesque stain on the United Nations.   
Although much has changed for the better. The Middle East remains an area of 
high tensions B many unrelated to Arab-Israeli conflict B where regional conflicts can 
escalate to threaten the vital interests of the United States.  As Saddam Hussein’s 
aggression against Kuwait demonstrated, heavily armed radical regimes are capable of 
independent aggressive action.  In this environment, Israel’s demonstrated strategic 
importance to the United States, as our most reliable and capable ally in this part of 
the world, is more important than ever.  This strategic relationship, with its unique 
moral dimension, explains the understandable support Israel receives from millions 
of Americans who participate in our political process.  The strong ties between the 
U.S. and Israel were demonstrated during the Gulf War when Israel chose not to 
retaliate against repeated missile attacks, even thought they caused severe damage 
and loss of life.  We will continue to broaden and deepen the strategic relationship 
with our ally Israel B the only true democracy in the Middle East B by taking 
additional concrete steps to further institutionalize the partnership.  This will 
include maintaining adequate levels of security and economic assistance; continuing 
our meetings on military, political and economic assistance; continuing our meetings 
on military, political and economic cooperation and coordination; prepositioning 
military equipment; developing joint contingency plans; and increasing joint naval 
and air exercises. 
Consistent with our strategic relationship, the United States should continue 
to provide large-scale security assistance to Israel, maintaining Israel’s qualitative 
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advantage over any adversary or coalition of adversaries.  We will also continue to 
negotiate with the major arms supplying nations to reach an agreement on limiting arms 
sales to the Middle East and preventing the proliferation of non-conventional weapons.   
We applaud the President’s leadership in fostering unprecedented direct talks 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors.  The Untied States is prepared to use its good 
offices to mediate disputes at their request.  We do not believe the U.S. should attempt 
to impose a solution on the parties.   
The basis for negotiations must be UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.  Peace must 
come from direct negotiations.  It will be up to the negotiators to determine exactly what 
is required to satisfy these resolutions, but we firmly believe Israel has a right to exist in 
secure and recognized borders.  As President Bush stated in Madrid, our objective is not 
simply to end the state of war; rather, it is to establish real peace, one with treaties, 
security, diplomatic relations, trade investment, cultural exchange, even tourism.  We 
want the Middle East to become a place where people lead normal lives.   
A meaningful peace must assure Israel’s security while recognizing the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.  We oppose the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state.  Nor will we support the creation of any political 
entity that would jeopardize Israel=s security.  As Israelis and Palestinians negotiate 
interim self-government, no party will be required to commit itself to any specific 
final outcome of direct negotiations.  Israel should not be forced to negotiate with any 
party.  In this regard, the United States will have no dialogue until it satisfies in full the 
conditions laid out by President Bush in 1990.  We believe 
Jerusalem should remain an undivided city, with free and unimpeded access 
to all holy places by people of all faiths.  No genuine peace would deny Jews the 
right to live anywhere in the special city of Jerusalem.   
Peace in the Middle East entails cooperation between all the parties in the region.  
To this end, we have worked to bring all of the states of area together with Israel to hold 
multilateral negotiations on issues of common concern such as regional development, 
water, refugees, arms control and the environment.  We support these forums as a means 
of encouraging Arab acceptance of Israel and solving common regional problems.   
We continue to back legislation mandating that if the U.N. and its agencies 
were to deny Israel’s right to participate, the United States would withhold financial 
support and withdraw from those bodies until their action was rectified.   
Republicans believe freedom of emigration is a fundamental human right and that 
Jews from any nation should be free to travel to Israel.  Republicans are proud we have 
maintained our historic and moral commitment to the resettlement in Israel of persecuted 
Jews.  We congratulate President Bush and Secretary [of State James] Baker on the 
agreement with Israel for a generous package of loan guarantees that will provide 
new immigrants with needed humanitarian assistance.   
We also should maintain our close ties with and generous aid for Egypt, which 
properly reaps the benefits of its courageous peace with Israel.  We continue to support 
Egypt and other pro-Western states in the region against subversion and aggression and 
call for an end to the Arab boycott of Israel.... 
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We will not permit the Soviet nuclear nightmare to be replaced by another one.  
Outlaw nations -- North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and others -- lust for weapons of mass 
destruction.  This is the nightmare of proliferation:  nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons that together with ballistic missiles, can deliver death across whole continents, 
including our own.” 
 
1996 D (Bill Clinton) –  
“President Clinton has overseen a remarkable record of achievement toward 
peace and security in the Middle East B the Israeli-Palestinian accords; the peace 
agreement between Israel and Jordan; new regional security and investment summits; 
Israel’s increased acceptance throughout the Middle East and the world; the dual 
containment of Iraq and Iran.  The Democratic Party is committed to help build on 
this record, knowing that peace and security are indivisible, and supports the efforts 
by the Clinton-Gore Administration to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace 
among Israel and all its neighbors, including Lebanon and Syria.  The Democratic 
Party remains committed to America’s long-standing special relationship with 
Israel, based on shared values, a mutual commitment to democracy and a strategic 
alliance that benefits both nations.  The United States should continue to help Israel 
maintain its qualitative edge.  Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and should remain 
an undivided city accessible to people of all faiths.  We are also committed to working 
with our Arab partners for peace to build a brighter, more secure and prosperous future 
for all the people of the Middle East.  To that end, we seek to further and enhance our 
close ties with states and peoples in the Arab and Islamic world committed to non-
aggression and willing to take risks for peace.” 
 
R (Bob Dole) –  
“The Middle East remains a region vital to American security.  Our enduring 
goals there are to promote freedom and stability, secure access to oil resources, and 
maintain the security of Israel, our one democratic ally in the region with whom we 
share moral bonds and common strategic interests.  Most of the world’s oil exports 
flow from the Middle East, and thus its strategic significance remains.  But it is still the 
most volatile region in the world.  Islamic radicalism, increasing terrorism, and rogue 
states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya threaten regional international stability.   
In this environment, Israel’s demonstrated strategic importance to the U.S. 
as our most reliable capable ally in this part of the world is more critical than ever.  
That is why Israel’s security is central to U.S. interests in the region.  That is why 
Republican Administrations initiated efforts with Israel to pre-position military 
equipment, to conduct joint contingency planning and joint military exercise.  That is 
why we advocate continuing cooperation on the Arrow Missile, boost phase intercept, 
and the Nautilus programs.  That is why we look toward the greater integration of Israel 
into our regional defense planning and wish to explore ways to enhance our strategic 
cooperation.  That is why we have continued to support our full funding for aid to Israel 
despite cuts in the foreign assistance budget, and why we applaud the country’s 
commitment toward economic self-sufficiency. 
 
 -331-
We reaffirm that Republican commitment to maintain Israel’s qualitative 
military advantage over any adversary or group of adversaries.  While we fully 
support Israel=s efforts to find peace and security with its neighbors, we will judge 
the peace process by security it generates both for Israel for the United States.  In 
that context, we support Israel’s right to make its own decisions regarding security 
and boundaries.  We strongly oppose the Clinton Administration’s attempts to 
interfere in Israel’s democratic process.   
We applaud the Republican Congress for enacting legislation to recognize 
Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel.  A Republican administration will 
ensure that the U.S. Embassy is moved to Jerusalem by May, 1999.   
We honor the memory of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and express our 
support for the new government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  We applaud 
those leaders in the Arab world, President Mubarak and King Hussein, who have spoken 
courageously and acted boldly for the cause of peace.  We endorse continued assistance 
and support for countries which have made peace with Israel - led by Egypt and later 
joined by Jordan.  Republican leadership will support others who follow their example, 
while isolating terrorist states until they are fit to rejoin the community of nations.” 
 
2000  D (Al Gore) 
“Al Gore and the Democratic Party are fundamentally committed to the 
security of our ally, Israel, and the creation of a comprehensive, just, and lasting 
peace between Israel and its neighbors.  We helped broker the Israel-Jordan Peace 
Treaty, the Wye River accords, and the Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum, and will continue 
to work with all parties to make progress towards peace. Our special relationship with 
Israel is based on the unshakable foundation of shared values and a mutual 
commitment to democracy, and we will ensure that under all circumstances, Israel 
retains the qualitative military edge for its national security.  Jerusalem is the 
capital of Israel and should remain an undivided city accessible to people of all 
faiths.  In view of the government of Israel’s courageous decision to withdraw from 
Lebanon, we believe special responsibility now resides with Syria to make a contribution 
toward peace. The recently-held Camp David summit, while failing to bridge all the gaps 
between Israel and the Palestinians, demonstrated President Clinton’s resolve to do all the 
United States could do to bring an end to that long conflict. Al Gore, as president, will 
demonstrate the same resolve. We call on both parties to avoid unilateral actions, such 
as a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood, that will prejudge the outcome of 
negotiations, and we urge the parties to adhere to their joint pledge to resolve all 
differences only by good faith negotiations…. 
In light of the possibility that U.S. Forces or our allies will have to contend with 
hostile tactical range ballistic missiles, we have been working rapidly to develop anti-
tactical ballistic missile systems. We are working successfully with Israel on developing 




In the Middle East, we are promoting regional trade, particularly among Israel, 
Jordan, and Egypt. We must continue our work to reach out to moderate Arab states and 
we must intensify our effort to foster closer ties to the Islamic World.” 
 
R (George W. Bush) 
“In the Middle East, the advancement of U.S. national interests requires 
clear and consistent priorities as well as close cooperation with America’s friends 
and allies. We have four priorities for the Middle East. First, we seek to promote 
and maintain peace throughout the region. Second, we must ensure that Israel 
remains safe and secure. Third, we must protect our economic interests and ensure 
the reliable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. And fourth, we must reduce the threat 
of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Because America cannot achieve these 
objectives by acting alone, U.S. policy must rest on leadership that can build strong 
coalitions of like-minded states and hold them together to achieve common aims.  
As American influence declined during the current administration, the OPEC 
cartel drove up the price of oil. Anti-Americanism among the Arab people redoubled. 
Iran continued to sponsor international terrorism, oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
and pursue nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile capabilities with extensive foreign 
assistance. America’s closest allies expanded their political and economic relations with 
Iran. A Republican president will work to reverse these damaging trends.                                                        
      
It is important for the United States to support and honor Israel, the only 
true democracy in the Middle East. We will ensure that Israel maintains a 
qualitative edge in defensive technology over any potential adversaries. We will not 
pick sides in Israeli elections. The United States has a moral and legal obligation to 
maintain its Embassy and Ambassador in Jerusalem. Immediately upon taking 
office, the next Republican president will begin the process of moving the U.S. 
Embassy from Tel Aviv to Israel’s capital, Jerusalem.   
The United States seeks a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle 
East. America can use its prestige to encourage discussions and negotiations. But peace 
must be negotiated between the parties themselves. We will not impose our view or an 
artificial timetable. At the heart of the peace process is the commitment to resolve all 
issues through negotiation. A unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Palestinians would be a violation of that commitment. A new Republican 
administration would oppose any such declaration. It will also do everything possible 
to promote the conclusion of a genuine peace in the Middle East. While we have hopes 
for the peace process, our commitment to the security of Israel is an overriding 
moral and strategic concern….        
Republicans endorse continued assistance and support for countries that have 
made peace with Israel — led by Egypt and Jordan. We appreciate the significant 
contributions by Jordan to our common struggle against terrorism, and will take steps to 
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bolster relations with Amman including negotiating a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.  
  
The next Republican administration will use its diplomatic influence to put 
an end to a pattern of discrimination that persists at the United Nations in denying 
committee assignments to Israel. It will do the likewise at the International Red 
Cross which refuses to accredit the symbol of Magen David Adom,  Israel’s 
equivalent of the Red Cross.” 
 
2004 D (John Kerry) 
“The Democratic Party is fundamentally committed to the security of our 
ally Israel and the creation of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace between 
Israel and her neighbors. Our special relationship with Israel is based on the 
unshakable foundation of shared values and a mutual commitment to democracy, 
and we will ensure that under all circumstances, Israel retains the qualitative edge 
for its national security and its right to self-defense. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel 
and should remain an undivided city accessible to people of all faiths.  Under a 
Democratic Administration, the United States will demonstrate the kind of resolve 
to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that President Clinton showed. We will work to 
transform the Palestinian Authority by promoting new and responsible leadership, 
committed to fighting terror and promoting democracy. We support the creation of a 
democratic Palestinian state dedicated to living in peace and security side by side 
with the Jewish State of Israel. The creation of a Palestinian state should resolve the 
issue of Palestinian refugees by allowing them to settle there, rather than in Israel. 
Furthermore, all understand that it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status 
negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949. And we 
understand that all final status negotiations must be mutually agreed. “ 
 
 R (George W. Bush) 
We applaud President Bush and the Republican Congress for working to end 
the unacceptable discrimination against Israel at the United Nations, by that 
institution’s denying committee assignments to Israel. We welcome Israel’s 
membership in the Western European and Others Group at the United Nations 
headquarters and urge its full acceptance at other United Nations venues. We 
support adoption of bipartisan legislation to withhold the annual headquarters 
contribution made by the U.S. Department of State to the International Committee 
of the Red Cross if Magen David Adom is not given the opportunity to participate 
fully in the activities of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement…. 
     
Republicans endorse continued assistance and support for countries that have 
made peace with Israel – led by Egypt and Jordan. We applaud the actions of President 
Bush and the Republican Congress to provide both nations with new grants and loan 
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guarantees to promote economic reform measures…..     
  
The Republican Party shares President Bush’s commitment to the security of 
America’s democratic ally Israel and the safety of the Israeli people. We remain 
committed to ensuring that Israel maintains a qualitative edge in defensive 
technology over any potential adversaries.        
We believe that terror attacks against Israelis are part of the same evil as the 
September 11, 2001, attacks against America. We recognize Israel’s right to defend itself 
in the face of homicide bombings and other attacks against the people of Israel.   
           
We are very concerned about the escalation of anti-Semitic violence worldwide, 
including in Europe. This violence has included physical assaults, use of weapons, arson 
of synagogues, and desecration of Jewish cemeteries and statues. We are proud of 
President Bush’s outspoken condemnation of anti-Semitism. We share his conviction that 
anti-Semitism poisons public debates within democratic nations and that mankind must 
come together to fight such dark impulses.        
      We support President Bush’s vision of two 
states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. However, as he 
observed in his remarks of June 24, 2002, for such a vision to become a reality, 
Palestinians need a new leadership, not compromised by terror. Like all other people, 
Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. If 
Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly 
reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state. 
The Bush Administration has been clear about the obligations of Arab nations in 
achieving peace in the Middle East.       
Republicans agree with President Bush that Israel’s plan to remove all 
settlements from Gaza and several settlements from the West Bank is a courageous 
step toward peace in the face of continuing terrorist violence. This initiative can 
stimulate progress toward peace as laid out in the Road Map launched by President 
Bush.  Republicans commend the government of Israel for its desire to pursue peace, 
even in the face of continuing terrorist attacks. This is demonstrated by steps Israel has 
taken, such as removing unauthorized outposts and improving the humanitarian situation 
by easing restrictions on the movement of Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities. 
Republicans agree with President Bush’s assessment that an agreed, just, 
fair, and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue, as part 
of any final status agreement, will need to be found through the establishment of a 
Palestinian state and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel. 
We also share the President’s view that as part of a final peace settlement, it is unrealistic 
to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to 
the armistice lines of 1949. All previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have 
reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will 
only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities. 
Republicans continue to support moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Israel’s 
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Key phrases on the nature of the U.S.-Israel Relationship as excerpted 
from Democratic and Republic political platforms, 1948-2004 
 
Year Democrats Republicans 
1948 “recognition of Israel” “full recognition”
1952 “continued assistance” “friendly interest”
1956 “selling or supply defensive weapons to Israel, and will take such steps, 
including security guarantees, as may be required” 
“We regard the preservation of Israel as an important tenet of 
American foreign policy” 
1960 “insure independence for all states” “integrity and independence of all states”
1964 “territorial integrity of every nation respected” “maintain stability in this region” 
1968 “We will assist her [Israel] with essential military equipment needed for 
her defense” 
“We will pursue a stable peace through recognition by all nations of a 
stable peace through recognition of all nations of each other’s right to 
assured boundaries” 
1972 “unequivocally committed to support Israel’s right to exist” “We support the right of Israel and its courageous people to survive 
and prosper in peace” 
1976 “The cornerstone of our policy is a firm commitment to the 
independence and security of the State of Israel.” 
“Our commitment to Israel is fundamental and enduring”
1980 “Our nation feels a profound moral obligation to sustain and assure the 
security of Israel.  That is why our relationship with Israel, in most 
respects, a unique one.  Israel is the single democracy, the most stable 
government, the most strategic asset and our closest ally in the region. ” 
“The sovereignty, security, and integrity of the State of Israel is a 
moral imperative and serves the strategic interests of the United 
States.  Republicans reaffirm our fundamental and enduring 
commitment to this principle” 
1984 “The Democratic Party believes that the security of Israel and the 
pursuit of peace in the Middle East are fundamental priorities for 
American foreign policy.  Israel remains more than a trusted friend, a 
steady ally and a sister democracy.” 
“The bedrock of that protection remains, as it has for over three 
decades, our moral and strategic relationship with Israel.  We are 
allies in the defense of freedom…  The sovereignty, security, and 
integrity of the State of Israel are moral imperatives.”
1988 “We believe that this country, maintaining the special relationship with 
Israel founded upon mutually shared values and strategic interests” 
“The foundation of our policy in the Middle East has been and must 
remain the promotion of a stable and lasting peace, recognizing our 
moral and strategic relationship with Israel.” 
1992 “The end of the Cold War does not alter America’s deep interest in our 
longstanding special relationship with Israel, based on shared values, a 
mutual commitment to democracy, and a strategic alliance that benefits 
both nations.” 
“In this environment, Israel’s demonstrated strategic importance to 
the United States, as our most reliable and capable ally in this part of 
the world, is more important than ever.  This strategic relationship, 
with its unique moral dimension, explains the understandable support 
Israel receives from millions of Americans who participate in our 
political process. “  
1996 “The Democratic Party remains committed to America’s long-standing 
special relationship with Israel, based on shared values, a mutual 
commitment to democracy and a strategic alliance that benefits both 
nations.” 
“…maintain the security of Israel, our one democratic ally in the 
region with whom we share moral bonds and common strategic 
interests. “ 
2000 “….fundamentally committed to the security of our ally, Israel….Our 
special relationship with Israel is based on the unshakable foundation of 
shared values and a mutual commitment to democracy….”  
“…we must ensure that Israel remains safe and 
secure.… It is important for the United States to 
support and honor Israel, the only true democracy in 
the Middle East.” 
2004 “The Democratic Party is fundamentally committed to the security of 
our ally Israel….Our special relationship with Israel is based on the 
unshakable foundation of shared values and a mutual commitment to 
democracy, and we will ensure that under all circumstances, Israel 
retains the qualitative edge for its national security and its right to self-
defense.” 
“The Republican Party shares President Bush’s commitment to the 
security of America’s democratic ally Israel and the safety of the 
Israeli people. We remain committed to ensuring that Israel maintains 





Appendix G:  Statistical Analysis of U.S. House Voting Record by State 
 


























WA 23.5  53.6% 9 67% 27.8% 43,000 5,908,000 0.73%
OR 22.8  52.1% 5 80% 66.7% 32,000 3,429,000 0.93%
MA 20.3  54.6% 10 100% 70.7% 275,000 6,357,000 4.33%
MN 20.1  51.8% 8 50% 50.0% 42,000 4,931,000 0.85%
MI 18.2  51.7% 15 40% 26.1% 110,000 9,952,000 1.11%
WI 15.7  50.2% 8 50% 40.0% 28,000 5,372,000 0.52%
CA 14.0  55.0% 52 63% 78.8% 999,000 34,000,000 2.94%
OH 10.9  48.9% 18 33% 48.5% 149,000 11,360,000 1.31%
IL 8.2  55.2% 19 53% 68.3% 270,000 12,436,000 2.17%
NC 7.4  43.8% 13 46% 5.9% 26,500 8,077,000 0.33%
MD 3.9  56.6% 8 75% 138.9% 213,000 5,311,000 4.01%
MS 1.8  40.5% 4 50% 0.0% 1,500 2,849,000 0.05%
LA 1.5  42.7% 7 29% 25.0% 16,000 4,470,000 0.36%
PA 0.1  51.3% 19 37% 50.0% 282,000 12,283,000 2.30%
KS 0.1  37.1% 4 25% 33.3% 14,000 2,692,000 0.52%
MO (0.4) 46.4% 9 44% 35.7% 62,500 5,603,000 1.12%
CT (1.5) 55.3% 5 40% 90.9% 111,000 3,410,000 3.26%
TX (2.2) 38.5% 32 34% 23.1% 131,000 20,947,000 0.63%
SC (3.6) 41.4% 6 33% 11.1% 11,500 4,023,000 0.29%
VA (4.3) 45.9% 11 27% 23.8% 66,000 7,104,000 0.93%
AR (4.5) 45.1% 4 75% 0.0% 1,700 2,678,000 0.06%
AZ (6.5) 44.7% 8 25% 40.0% 81,500 5,165,000 1.58%
KY (6.7) 40.0% 6 17% 16.7% 11,500 4,047,000 0.28%
CO (8.7) 47.6% 7 43% 50.0% 73,000 4,323,000 1.69%
IN (9.0) 39.6% 9 22% 17.6% 17,500 6,090,000 0.29%
IA (9.9) 49.7% 5 20% 12.5% 6,100 2,928,000 0.21%
NY (10.0) 59.3% 29 69% 193.9% 1,657,000 18,990,000 8.73%
AL (10.4) 37.1% 7 29% 11.1% 9,000 4,451,000 0.20%
NJ (12.0) 53.4% 12 50% 125.0% 485,000 8,429,000 5.75%
GA (13.0) 41.6% 13 46% 41.2% 93,500 8,230,000 1.14%
OK (15.1) 34.4% 5 20% 0.0% 5,000 3,453,000 0.14%
FL (18.9) 47.5% 25 28% 64.9% 620,000 16,054,000 3.86%
TN (22.5) 42.8% 9 56% 75.0% 18,000 5,702,000 0.32%
 
Analysis based on Congressional voting records in the 108th (2003-2005) and 109th (2005-
2007) Congresses in the U.S. House of Representatives.  This chart only includes the 33 
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largest states with 4 or more members of the U.S. House.  A high average in the 2nd 
column is indicative of support for policies that are supportive of Middle East peace, 
while a low average is indicative of support for policies that support AIPAC’s policies 
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